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VASUBANDHU ON THE *AVIJNAPTI-RŪPA*: A STUDY IN FIFTH-CENTURY ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

Thomas Lee Dowling

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ABSTRACT

VASUBANDHU ON THE AVIJÑAPTI-RŪPA: A STUDY IN FIFTH-CENTURY ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

THOMAS LEE DOWLING

The main focus of this study is on a fifth-century controversy between two Sanskrit schools of Abhidharma Buddhism -- the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika -- concerning the mechanism whereby the principle of karma is effected for the individual. The locus of this controversy is the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu (ca. 390-410 -- 470-490 A.D.) In addition to treating the necessary historical developments appropriate to these schools and the life of the author of the text, a translation of and commentary on the first 23 kārikās and Bhāṣya of the fourth chapter of the text is presented. These verses and commentary by Vasubandhu treat the *vijñapti* and *avijñapti-rūpas* postulated by the Vaibhāṣika school of the Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition and subject them to a critique from the Sautrāntika perspective. Thus, in addition to presenting the controversial Vaibhāṣika material in English translation for the first time, the study also provides a concrete introduction to the doctrinal matters about which these two schools disagreed.

An ever recurring theme in the Kośa is the Vaibhāṣika attempt to establish a substantial *dharma* that will account for endurance of karmic efficacy within the phenomenal

individual. Among the theoretical entities postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas for the purpose of explaining the continuation of karmic efficacy were *prāpti* and *aprāpti*, the *avijñapti-rūpa* and *anuśaya*. Vasubandhu subjects each of these to a critique from the Sautrāntika perspective, a position characterizable by reverence for the Sūtras of the Sanskrit canon coupled with a highly critical mind. The essence of Vasubandhu's alternative model for the explanation of the mechanism whereby the karmic principle is effected is the image of the *bīja* or seed and its functional counterpart, the subtle and distinct transformation of the stream of consciousness (*sukṣma santāna-pariṇama-viseṣa*). These are further reducible to the five personality aggregates.

The section of the Kośa translated in this study centers on what is perhaps the most representative Vaibhāṣika entity and captures the flavor of both the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika perspectives. The significance of the Kośa [illegible] a representative of the critical thought displayed in later Ab[illegible]dharma thought cannot be underestimated. The postulation of *prajñapti* (designational) *dharmas* and the reduction of the number of 'reals' in the descriptive system of the Vaibhāṣikas characterize the Sautrāntika posture as it is found in the Kośa and call into question many of the reductive treatments of Abhidharma to be found in western language Buddhist studies. In order to demonstrate the integrity and centrality of this critical dimension of the Abhidharma traditions and place the debate within the context of Indian Buddhism as a whole,

materials from the Pali Abhidhamma tradition are referred to throughout the study and in the final comparative chapter.

The final chapter also treats the employments of the seed image in Vasubandhu's Mahāyāna writings as well as the radically new meaning of the term _vijñapti_ in the Vijñapti-mātra school of Buddhism. The identity of the Vasubandhu who wrote the Abhidharmakośa and the (half) brother converted to the Mahāyāna by Asaṅga is established and maintained throughout the study. The similarity of the terminological matrices in both the Kośa and the Mahāyāna works of Vasubandhu supports this identity.

In conclusion, the study stresses the need for a more discriminating appraisal of Abhidharma thought--an appraisal that recognizes the soteriological intentions that inform the texts and the centrality of refined descriptive systems to the Buddhist tradition.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABBREVIATIONS

BAM - Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter.

ASBM - Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript

BSI - Nalinaksha Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India

CPB - T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism

DTCVS Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Development of the Theory of Citta Viprayukta Saṃskāras," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

EBP - Junjiro Tatakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy.

IB - A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism.

OALS - Junjiro Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvastivadins," Journal of the Pali Text Society.

LVP - Junjiro Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569)."

STB - Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

CCB - T. Scherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism.

L'AK - Louis de La Vallee Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa du Vasubandhu.

OTTV - Padmanabh S. Jaini, "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

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INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, TRANSLATIONAL PROBLEMS, AND SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTENT OF THE TEXT

Methodological Perspective

If a given religion is to provide an ultimate nomic[1] structure within which discrete bits of human experience are to be integrated, then it is imperative that there be a high degree of consensus regarding two fundamental pillars of that structure--orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Historical conceptions of orthodoxy and orthopraxis vary both in terms of rigidity and complexity. They are subject to the same vicissitudes as all other humanly created products; like all compounded things, they are impermanent. Nonetheless, at a given moment in a given religious tradition, the overall plausibility of the meaning structures created thereby is enhanced to the degree that there is general agreement about the basic elements of those structures. Different degrees of practical involvement and doctrinal sophistication will require varying degrees of speculative complexity and theoretical elaboration. As Berger has put it:

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[1] Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 19-24.

> The illiterate peasant who comments upon the death of a child by referring to the will of God is engaging in theodicy as much as the learned theologian who writes a treatise to demonstrate that the suffering of the innocent does not negate the conception of a God both all-good and all-powerful.[2]

And, while granting that there are differing standards of orthodoxy and orthopraxis applicable to different levels of religious involvement (particularly along lines of a lay/monastic dichotomy), the point must be made that the cognitive and normative stakes involved are equally high for all parties involved. The Indian Buddhist tradition is notable for the emphasis that it places on the need for the correct view of experience. Orthodoxy within this tradition was usually determined in reference to Sūtra (Sutta), although variant canons were extant. This body of teachings provided a structure the functional equivalent of which is nothing less than the 'Center' so widely documented in archaic religions and so superbly treated by Eliade and others.[3] The universal yearning for this 'Center' manifests itself in the text under consideration in a highly abstract and philosophical vein and with reference to correct conceptualization.

The historical forces operative on religious traditions result in differing emphases on what we have termed two

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[2]Berger, The Sacred Canopy . . ., p. 53.

[3]Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1959), passim; Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return or Cosmos and History, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), passim; Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 17-27.

fundamental pillars of the ultimate nomic structure of a given tradition. For example, O'Flaherty, in an article titled "The Origin of Heresy in Hindu Mythology,"[4] points out that lapses in purity of practice (violation of caste dietary restrictions especially) unleashed the demon heresy into the orthodox Brahmanic cosmos on several crucial occasions. Without minimizing the importance of orthodoxy on the conceptual level, the point could be made that the Brahmanic/Hindu tradition did place much emphasis on orthopraxis.

And, while not denying the emphasis on purity in practice to be found in Buddhism the point can be made that this tradition placed much emphasis on orthodoxy--samyag-dṛṣṭi or right view in a non-specific sense. Buddhist tradition records schisms in the order arising from disagreement about both forms of propriety.[5] We are concerned here with a particular moment in the history of Indian Buddhism--a moment that places total emphasis on orthodoxy and reformation on an intensely abstract and philosophical level. The complex and abstract nature of the material notwithstanding, the basic dynamic of revitalization and the establishment of a 'center' (albeit, an abstract one) is still present. The fact that Vasubandhu seeks to develop a firm existential

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[4]Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, "The Origin of Heresy in Hindu Mythology," History of Religions 10, no. 4 (May, 1971), 273-333.

[5]Charles S. Prebish, "A Review of the Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils," The Journal of Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (February, 1974), 239-354.

posture in the sacred mode on such an abstract level merely demonstrates the omnipresence of man's need to organize his experience into ultimately nomic patterns.

Revitalization of religious and cultural tradition by individuals of particular genius is a widely documented phenomenon in the history of religions.[6] Buddhism, as a revitalization of certain strains of pan-Indian spirituality arose out of the experiences of one such genius--the Buddha. The reformulation[7] of Buddhist tradition by Nagārjuna is but one more example of the revitalization motif. This study attempts to demonstrate that the same revitalizing motivation informs the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. Unlike Nagārjuna, however, Vasubandhu is not so much concerned with a reformulation of Buddhist doctrine as with reform within it and a return to canonical terms of exposition and conceptualization. It is highly appropriate that a basic dynamic in the history of religions--the yearning for the 'center' and the nomos of cognitive and normative purity--should manifest itself in Buddhism on an almost purely theoretical level. In a tradition which emphasizes the degree to which we are entrapped by our very views of experience, reform on the level of theory is of no small significance. Thus, while the material itself is highly

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[6]See, for example, Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), passim; Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for their Comparative Study," American Anthropologist 58 (1956 b), 264-81.

[7]Streng, Emptiness . . ., p. 19.

abstract, it is hoped that the implications thereof as a document in the history of the Buddhist tradition and religions in general will not be lost sight of.

The soteriological intention that informs the material of this study cannot be overestimated. This material is drawn from the Buddhist Abhidharma tradition in general and portions of the Abhidharmkośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu--a highly important text within that tradition--in particular. One way of conceptualizing the abhidharma enterprise is to see it as an attempt to elaborate an enormous cognitive and interpretive edifice in terms of which the turmoil of human experience can be reduced and eventually overcome. Thus, whatever the degree of complexity and abstraction, the goal thereof is a salvational one. Such is the form of the material to be dealt with. The content is equally important. The portion of the Kośa under consideration concerns the theoretical explanation of the mechanism whereby karmic continuity is maintained in an individual's stream of consciousness. The notion of a principle of karmic retribution is certainly one of the key elements in the entire Buddhist tradition. The centrality of the principle of karmic retribution within the Buddhist tradition cannot be underestimated--nor can the need for an intelligible and consistent vocabulary for describing the mechanism whereby that principle works.

Hence, both the form and the content of the material lend themselves to analysis in terms of basic dynamics in

the history of religions. Among these dynamics, we have mentioned the following: the fundamental chaos/cosmos dichotomy manifested in terms of heterodoxy/orthodoxy and heteropraxis/orthopraxis, reformation, reformulation and revitalization. These themes will be elaborated at greater length throughout the study.

Translational Problems

A large part of the study is a translation of the Sanskrit text of the Kośa. Hence, the following remarks are in order. In addition to the usual problems that confront the translator, there are a few that seem unique to this text. In form the text is an exposition of the views of one school of thought that are in turn often criticized from the standpoint of another. Thus, the text is generally regarded as an accurate rendering of the positions of the Vaibhāṣika (Expositer or Unpacker) School while its author is ultimately committed to another--the Sautrāntika--orientation. One is justified in assuming partiality of the author thereof for the opinions of the latter and the possibility that the views of the former school may not be presented in the most favorable light. Preliminary investigations into other texts of the Vaibhāṣikas, however, would indicate that this is not the case.[8] But, even if the

[8]See Padmanabh S. Jaini, ed., The Abhidharma Dipa with the Vibhasa-prabha-vrtti (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959), intro. and passim; also, the painstaking cross references to the Mahā Vibhāsa and other Vaibhāsika texts in Louis de La Vallee Poussin, trans., L'Abhidharmakośa

objectivity of the author of the text be proven, there is still the acquired partiality of the translator in favor of the view of the Sautrāntika School. After over four years of involvement with the two positions and keeping in mind that Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika) generally has the last word in a given argument, I must admit to being captured by the Sautrāntika perspective. I have come to see the various issues from the Sautrāntika side. This will be evident throughout the study. Vasubandhu's reverence for mutually accepted Sūtras coupled with his critical spirit and expositional skill distinguish him as one of the truly great figures in the Indian Buddhist tradition. If this study is successful, hopefully some of his genius and centrality to the tradition will be demonstrated.

Less specific but equally important translational problems also exist. The text is an Abhidharma work and as such presents a highly specialized vocabulary. The French translation of the Sanskrit fragments, Tibetan and Chinese versions, by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, utilized the convention of leaving many of the Sanskrit terms untranslated after acquainting the reader with possible translational equivalents and painstaking cross references to other contexts in which the terms function. I chose to attempt English translational equivalents whenever possible. Particularly specialized terms and the rationale for their

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de Vasubandhu, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, 16 (Brussels: Institut Belge des Haute Etudes Chinois, 1971), passim.

respective translational equivalents are indicated in introductory material or footnotes.

Significance and Content of the Study

The study focuses on several controversies in the Abhidharmakośa concerning the mechanism whereby certain aspects of the karma process are maintained. Primarily between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition, the controversies deal with several theoretical entities put forth by the two schools in order to account for karmic or retributional continuity between thoughts, volitions, deeds, and fruits. Among the theoretical entities proposed by the Vaibhāṣika school are: *prāpti* and *aprāpti* (reach and non-reach), the *avijñapti-rūpa* (non-indicational form) and the concepts of *anuśaya* and *paryavasthāna* (residue and emergence or outburst of defilement). These entities are subjected to a critique from the Sautrāntika perspective by Vasubandhu, reduced from substantial (*dravya*) status to designational (*prajñapti*) status, and ultimately replaced by Vasubandhu's theory of *bījas* (seeds). The doctrinal significance of these apparently nominal disputes will be brought out in the course of the study, primarily in the third chapter of this work, which consists of an introduction to and commentary on the translated material.

I intend to demonstrate the following:

1. Debate about the mechanism whereby karmic continuity is effected within the momentarily arising and passing

away stream of consciousness is one of the underlying themes to be found in the Kośa. Moreover, many similar controversies are to be found in Pali materials, specifically, in the Kathā Vatthu and other Abhidhamma works. To follow these discussions is to gain access to the manner in which highly critical minds operationalized and made intelligible an ethical posture of the utmost significance in all of Indian Buddhism.

2. While the quality of adopting a 'critical approach' to the dharma level of analysis of human experience is generally reserved to Nagārjuna, the Mādhyamika school and its Western translators and exponents, the Kośa in general and the portions thereof dealt with in this study depict Vasubandhu as an equally critical figure in Indian Buddhism. It will be pointed out, however, that Vasubandhu's critical approach is one devoted to reform rather than reformulation.

3. Despite the difficulties to be overcome in adequately describing the mechanism of karmic continuity, Vasubandhu does offer us a 'vocabulary' equal to the task. Moreover, this description or vocabulary is one that is both self-consistent and in harmony with basic and traditional Buddhist notions and constructs.

In order to demonstrate these points a brief historical account of the schools and the issues that generated the controversies between them is given. This historical backdrop is developed in the first two chapters of the work.

The third chapter of the study introduces us to the specifics of the controversies and naturally unfolds into a commentary on the translation which makes up the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter provides a comparative view of two of the terms crucial to the argument--the *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* rūpas--as they functioned in three discrete moments in the Buddhist tradition in India. With this in mind, let us proceed to the historical material without which a full appreciation of the text is impossible.

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKA AND SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOLS

Prior to undertaking an analysis of the text so as to demonstrate the above-outlined points, a systematic and thorough account should be given of the historical and doctrinal framework for the controversy. This aspect of the study requires looking into one of the most complex areas of Indian Buddhism--the origins of the many sects or schools of Buddhism in the subcontinent. Nor is this aspect of the study the only one that touches on especially problematic areas within Indian Buddhism. The controversial question of the life and career of Vasubandhu must also be settled. This, too, is a highly debated matter, marked by disagreement, even with reference to the principle source, Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu.[1] The last major area of a problematic nature (over and above the translation and analysis of the text itself) has to do with basic Buddhist categories, the _dharmas_. Vasubandhu's repeated criticism of many of the purported _dharmas_ of the Vaibhāṣika School and his reduction of them to the level of designations (_prajñapti_) raises the rather weighty question of what, then,

[1] J. Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569)," _T'oung Pao_, Ser. 2, 5

constitutes a real or substantial (dravya) dharma. This will be dealt with in the commentary on the text.

With all of the above in mind, let us proceed to discuss the text itself and its historical and doctrinal setting. The Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu (hereafter referred to as the Kośa) is widely regarded as the authoritative summary of Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition.[2] The text is further held to represent faithfully and completely the views of the Vaibhāṣikas, a school of Sanskrit Abhidharma that is generally regarded as the orthodox exegetical and commentarial heir of the Sarvāstivādin tradition.[3] But, in addition to the exposition of Vaibhāṣika views on the Abhidharma, the text also adopts the critical Sautrāntika approach to the Vaibhāṣika position.[4] The dual nature of the text, i.e., the exposition of Vaibhāṣika, other Buddhist and non-Buddhist positions on the one hand and Vasubandhu's own Sautrāntika allegiances on the other, make the text an exceptionally rich source for the study of the Sanskrit Abhidharma. Indeed, there is widespread agreement among the

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[2]T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 68; E. Lamotte, trans., "Le Traite de la Demonstration de l'Acte (Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa)," Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 4 (1936), p. 256.

[3]Murti, CPB, p. 68; Junjiro Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvastivadins," Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1905, p. 76; Kośa, VIII, Kā. 40, Bhāsya and sub com.; Kośa, I, Kā. 3, Bhāsya and sub com.

[4]de La Vallee Poussin, L'AK, I, pp. xi-xii; Murti, CPB, p. 68 and p. 68, n. 3.

various Indian and Non-Indian schools that the Kośa is indispensable for a complete study of Buddhist doctrine.[5]

Perhaps the first date to which we can refer with some degree of certainty in an effort to establish the historical evolution of the Sarvāstivādin school, the general tradition from which the Kośa arose, is ca. 250 B.C.[6] Most authorities agree that the split from the Theravādin school was made official at the Council held at Pāṭaliputra, called during the seventeenth year of the reign of Aśoka.[7] No less an authority than Bareau[8] sees this council as the one that separated the Sarvāstivādins from the Sthaviravādins. Takakusu suggests that the Sarvāstivādins "were closely allied with the Theravāda school, from which they separated, probably before the Buddhist council held during King Asoka's reign (ca. 250 B.C.).[9] Another authority for this date is Buddhaghosa, the famous Pali commentator.[10] While Dutt

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[5]Murti, CPB, p. 69; Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 63.

[6]Takakusu, OALS, pp. 68-69; Nalinaksana Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), pp. 135-40; A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970), pp. 272-74.

[7]See note 6 and Takakusu, EBP, pp. 58-59.

[8]Andre Bareau, Les Premiers Conciles Bouddhiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), pp. 115-18; Andre Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule (Paris: Publications de l'Ecole Française d' Extreme-Orient, 1956), p. 33.

[9]Takakusu, EBP, pp. 58-59.

[10]Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., Points of Controversy or Subjects of Discourse: being a Translation of the Kathā-Vatthu (London: Pali Text Society, 1960), p. xxx.

dissents from the view that the Sarvāstivādins split directly off from the Theravādins,[11] we may still regard this split as officially sealed by the Pāṭaliputra council. The references to the Sabbathivādins in the Kathā Vatthu, the traditionally regarded record of that council, historically fix what may have indeed been an evolving set of doctrinal divergences, adhered to by an unknown percentage of the community in one or more monasteries.

The Sarvāstivādin school takes its name from the assertion '*Sarvam asti*' (Pali: *sabbam atthi*), which translates as 'All (or, everything) exists (or, is).' The Theravādin party in the Kathā Vatthu takes the Sarvāstivādin to task for this assertion. The significance of the Sarvāstivādin position on the existence of the *dharmas* in the past and future as well as in the present for this study will be dealt with in the third chapter.

At present it should be pointed out that the dispute was based on, in some more or less distinct fashion, the ontological status of the *dharmas* as categories into which the world can be meaningly analyzed and as specific natures as they effect the karmic continuity within an individual stream of consciousness. It will be seen that a full examination of the several Vaibhāṣika attempts to establish an explanation for the phenomenon of karmic continuity, a link-up between thought, deed, and fruit, leads to the question

[11] Dutt, BSI, p. 129.

of the manner in which past natures can be said to exert causal efficacy.

Both the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin accounts agree that such a council was held. However, the events that follow the council are depicted differently in the two traditions. Both traditions claim some degree of favor from Aśoka following the council.[12] Thus, while Pali tradition has Moggaliputta Tissa as Aśoka's adviser in matters Buddhist,[13] the Sarvāstivādin tradition assigns that role to Upagupta.[14]

The thrust of the Theravādin account is that after the council, wherein the doctrine of '*sarvāstivāda*' was refuted, a new era in the propagation of Buddhism began. The accounts do not refer to the Council as highlighting a schism. Rather, the council records the affair "as the expulsion of persons who were not Buddhists, followers of other sects who had joined the Favored community. They were expelled not for reasons of discipline but for holding false (non-Buddhist) opinions about metaphysical questions."[15] Further, they credit Majjhantika with having spread Buddhism throughout India. The Sarvāstivādins, too, claim a Madhyāntika as a teacher in their tradition.[16] It is clear that

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[12]Warder, IB, pp. 272-74.

[13]Ibid., p. 301.

[14]Ibid., p. 273.

[15]Ibid., p. 274.

[16]Dutt, BSI, p. 137.

such contradictory treatments of the same material in the two traditions allow us to treat the Council as the crucial point in time for the development of the Sarvāstivāda tradition. We can assume that, far from allowing themselves to be reduced to the status of laymen, this (probably sizeable?) group simply went elsewhere. Warder offers a probable line of interpretation for the material in question:

> . . . in fact the expelled monks evaded reduction to the laity by retiring to a remote part of the empire and continuing their own community there. As they had themselves formed part of the united Sthaviravāda school favored by Aśoka earlier in his reign they preserved a tradition that it was a monk of their own school, Upagupta, whom the Emperor was guided by in his good work of popularising Buddhism. The Orthodox Sthaviravādins on the other hand have, according to Eggermont, invented an apochryphal 'third rehearsal,' reaffirming their perfect orthodoxy and continuity, and at the same time backdated it to a time of the mission to Ceylon and made their school in the island stem directly from this orthodox rehearsal.[17]

Leaving aside the question of whether Majjhāntika/ Madhyantika carried the Sthaviravādin or Sarvāstivādin message on his missions, it can be said that as time goes on (200 B.C.-) the Sarvāstivādins become the dominant Sanskrit, non-Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition on the subcontinent.[18] Centers of Sarvāstivādin activity include: Mathurā, Gandhāra, Kashmir, Kaśgar, Udyāna, the Northern frontier, Kanoj, Rajagṛha, Persia, parts of East India, Sumatra, Java, Champa and Cochin China.[19]

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[17] Warder, IB, p. 274.

[18] Takakusu, EBP, p. 58.

[19] Takakusu, OALS, p. 71.

Once the split was effected, independent development followed. The school became the dominant Abhidharma School of Indian Buddhism. That is, when later writers refer to the Abhidharma they refer to some version of Sarvāstivāda, usually the Vaibhāṣika, if the reference is specific.

Keeping in mind the theoretical nature of the split with the Theravādins, it is not surprising that the Sarvāstivadins would develop their own unique Abhidharma material. And, while it is important to keep the independent nature of this development in mind, it is also instructive to note the similar developments in the general area of Abhidharma (Pali: Abhidhamma) that occurred in the Ceylonese tradition.[20] Among the areas of common concern are the Citta-viprayukta samskāras (motivational forces not associated with thoughts), the relationship between latent or dormant defilement (anuśaya, Skt., anusaya, Pali) and their emergences into consciousness (paryavasthāna, Skt., pariyuṭṭhāna, Pali).[21]

In Kashmir, the major seat of activity, the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma works became elaborated in a system

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[20] See Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Ceylon: Department of Cultural Affairs, 1967), passim; Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Development of the Theory of the Citta-Viprayukta Samskāras," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 22 (1959), 531-47.

[21] See the following in the Kathā-Vatthu: X, 4, 7, 8, 11; XI, 1; XII, 1; XIV, 1, 5, 6; and IX, 4. Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 22 (1959), 236-49.

known as the Vaibhāṣika. The texts so treated were:

I. Jñāna Prasthāna, attributed to Ārya Katyāyaniputra (the major text, in terms of which the remaining six are 'feet' or appendages [Pada]).

II. Prakarana Pāda, attributed to Sthavira Vasumitra.

III. Vijñāna Kāya, attributed to Sthavira-Devaśarma.

IV. Dharma Skandha, attributed to Ārya Sāriputra.

V. Prajñapti Śāstra, attributed to Ārya Maudgalyāyana.

VI. Dhātu-Kāya, attributed to Pūrṇa.

VII. Sangīti Paryāya, attributed to Mahā Kauṣṭhila.[22]

Several estimations are available of the period in which these texts were written (or, following the Vaibhāṣika tradition, when these texts were collected and put into order by the respective figures).[23] Warder, without citing any particular authority, gives the date of ca. 200 B.C. For the composition of the Jñāna Prasthāna[24] Takakusu also suggests the same date.[25] Dutt defers judgement on the actual date of the composition of the texts, giving instead the dates at which they were translated into Chinese.[26] These dates ranged from the fourth to the eleventh century A.D. About the chronology of these texts, Takakusu says:

> The seven Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivadin do not represent one and the same period of Buddhist

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[22] Takakusu, OALS, pp. 74-75, infra.

[23] Warder, IB, p. 342; Takakusu, OALS, p. 76 and n. 1.

[24] Warder, IB, p. 342.

[25] Takakusu, EBP, p. 59.

[26] Dutt, BSI, pp. 152-58.

> philosophy, nor do they agree with one another as regards the expositions of categories and nomenclatures in which these books abound. They must have come into existence one after another, in the course of several centuries before they began to be recognized as a body of literature. It will, however, be extremely hazardous, at the present state of our knowledge, to try to fix a date for any of these works. . . . Their division into one principal and six supplementary books, for which we have the evidence of Dhammapiya, A.D. 379, as the earliest, seems to be of comparatively late origin, and was probably adopted after the compilation of the Mahāvibhāsa, which represents the climax of Sarvāstivāda philosophy.[27]

Hence, it seems safe to posit an evolving Buddhist school, developing its own literature and doctrinal posture, throughout India, but principally in Kashmir and Gandhāra from a point in time following the Council at Pāṭaliputra and prior to the Council traditionally acknowledged as having been called by King Kaniṣka (ca. 125 A.D.). From the time of the latter council onward, the Sarvāstivāda legacy comes to be more and more regarded as the property of the Vaibhāṣika school who take their name from a text, the Mahā Vibhāṣa, or Great Commentary. Let us look briefly into the circumstances that surrounded the Kaniṣka Council. One development that may have lead to the calling of such a council was disagreement concerning the number of <u>dharmas</u> to be reckoned as ultimate categories of analysis. Putting Vasumitra's Prakarana pāda some time after the Jñāna Prasthāna and acknowledging the former as the perhaps first work to posit the category of <u>citta-viprayukta-samskāras</u>,

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[27]Takakusu, OALS, pp. 118-19.

we begin to get into doctrinal matters that will be continually challenged from a position that will further be identifiable as Sautrāntika. It would appear that some time after 50 A.D. Dharmatrāta composed the Samuktabhidharmahridaya[28] which denied ultimate status to many of the dharmas then being asserted in the Sarvāstivādin literature. We can label this an exercise in Sautrāntika style because of its rejection of the proliferation of dharmas and its reliance on the authority of Sutra.[29] Evidently, exercises such as that of Dharmatrāta were not rare, and the Sarvāstivādins felt the need to hold a Council in order to lay such controversy to rest. Warder regards "this assembly as that which rejected the Sautrāntika revisions, as a result of which the revisionists formed themselves into a new schismatic school."[30] At this assembly, the particular explanation of the expression 'sarvāsti' attributed to Vasumitra (II) was accepted by the Sarvāstivādins. The various opinions of the non-Sautrāntika faction were codified in the Mahā-Vibhāṣa or Great Commentary. Those who reckon this commentary as the authoritative exposition of Abhidharma came to be known as the Vaibhāṣikas. Henceforth, the Orthodox Sarvāstivāda position can be identified with the Vaibhāṣikas. Whereas before the compilation of the Great Commentary there were Sarvāstivādin schools in both Kashmir and Gandhāra, the

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[28]Warder, IB, p. 345.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid., p. 346; Takakusu, OALS, p. 121.

composition of the Great Commentary seems to have made Kashmir the stronghold of Vaibhāṣika thought. Takakusu observes:

> Originally the Sarvāstivādin scholars seem to have formed themselves into two great groups, Kaśmiran and Gandhāran, as they often mentioned in the Vibhāṣa, but after the compilation of the great commentary they have either united themselves or the one has been eclipsed by the other, for we hear only the name Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikās or simply Vaibhāṣikās.[31]

The strength of the school and the zealousness with which its teachings were guarded is hinted at in Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu.[32] This account refers to an incident whereby the Vaibhāṣika teachings were finally gotten out of Kashmir by means of a strategem employed by one Vasubhadra who, pretending to be mad, was allowed to leave the country contrary to convention, after having had some twelve years' access to the teachings.[33] In a later work,[34] Takakusu identifies this Vasubhadra with Vasubandhu, although no such identification is made or hinted at in his earlier work.[35] Certainly the biography has Vasubandhu studying the Vaibhāṣika teachings after their introduction to Ayodya.[36] Nonetheless,

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[31]Takakusu, OALS, p. 119.

[32]Takakusu, LVP, p. 279.

[33]Ibid., pp. 279-81.

[34]Takakusu, EBP, p. 61: "The great philosopher Vasubhandu was born in Purusapura [sic] Peshwar) in Gandhāra and received his ordination in the Sarvastivada [sic] School. He went to Kasmira incognito to learn the Abhidharma philosophy. On his return home he wrote the Abhidharmakośa . . . ."

[35]Takakusu, LVP, pp. 279-81; Takakusu, OALS, p. 119.

[36]Ibid., pp. 283 and 286-88.

we can agree with him when he suggests that the Vaibhāṣikas enjoyed some three centuries of peace and doctrinal development in their Kashmir home.[37] It is in such a milieu (Orthodox Kashmirian Vaibhāṣika prominence and undercurrents of a critical body of opinion that is inherited and furthered by the Sautrāntika school) that Vasubandhu developed as a critical thinker. The Abhidharmakośa stands as the classical statement of these two currents of thought. With the above in mind, we can proceed to the life of Vasubandhu.

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[37] Takakusu, OALS, p. 119.

CHAPTER II

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE OF VASUBANDHU

The primary source for information regarding the life of Vasubandhu is "The Life of Vasubandhu," attributed to Parmārtha (A.D. 499-569). This biography, translated into English by Junjiro Takakusu,[1] is the main source to be dealt with in any attempt to determine the dates and sphere of activity of Vasubandhu. Takakusu and other scholars have given excellent summaries of the relevant Paramārtha material.[2] Jaini[3] summarizes the material brought together by Frauwellner. And, although Jaini is critical of Frauwallner's interpretation of the material, he nonetheless accurately summarizes it as follows:

> 1. Of the three dates current in the tradition, the first, viz. the A.N. 900, points to a time prior to 400 A.D., the last two, viz. the A.N. 1000 and 1100, refer to one and the same date, viz. the fifth century A.D. Thus there are only two dates for Vasubandhu.
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> 2. These two dates refer to not one but two persons bearing the same name. One Vasubandhu (the elder--

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[1]Junjiro Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramartha (A.D. 499-569)," T'oung Pao, Ser. 2, 5, 269-96.

[2]Takakusu, LVP, pp. 294-96; E. Frauwallner, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Serie Oriental Roma, III (Rome, 1951); A. Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 19-24.

[3]P. S. Jaini, "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 21 (1958), 48-53.

fourth century A.D.) is the Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu mentioned in the Vyākhya of Yaśomitra, and the other Vasubandhu (the younger--fifth century A.D.) is the author of the Abhidharma-kośa.

3. Paramartha in his "Life of Vasubandhu" confuses these two and hence the difficulty of determining the date of Vasubandhu.

4. This biography can be divided into three distinct parts:

(i) The legend of the name of Vasubandhu's native city Puruṣapura, his father, the Brahman Kauśika, and of the three sons Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Vrincivatsa.

(ii) Account of the council in Kaśmir, arrival of the Samkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin, and the defeat of Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's composition of the Paramārthasaptatika in refutation of Vindhyavāsin. The composition of the Abhidharmakośa. Samghabhadra's challenge to Vasubandhu for a disputation, declined on account of his old age.

(iii) Asanga's conversion of Vasubandhu to Māhāyana. Vasubandhu's Mahāyāna works and death.

Jaini accurately summarizes Frauwallner's treatment of this tripartite division of the material as follows: "Of these (i, ii and iii) the first and last sections deal with Vasubandhu the elder, the second part deals with Vasubandhu the younger."[4]

Now, even if it be admitted that there were two Vasubandhus, is there any necessity for accepting Frauwallner's division, a division that makes the brother of Asaṅga one person and the author of the Kośa another? In fact, there is no such necessity. A review of the evidence has lead at least two scholars to the conclusion that the author of the Kośa and the brother of Asaṅga were or could have been

[4] Jaini, OTTV, pp. 48-49.

one and the same person.[5] While Frauwallner has raised two points that raise some difficulties regarding this identification, these difficulties are not insurmountable. These two points are:

1. Yaśomitra's commentary glosses Vasubandhu's references to '<u>pūrvācāryāḥ</u>' (teachers of old, former teachers)[6] with the following: 'Yogācārā āryāsaṅgaprabhṛtayah' (The Yogācārā, Noble Asaṅga, etc.). Frauwallner deems this reference important to his argument because ". . . Yaśomitra sees in Asaṅga such an old master."[7]

2. Yaśomitra's commentary mentions in three places an older Vasubandhu. "Thus he knows, besides the author of the Abhidharmakośa, also an older bearer of the same name."[8]

3. Kumārajīva (344-413) is said to have translated two works attributed to Vasubandhu. Further, these works were Mahāyāna works (commentaries on works classified as Mādhyamika in the Tibetan Tanjur).[9]

What prompted Frauwallner to conclude that, based on this evidence, the material should be divided in such a way as to make Asaṅga's brother and the author of the Abhidharmakośa two different people? Having struck upon the near

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[5]Wayman, ASMB, pp. 19-24; Jaini, OTTV, passim.

[6]See Kośa, III, Kā 15, c, sub-comm. by Yaśomitra, cited in Wayman, ASBM; Jaini, OTTV; and Frauwallner, "On the Date . . . ."

[7]Frauwallner, "On the Date . . .," p. 21.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., pp. 35-36; Wayman, ASBM, p. 21.

certainty of two Vasubandhus (see 2, above), Frauwallner seems to have looked for the easiest way to divide the Paramārtha material so that it would substantiate this near certainty. Since we find evidence of a Vasubandhu, engaged in significant Mahāyāna work some time in the fourth century[10] and the biography mentions the conversion of Asaṅga's brother to Mahāyāna, Frauwallner chooses to identify these two figures. Once this line of interpretation has been begun, Yaśomitra's mention of Asaṅga as a 'teacher of old' seems further to substantiate it. Dr. Wayman has given a convincing alternative interpretation of these and other relevant points, an interpretation that does not require the division along the lines taken by Frauwallner. Regarding point #1, Wayman points out that there is a secondary tradition that maintains that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were half brothers.[11]

Referring to Bu-ston's history of Buddhism he points out:

> . . . we read that a woman of the Brāhmana caste had a son Asaṅga from her union with a Kṣatriya, and later on a son Vasubandhu from her union with a Brāhmana. If the story were not true, it would be difficult to imagine any reason for such a tradition to start. If we assume that a woman when quite young had a son Asaṅga, and that many years later toward the end of her child-bearing career had two sons in quick succession through union with a different father, the stage is set for understanding not only the chronology but also certain puzzling aspects of Vasubandhu's

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[10]Wayman, ASBM, p. 22.

[11]Ibid., p. 23.

> biography. It means that Asaṅga could already be engaged in a mature work destined to be of enduring fame in the Buddhist world while Vasubandhu had hardly been born or was a mere child or lad.[12]

The relevance of these observations to the point of Yaśomitra's understanding of Asaṅga as a teacher of old in relation to Vasubandhu is as follows:

> Of course, Yaśomitra might well be mistaken in his interpretation of what Vasubandhu means by the expression, but it is certain that Yaśomitra takes Asaṅga to be a pūrvācārya with respect to Vasubandhu. In the light of the foregoing discussion of the half brothers, this is understandable. Asaṅga belongs to the immediately preceding generation. Furthermore, he "converted" Vasubandhu to the Mahāyāna and therefore stands in relation to him as a father to a son.[13]

The second point mentioned by Frauwallner (the mention of an older Vasubandhu) can be taken without in any way weakening the identification that we wish to establish--the identity of Asaṅga's brother with the author of the Kośa. Wayman has pointed out that while the earlier Vasubandhu probably distinguished himself in a Mādhyamika (and also possibly Pure Land) milieu,[14] "the Vasubandhu who was Asaṅga's brother developed a school of Buddhist idealist philosophy, usually called Vijñaptimātra ('representation only') or Cittamātra ('mind only')."[15] Thus, the fact that one Vasubandhu (the older) is identified with the Mahāyāna in no way precludes the possibility that the younger

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[12] Wayman, ASBM, p. 23.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 22.

[15] Ibid., p. 21.

Vasubandhu (author of the Kośa, half-brother of Asaṅga, living mainly in the fifth century A.D.) was converted to the Mahāyāna.

Another scholar also attacks Frauwallner's division of the two Vasubandhu's from a doctrinal angle. Jaini has written an article in which he attempts to undermine Frauwallner's conclusions by pointing to what he considers to be evidence in favor of Mahāyāna leanings on the part of the author of the Abhidharmakośa. Jaini feels that demonstration of such leanings would make the traditional story of his conversion to the Mahāyāna by Asaṅga more credible.[16] Jaini's evidence "is based on the manuscript of the Abhidharmadipa (together with a commentary--the Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti), discovered in the Shala monastery in Tibet by Pandit Rāhula Sankrtyayana in the year 1937."[17] This is a Vaibhāṣika text, written to refute Sautrāntika views offered in the Kośa. The strength of Jaini's argument rests on the text's imputation of various Mahāyāna and other unsavory leanings to the author of the Kośa. Now, while evidence <u>contra</u> Frauwallner is welcome here, the passages referred to by Jaini can hardly be said to constitute such evidence. Surely, the accusation of 'entering the portals of Mahāyāna'[18] by a hostile party does not in and of itself constitute proof

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[16]Jaini, OTTV, pp. 51-53.

[17]Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[18]Ibid., p. 22.

thereof. Are we compelled to see these charges as anything other than abusive ad hominem argument? I think not. A more fruitful line of investigation might have been actually to have investigated the passages referred to in the Kośa so as to determine the legitimacy of the charges made by the author of the Abhidharma-dīpa. Such an investigation would reveal that Vasubandhu was indeed aware of various Yogācāra doctrines and actually quotes the Yogācāra on occasion to refute certain Vaibhāṣika assertions.[19] But, in a very real sense, it is not at all necessary to find or manufacture any Mahāyāna leanings in the Kośa in order to maintain the hypothesis that its author was converted to the Mahāyāna. The biography stresses the fact that Vasubandhu's 'conversion' took place after he had become famous for his non-Mahāyāna works, presumably such works as the Abhidharmakośa. Certainly one dimension of any such conversion (and it is a dramatic one in Paramārtha's account) would be a radical change in doctrinal and/or practical allegiances. In short, the integrity of our hypothesis would in no way be diminished if we were to find no hint whatsoever of Mahāyāna leanings in the Kośa.

Having maintained the traditional identification of Vasubandhu, author of the Kośa, with Vasubandhu the brother of Asaṅga, let us proceed briefly to reconstruct his career. We can agree with Frauwallner that we are dealing with the

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[19] See, for example, Kośa, IV, Kā. 3, a and b, Bhāṣya.

fifth-century Vasubandhu. Paramārtha gives his place of birth as Puruṣapura, modern Peshwar. This is supported by the observations of Huian Tsang, the seventh-century Chinese pilgrim. In his treatment of Gandhāra, the capital city of which was Puruṣapura, he states: "From old time till now this border-land of India has produced many authors of śāstras; for example, Nārāyaṇadeva, Asaṅga Bodhisattva, Vasubandhu Bodhisattva, Dharmatrāta, Manorhita, Pārśva the Noble, and so on."[20] Indeed, in his description of Puruṣapura he observes the following: "To the east of Parśvika's chamber is an old building in which Bodhisattva Vasubandhu prepared the 'O-pi-ta-mo-ku-she-lun (Abhidharmakosha Śāstra); men, out of respect to him, have placed here a commemorative tablet to this effect."[21]

However, the Paramārtha account points out that Vasubandhu's first apparent place of significant activity was Ayodhya. It is to Ayodhya that the famous Sāmkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin had come, in search of someone to dispute with. It seems that the only one able to debate him was Buddhamitra, Vasubandhu's teacher. This is because "at that time the great Teachers of the Law, Ma-nu-la-ta (Manoratha), Ba-su-ban-du (Vasubandhu) and others were all about travelling in other countries."[22] It was in refutation of Vindhyavāsin

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[20]S. Beal, trans., Buddhist Records of the Western World (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1969), I, 98.

[21]Ibid., p. 105.

[22]Takakusu, LVP, p. 284.

that Vasubandhu wrote the Paramārthasaptatika. Prior to this the only pertinent information given in the biography is the mention of his kinship with Asaṅga and his early involvement with the Sarvāstivādins. Evidently the Paramārthasaptatika was well received:

> Thereupon he composed a śāstra entitled the "Truth-Seventy," in which he refuted the "Seng-ch'ia-lun" (Sāmkhya-śāstra) composed by that heretic, whose doctrine fell to pieces like broken tiles, from the beginning to the end, leaving no sentence which could hold together. All the heretics were grieved as though it were their own life that was thus destroyed, for although he (Vasu-bandhu) did not encounter his opponent, the latter's sit-tan (doctrine, siddhānta) was so discredited in all its branches that there was nothing left for them to fall back upon. Thus he took full vengeance (on his enemy) and wiped off the disgrace put upon his teacher .
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> Everyone was gratified on hearing the news. The King Vikramaditya gave him three lacs of gold as a prize. This amount he divided into three portions with which he built three monasteries in the country of Ayodhya.[23]

While this portion of the account is emphatic about Vasubandhu's activity in Ayodhya, other segments of the biography are not specific as to the locale of his later activity. As was pointed out, the tradition is emphatic about his composition of the Kośa in Puruṣapura.

Since so much importance attaches to the Kośa, let us look at parts of the account that describe its composition. While the flow of the biography may not follow the general flow of Vasubandhu's life,[24] it is on this point rather specific that it was after the composition of the

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[23]Takakusu, LVP, p. 284.

[24]Wayman, ASBM, p. 24.

Paramārthasaptatika that he wrote the Kārikās and prose sections of the Kośa: "The Teacher of the Law (Vasubandhu) afterwards re-established the true Law (of the Buddha). He studied, first, the principles of the Bi-ba-sha (Vibhāṣā). When he was well versed in them, he lectured thereupon before the general public. At the close of each day's lecture he composed a verse in which he summed up his exposition for the day."[25] It is in this fashion that he is said to have composed the verse portion of the Kośa. Then these verses were sent to the Vaibhāṣika community in Kaśmir. The tradition has it that they were unable to understand the verses and so returned them to Vasubandhu requesting that he write a prose explanation of them. It is at this point that the Sautrāntika side of the Kośa arose:

> Thereupon he composed the prose portion of the Abhidharma-kośa, which is the commentary upon them. He thus established the tenets of the Sat-ba-ta (Sarvāstivāda) school; but whenever he found a doctrine pushed to an extreme in that school, he refuted it by the principles of the Sautrāntika school. This work was called the A-bi-da-ma-ku-sha (Abhidharma-kośa). When he had completed the work he forwarded it to the Bi-ba-sha (Vibhāsā) teachers of Ki-pin (Kaśmir), who, on seeing their own opinions therein refuted, were grieved.[26]

Subsequently he is summoned to the city of Ayodhya by King Bālāditya, whose tutor he had been during the reign of his father, Vikramāditya. This supports the tradition of his having been in Puruṣapura during the composition of the

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[25] Takakusu, LVP, p. 287.

[26] Ibid., pp. 287-88.

Abhidharmakośa. Some time after his return to Ayodhya he is challenged to debate by the grammarian Vasurāta. Once again Vasubandhu avoids direct debate and instead composes a treatise which refutes the Vyākaraṇa treatise. This is followed by Bālāditya lavishing a lac of gold on Vasubandhu with which he has three temples built, one in Ayodhya, one in Puruṣapura and one in Kaśmir. Interestingly enough, the biography has it that it was the disgruntled Vasurāta, and not the shattered Vaibhāṣika community in Kaśmir, who sends to central India to summon Saṃghabhadra to refute the Kośa. He is said to have written two texts, one of which (the Samaya of Light ?) establishes the Vibhāṣā, and another called the Nyāyānusara (Conformity with Truth of Rule) which is said to refute the Kośa in favor of the Vibhāṣā. Following the completion of these treatises he invites Vasubandhu to debate him. It is at this point that Paramārtha's account differs with that of Huian Tsang. According tc Paramārtha he refuses debate for the following reason: "I am now already old. You may do as you please. I formerly composed the śāstra to refute the doctrines of the Vibhāṣā. There is no need to enter further upon a decisive debate with you. . . . Any person endowed with knowledge will himself judge which party is right and which is wrong? [sic]."[27] This paragraph of the biography (a division that need not have been made in the Chinese) ends with a mention of Vasubandhu's

[27]Takakusu, LVP, p. 290.

Hinayāna allegiances. This gives the impression that at the time of the challenge by Samghabhadra Vasubandhu was still committed to the Hinayāna. However, we see instead that this reference to his Hinayāna allegiances is merely preparatory data to explain the necessity for Asaṅga's conversion of him. (The conversion material immediately follows the mention of his Hinayāna commitment.) This juxtaposition of the material is apparently one of the reasons for Frauwallner's division of the material along lines described above. He says: "Vasubandhu stands at the end of a glorious career and has just refused a disputation with Samghabhadra on account of his old age. And now we are requested to believe that the old man is converted by his brother and develops yet a far-reaching activity at the service of Mahayana."[28] Frauwallner also draws our attention to a fact that he considers important--the section of the biography dealing with the composition of the Kośa never refers to Asaṅga, ". . . while on the contrary he plays an outstanding role in the life of his brother Vasubandhu, where his absence would be unthinkable."[29] Wayman has pointed out that these remarks in no way diminish the possibility of the Kośakara/brother of Asaṅga identity:

> It may well be that Vasubandhu composed his Abhidharmakośa when he was fairly young. . . . At the time of composition his work may well have been ignored, and perhaps he was less welcome in those quarters than

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[28] Frauwallner, "On the Date . . .," p. 15, quoted in Wayman, ASBM, p. 24.

[29] Frauwallner, "On the Date . . .," p. 17, quoted in Wayman, ASBM, p. 24.

> he had previously been. This would be the propitious moment for Asanga to "convert" him to the Mahāyāna. . . . Thus, in his old age, works might be written in attempted refutation of his Abhidharmakośa. Understandably he would not care to debate it. In this light it is reasonable that the part of Paramārtha's account dealing with the Abhidharmakośa should make no mention of Asaṅga. In my view this is because Vasubandhu composed the Abhidharmakośa before he became associated with Asaṅga, and the attempted refutations of his work occurred after Asanga's death. And of course it is not an old man who was converted to the Mayāyāna. It is simply that the part of the account dealing with Vasubandhu's conversion to the Mahayāna begins immediately after the part dealing with the Abhidharmakośa.[30]

After his conversion he wrote many Mahāyāna treatises. He died in Ayodhya at the age of eighty.

The account offered by Huian Tsang differs somewhat from the Paramārtha account, especially in relation to the supposed challenge by Samghabhadra and Vasubandhu's refusal to debate the Vaibhāṣika master. Keeping in mind that Huian Tsang's account is not systematic, but rather given in the form of anecdotes and legends associated with the various spots he visited, it is still of sufficient interest to be mentioned here. In his description of the Vasubandhu/Samghabhadra confrontation we find that Samghabhadra has read the work and resolves to write a text in refutation of it:

> He devoted himself during 12 years to the most profound researches, and composed the Kin-she-pao-lun (Kosakarakā Sāstra) in 25,000 ślokas, containing altogether 800,000 words. . . . Addressing his disciples he said, "Whilst I retire from sight, do you, distinguished disciples, take this my orthodox treatise and go attack Vasubandhu; break down his sharp-pointed

[30] Wayman, ASBM, p. 24.

> arguments, and permit not this old man alone to assume the leading name."[31]

His disciples meet Vasubandhu "in the country of Cheka, in the town of Sakala, his fame being spread far and wide."[32] Vasubandhu hears that Samghabhadra is coming:

> Vasubandhu having heard it, forthwith ordered his disciples to prepare for removal (dress for travel). His disciples cherishing some doubts, the most eminent of them began to remonstrate with him, and said, "The high qualities of our great master transcend those of former men of note, and at the present day your wisdom is far spread and acknowledged by all. Why, then, on hearing the name of Samghabhadra are you so fearful and timid? We, your disciples, are indeed humbled thereat."[33]

Vasubandhu explains that he is not leaving out of fear, but because he claims that the people in this area are not smart enough to judge a good argument and would probably be taken in by a cheap ad hominem argument, such as one addressed to his old age. He says:

> "I am going away not because I fear to meet this man doctor , but because in this country there is no one of penetration enough to recognize the inferiority of Samghabhadra. He would only villify me as if my old age were a fault. There would be no holding him to the śāstra, or in one word I could overthrow his vagaries. Let us draw him to Mid-India, and there, in the presence of the eminent and the wise, let us examine into the matter and determine what is true and what is false, and who should be pronounced the victor or the loser." Forthwith he ordered his disciples to pack up their books, and to remove far away.[34]

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[31] Beal, Buddhist Records . . ., I, 193.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., I, 193-94.

[34] Ibid., I, 194.

At this point it might be pointed out that Vasubandhu's career, while revered and excellent, is not characterized by a knack for debate. He missed the one with Vindhyavāsin because he was elsewhere. He talked himself out of the debate to which he had been challenged by Vasurāta, and, if this rather unusual tradition be followed, declined debate with Saṃghabhadra for what do not seem to be very compelling reasons. But even in this account, he wins the day (without debate, I might add). Saṃghabhadra, upon arriving at the town, becomes aware of his own approaching death. He writes a letter to Vasubandhu (who presumably has left or is in the process of leaving) apologizing for the sectarian state of the Dharma and for his own upholding of the school in which he found himself at this rather unfortunate time. Speaking of the sectarian nature of Buddhism, he adds:

> "I who possess but weak understanding, unhappily inherited this custom from my predecessors, and coming to read your treatise called the Abhidharmakośa, written to overthrow the great principles of the masters of the Vaibhāṣika school, abruptly, without measuring my strength, after many years' study have produced this śāstra upholding the teaching of the orthodox school. My wisdom is indeed little, my intentions great. . . . My end is approaching. If the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, in spreading abroad his subtle maxims and disseminating his profound reasonings, will vouchsafe not to overthrow my production, but will let it remain whole and entire for posterity, then I shall not regret my death."[35]

Shortly thereafter Saṃghabhadra dies. Vasubandhu receives the text and Saṃghabhadra's covering letter, damns Saṃghabhadra with faint praise and decides to grant him his last

[35]Beal, Buddhist Records . . ., I, 194.

wish. Further, he adds:

> "If I had any desire to overthrow Samghabhadra's śāstra, I could do so as easily as I place my finger in my hand. As to his dying request made to me, I greatly respect the expression of the difficulty he acknowledges. But besides that, there is great reason why I should observe his last wish, for indeed this śāstra may illustrate the doctrine of my school, and accordingly I will only change its name and call it Shun-ching-li-lun (Nyāyānusāra Śāstra)."[36]

Samghabhadra's disciple questions Vasubandhu's audacity at proposing to change the name of the very text from which he had flown. Vasubandhu ("wishing to remove all doubts"!) utters the following bit of wisdom, on which note this rather unusual tale ends: "Though the lion-king retires afar off before the pig, nevertheless the wise will know which of the two is best in strength."[37]

I am not suggesting that this last account of the Vasubandhu/Samghabhadra confrontation (or lack of one) be taken all that seriously. I only wish to point out that it substantiates the tradition that Vasubandhu refused debate on grounds that had to do with his old age.

Having met and overcome Frauwallner's objections to the position that Vasubandhu (author of the Kośa) and Asaṅga were brothers (or at least half-brothers), it seems safe to assert the following. Vasubandhu lived mainly in the fifth century A.D. Thus, in agreement with most of the sources cited above, we can offer the following dates:

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[36] Beal, Buddhist Records . . ., I, 195.

[37] Ibid., I, 196.

400 A.D. (+ or - 10 years)-480 A.D. (+ or - 10 years). This dating has the virtue of consistency with the Paramārtha material which asserts his kinship with Asaṅga as well as his continued activity in Mahāyāna endeavors after Asaṅga's death. We now move on to a direct consideration of the disputes to be treated in the translation and commentary. This consideration moves naturally into the commentary on the translation itself and forms the next chapter of this study.

CHAPTER III

INTRODUCTION TO AND COMMENTARY ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE AVIJÑAPTI-ADHIKĀRA AND RELATED MATERIAL

The above summary of the origins of the schools of thought with which this study is primarily concerned and the biographical information concerning Vasubandhu have established the overall doctrinal context for an introduction to the text itself and the sections thereof with which we are concerned. Vasubandhu's knowledge of the Sarvāstivādin tradition as codified by the Vaibhāṣika school as well as his ultimate Sautrāntika allegiances have been mentioned. In order to distinguish these two schools on other than nominal grounds, some of the specific differences on doctrinal matters should be mentioned. These differences can best be brought to light by focussing on the Vaibhāṣika notions that the Sautrāntikas denied. After exposing some of these differences, an overall characterization of the Sautrāntika position will be given.

One of the first traditionally regarded significant criticisms of Sarvāstivādin doctrine seems to have been the Samuktābhidharmahridaya composed by Dharmatrāta (ca. 50 A.D.). This treatise denied ultimate status to several of the *dharmas*

then being asserted in the Sarvāstivādin literature.[1] The category of <u>citta-viprayukta-samskāras</u>, apparently first developed in Vasumitra's Prakaraṇa Pāda precipitated such critiques as that of Dharmatrāta. It is in light of this and other critical texts that we can understand the Council called ca. 125 A.D. under King Kaniṣka. One faction that opposed the Sarvāstivādins, the Dārṣṭāntika, is often referred to in the Mahā Vibhāṣa or Great Commentary which represents the codification of Sarvāstivādin doctrine and arose out of the Kaniṣka Council.[2] Hereafter we can regard the followers of the Mahā Vibhāṣa or Vaibhāṣikas as the dominant heirs to Sarvāstivādin tradition. The doctrinal kinship between the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas can be demonstrated by the fact that the Vibhāṣa attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas nearly all of the theses that the Kośa attributes to the Sautrāntikas.[3] Among these tenets we can isolate several that relate directly to this study. The Sautrāntikas deny canonical authority to the major Abhidharma works of the Vaibhāṣika school. The category of <u>dharmas</u> called <u>citta-viprayukta</u> (not associated with thought) do not have <u>dravya</u> or real or substantial status. They are designations (<u>prajñapti</u>). They deny the existence of past <u>dharmas</u>. They deny the legitimacy of the <u>avijñapti-rūpa</u> and criticize the Vaibhāsika's

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[1]Warder, IB, pp. 28-29.

[2]Ibid., pp. 346-47.

[3]Poussin, L'AK, I, liii.

interpretation of shape as the corporeal indication (vijnapti).[4]

These particular disputes should be seen in the light of wider doctrinal postures or perspectives. The Sautrāntikas are those who take the Sutra as their standard. When an Abhidharma doctrine is in conflict with that of a Sutra, the former is usually rejected. This indicates a return to the traditionally accepted body of teachings, in this case, as found in the Sanskrit Āgamas. These often have Pali equivalents. This is not to suggest that the Vaibhāṣikas were either unfamiliar with scripture or lax in interpreting it. What the Sautrāntikas do demonstrate, however, is that the Vaibhāṣika exegesis of Abhidharma has come to be inflated with many dharmas that are without scriptural authority. The Vaibhāṣika portrayal of the citta-viprayukta-samskāras and the avijnapti-rūpa are examples of this tendency. Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika critique of these dharmas is an equally representative slice of the Sautrāntika enterprise, both in terms of overall posture and particular tenets.

Let us now look at the general area of doctrinal concern with which the study is concerned. All of the material to be considered in this study had a direct or indirect bearing on the principle of karma (understood as both action and the later biographical consequences of that action when it is of a morally qualifiable nature). The centrality of a

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[4]Ibid.

principle of karmic efficacy to the Indian Buddhist tradition cannot be overestimated. Very simply put, this principle affirms that there is retribution for morally qualifiable thoughts, words and deeds originated by the phenomenal individual. More or less sophisticated versions of this principle were part of the cognitive and normative horizon of all devout Buddhists, lay or monastic. Indeed, the entire Buddhist salvational edifice stands or falls on the karmic principle. If there is no retribution for morally qualifiable acts then there is very little justification for setting out on the path to salvation. The wide range of canonical and post-canonical support given to this basic principle is so well known that little documentation thereof is necessary. It is worthy of note, however, that the karma principle was invoked on several different levels of Buddhist discourse.[5] The monk's ability to insure a given form of rebirth is attested to in the Samkhārauppatti-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. Keeping in mind that many of the suttas are informed by the tacit assumption of the efficacy of the karmic principle, a few that dwell on that topic in detail may be pointed out. For example, the Cūḷa and Mahā-Dhammasamādāna suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya deal with the concept of the ripening of pain and pleasure in a future life. Equally rich in the area of the karmic principle are: the Devadaha-sutta

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[5] See, for example, the causal manner in which such a principle is assumed in the Vimāna and Peta Vatthus on the one hand, and the technical side of the material of this study on the other.

of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Pancattaya Sutta of the same, the Bālapaṇḍita Sutta of the same, and the Cūḷa and Mahā Kamma-vibhanga Suttas of the same. In addition to these specific suttas, entire books of the Khuddaka Nikāya rely on a firmly agreed upon theory of karma. For example, the Vimāna-vatthu details the manner in which specific rebirths were brought about as the result of specific acts of merit. Such a text clearly points out the tacit assumption of a principle governing deeds and their future effects. The Peta Vatthu of the Khuddaka Nikāya suggests a highly routinized picture of the causal efficacy of karma. In this work we are presented with a portrayal of the speed and certainty with which acts of merit reach fruition. Moreover, the acts of merit are transferrable to those in the purgatory-like state of *petas* (Skt. *preta*) or 'hungry ghosts.' These unfortunates are cursed with various afflictions based on and generally mirroring the quality of past evil deeds. Many of these stories stress the importance of giving to the monks in order to accrue karmic merit which can then be transferred to a relative in a state of karmic distress. The translator of the Peta Vatthu suggests that a "mercenary motive"[6] may have been involved in the compilation of these tales. Certainly the general internalization of such concepts would have

[6]Jean Kennedy and Henry S. Gehman, trans., *The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon, Part IV, Vimāna Vatthu: Stories of the Mansions and Peta Vatthu: Stories of the Departed* (London: Luzac & Co., 1942), p. 13.

positive implications for the Sangha. Citing the refusal of Siamese theologians to admit the Peta Vatthu in printed editions of the canon, Gehman considers them to be a ". . . low type of Buddhism,"[7] ". . . popular ghost stories, in most cases, in this work given a Buddhist veneer."[8] Leaving aside such considerations, it is safe to say that this text is an example of the pan-Buddhist dimension of belief in the notion of a principle of karmic efficacy.

We may take then as a given a pan-Buddhist recognition of a principle of karmic retribution. And, while there may have been nearly universal agreement within the Indian Buddhist community concerning the necessity of karmic retribution for morally qualifiable volitions, utterances and actions, there was certainly much disagreement about the manner or mechanism whereby that retribution occurs. It is likely, for example, that the Vatsiputra-Sammitiya 'heresy' of asserting a 'self' was precipitated by the desire to establish a mechanism of retribution. Their postulation of an entity called the _avipraṇāśa_ or 'indestructable,' a purported _citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra_ also plays an important role in their exposition of karmic efficacy.[9] Indeed, an ever

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[7]Ibid., p. 15.

[8]Ibid., p. 14.

[9]For a detailed treatment of this and various other attempts to deal with the problem of karmic continuity, see Etienne Lamotte, "Le Traite De L'Acte De Vasubandhu," _Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques_ 4 (1935-36), pp. 151-263.

recurring theme in the writing of the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma schools is the refinement or reorganization of the various vocabularies put forth in order to describe human experience and the workings of the principle of karma as a vital dimension of that experience. The overall Abhidharma/Abhidhamma enterprise is first to determine, and then explain the interrelationship of, the various _dharmas_ regarded as constitutive or descriptive of human experience. The goal of this task is a salvational one. The Vaibhāṣika statement of the soteriological intention that informed the actual elaboration of their theoretical framework is found in I, Kā. 3 and may be taken as representative of the religious dimension of Abhidharma:

> Whereas the world erroneously falls into the flood of becoming by reason of defilement, and, whereas there is no access to the taming of defilement without the discernment of dharmas, therefore for the purpose of discerning the dharmas it is said that the Abhidharma was declared by the Teacher (The Buddha).[10]

This Kārikā is informed by certain presuppositions. The world falls into the flood of becoming. This fall is due to the force of defilements. Discernment of the _dharmas_ (natures) is a necessary condition for taming the defilements. The taming of defilements makes possible the reversal of the erroneous fall into the 'flood of becoming.'

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[10] _Dharmāṇāṃ pravicayamantareṇa nāsti kleśānāṃ yata upaśantaye 'bhyūpāyaḥ/ kleśaiś ca bhramati bhavārṇave 'tra lokas taddhetor ata ūditaḥ kilaiṣa śastra._//3//

Abhidharma was taught by the Buddha for the purpose of effecting this reversal.

Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika) denies only the last assertion--that the Abhidharma was taught by the Buddha. This denial is crucial to his orientation to the Vaibhāṣika theoretical edifice. While not denying the need for discernment of the dharmas (dharma-pravicaya) or the salvational efficacy thereof, he is not willing to accept the scholastic and post-canonical attempts to define the dharmas that will be subject to the discernment. Hence, his recourse to the authority of Sūtra is not intended to diminish the significance of the Abhidharma. Rather, his position is that any assertions as to what constitutes a dharma should have the certification of scripture. And, while he criticizes the postulation of certain dharmas postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas, he is in general agreement with that school in reference to the overall categories (with the exception of the citta-viprayukta-samskāras) into which legitimate or substantial (dravya) dharmas are to be located.

Now, if Vasubandhu has grounds on which he rejects the substantial nature of a given dharma, we are certainly justified in asking him what these grounds are. These grounds are given in a general way in Vasubandhu's etymology of the term dharma in his auto-commentary (Bhāṣya) on I, Kā. 2: "Etymologically then (something is a) dharma because of bearing its own characteristics." (Nirvacanam tu svalakṣaṇadhāraṇād

dharmaḥ.) Further, "This is called Abhidharma because it envisages dharma; the characteristics of dharmas or Nirvāṇa, the dharma in the ultimate sense."[11] The silence of Yaśomitra's sub-commentary on Vasubandhu's definition of dharma is most distressing. Perhaps our understanding of the full meaning of 'bearing its own marks' must rely on an analysis of some specific, disputed dharmas. Nonetheless, it is correct to say that not every particular of experience is to be understood as a discrete dharma. These particulars can be understood as collocations of dharmas (samagra, kalāpa, etc.). Particular trees, mountains, people, thought moments, etc. can be described in terms of particular dharmas. These dharmas are moreover not further reducible to other dharmas. If they are, then they are not 'bearers of their own characteristics.'

The Abhidharma structure then represents what we can call an attempt to formulate an exhaustive and consistent phenomenology of possible experience, capable of ultimately providing the means for a radical reorientation toward that experience. This is of course an ambitious undertaking, and historically was characterized by much dispute. That the Abhidharma enterprise was foreshadowed by certain tendencies in the Sūtras is commonly accepted. That a full fledged Abhidharma was not worked out in the same body of teachings

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[11] Tad ayam paramārthadharma vā nirvāṇam dharmalakṣaṇam vā pratyabhimukho dharma ityabhidharmaḥ./

is equally agreed upon. The fact that three different structures (the *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* classifications), directly traceable to the Sūtras, are each capable of integrating the various *dharmas* that were said to comprise the 'Sarvam' or 'All' of potential experience, indicates the canonical absence of one grand archetechtonic model under which all other categories are placeable. Thus, The Buddha could analyze the 'All' from the perspective of the five personality agregates or *skandhas*. Equally well documented are the *āyatana* or twelvefold classification of experience into terms of internal and external sense bases, and the *dhātu* or eighteenfold classification made up of the twelve *āyatanas* plus the six forms of consciousness pertinent to the six internal and six external bases.[12]

One last observation on the canonical sūtras is in order if we are to fully understand the controversy that marked the Abhidharma schools and their treatment of the area of karmic efficacy in particular. The Buddha resorted to the *dharma* level of analysis of experience for the purpose of thwarting the tendency toward reification of entities and clinging thereto. The classical example of this is the denial of an enduring 'self' entity and the substitution of the analysis of the person into the five personality aggregates.

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[12]Scherbatsky, CCB, pp. 6-14.

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A representative expression of the denial of an enduring 'self' entity and the substitution of the skandha level of analysis is to be found in the Parable of the Watersnake, sutta I, 22 in the Pali Text Society's translation.[13] In this work we find the further Parable of the Raft. In this parable we hear of a man desirous of crossing over a river, from the bank that is fraught with fear and danger to the bank that is secure, etc. For this purpose it is necessary to construct a raft out of bits of grass, sticks, etc. Once the raft has been constructed and has gotten the person safely to the other side, the question arises of what to do with the raft. Now that it has served its purpose, what is to be done with it? The Buddha approves of abandoning the raft since it is of no further use. This injunction is followed by what we might very well take as examples of the constituents of the Buddha's salvational raft--reference to the five skandhas and the experiences pertinent thereto. Now, this parable of the raft has been seen as one forerunner of the Mādhyamika position that makes much of the ultimate voidness (sunyatā) of all <u>dharmas</u>. This discovery of what Murti regards as the canonical 'anticipation' of the Mādhyamika school's teaching of the ultimate Voidness of all <u>dharmas</u> has apparent implications for the Sautrāntika enterprise as embodied in the Kośa. The apparent implication would be that

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[13] I. B. Horner, trans., <u>The Collection of Middle Length Sayings</u> (Majjhima Mikaya), I (London: Luzac & Co., 1967), pp. 167-82.

if, as Nagārjuna and his present day translators and interpreters claim, all dharmas are void of self-existence, then the piecemeal treatment of certain dharmas undertaken by Vasubandhu is somehow pointless. That is, since we can (it appears) establish the canonical basis for the position that all the dharmas taught by the Buddha are empty or void of self existence, why quibble over a few discrete ones in the Vaibhāṣika list? Actually, the importance of studying the Kosa is not diminished by the recognition that, on the level of ultimate truth (paramārtha satya), all dharmas are void of self existence. The provisional and instrumental dimension of the Abhidharma enterprise has been mentioned above. Indeed, Vasubandhu himself as well as Nagārjuna "relegated this abhidharma concern to conventional knowledge. . . ."[14] Moreover, if Streng and the authors quoted by him are correct, then it was in opposition to precisely the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma tradition that Nagārjuna wrote the famed Mūlamādhyamakakārikās and Vigrahavyāvartanī, etc.[15] Moreover, Vasubandhu's critique of the Vaibhāṣika, unlike Nagārjuna's critique of Sarvāstivādin dharma theory, is one carried out under mutually accepted principles and without the shifting of levels of dialogue, i.e., from conventional truth to ultimate truth. Thus, our understanding of Vaibhāṣika dharma theory and the Sautrāntika critique thereof can arise within

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[14]Streng, Emptiness . . ., p. 43.

[15]Ibid., p. 33 and 33, n. 14.

a broad range of agreed upon texts and levels of discourse.

These considerations return us to Vasubandhu's definition of a *dharma*: a bearer of its own characteristics. Minimally, what need we see as entailed by this definition? At the very least, we are dealing with entities on the level of theory that, by reason of scriptural authority or sound reasoning, can be said to be in some way salvationally auspicious in their descriptive capacity. In short, to return to the statement of I, Kā. 3, in order to tame the defilements one must discern the *dharmas*. Vasubandhu occupies a unique doctrinal position vis a vis the question of what constitutes a *dharma*. On the one hand, he is unwilling to accept the over inflated *dharma* list of the Vaibhāṣikas, and on the other, not committed to the radical perspective of the ultimate voidness of all *dharmas* (in the Kośa, at any rate.) His lack of recourse to such terms as *paramārtha satya*/*saṃvṛti satya* in their specifically Mahāyāna sense is evidence that the Kośa is a straightforward text grounded in the tacit assumption that in some sense there 'are' *dharmas*, these *dharmas* were taught by the Buddha and the correct conceptualization of these *dharmas* is of immense salvational value. And, even granting that the Buddha taught the ultimate voidness of all *dharmas*, we are still more than justified to attempt to discern what conventional utility these ultimately void *dharmas* had. Further still, if we are to understand the intentional posture that informed the Buddha's adumbration of

the dharma level of analysis, then we need to know what was put forth as a dharma and what was not. The integrity of the Buddha's phenomenology of possible experience can only be grasped after we peel away the accretions of additional dharmas developed by the Vaibhāṣikas.

With these general remarks about the varying statuses attributed to the dharmas, we can now focus on the area of karmic continuity and the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika descriptions thereof. One basic 'problem' seems to inform all of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika 'descriptions' of the mechanism whereby karmic continuity is effected. In fact, the nature of this description is such a crucial element in many of the Buddhist schools that said descriptions could be utilized as convenient criteria for dividing up the various schools. The purported pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas and Sāmmitīyas as well as their notion of the citta-viprayukta-samskāra called avipranāśa (indestructible) have already been mentioned in this regard.[16] Equally strong is the identification of the Vaibhāṣika school with the very elements with which this study is concerned--the avijñapti-rūpa, as well as the citta-viprayukta-samskāras, prāpti and aprāpti, and to a lesser extent the notions of anuśaya and paryavasthāna. Along the same lines, the Yogācāra/Vijnānavāda orientation is intimately tied up with the notion of a store-house consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), which notion plays an important role in

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[16]See note 9, above.

their description of the karma process. Finally, we could point to the fact that one of the arguments cited by the Sarvāstivādins in the Kosa in favor of their postulation of the existence of the dharmas in the past, present and future has to do with the necessity for tying up past acts with present or future retribution.[17] Given the fact that such a wide range of descriptive conventions attended the karma/fruit problem, it is vital that we isolate the basically agreed upon elements to be described so that we can best appreciate the issues involved.

It can be demonstrated that all of the various 'descriptions' of the karma process tend to address the same basic question: How do morally unlike thoughts, tendencies, etc. reside in one stream of consciousness without thereby constantly manifesting themselves in the moment to moment functioning of that stream? For example, the average person (pṛthag-jana) is definitionally characterized by not having allayed certain defilements. Thus, in some sense he is endowed with, or characterized by having, those defilements. Nonetheless, this same average person has, from time to time, virtuous thoughts, does virtuous deeds and utters virtuous utterances. How do we explain the mutual presence of the defiled natures on the one hand and the virtuous moments on

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[17]See Kośa, V, kās. 24-26, Bhāṣya and sub comm. thereon as well as Scherbatsky, CCB, pp. 76-91; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 115-24.

the other? How is it that these defilements do not color or pervade each discrete thought moment? What accounts for the 'idling' or non-active aspect of them when a given thought, etc. is obviously of a morally unlike nature? Jaini has put the problem succinctly:

> If the akusala-mūlas are not annihilated till the attainment of arhatship and if they are incompatible with the kusala-mūlas, how are we to explain the operation of kusala-mūlas or of kusala volitions in a mundane (laukika) existence? Being incompatible, they cannot operate simultaneously. Nor can they operate successively, for succession demands a certain element of homogeneity between the preceding and succeeding moments. If a kusala-citta were to follow an akusala-citta, then it will depend for its nature on a heterogeneous cause. This will amount to an admission of the unacceptable position that good springs out of evil or vice versa.[18]

The same problem arises if we focus on an individual who is involved with the criminal life. Suppose that an individual decides to commit theft on a given day in the future. Nonetheless, between the time of resolving to steal and the actual act, he may undertake various virtuous acts or have virtuous thoughts. How do we account for the mutual presence of the virtuous thoughts, deeds, etc. and the unvirtuous resolution in the same stream of consciousness? Or, suppose that one involved with the religious life vows to refrain from certain reprehensible acts but finds himself engaging in other equally reprehensible acts. How do we account for the mutual presence of such conflicting or morally unlike thoughts in a given stream of consciousness? Now, surely the last

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[18] Jaini, STB, p. 238.

thing we can do is deny that such cases occur. Nor did the various Buddhist schools deny that such cases occur. What is needed, then, is a vocabulary capable of describing the mechanism whereby certain thoughts are functional from moment to moment and non-functional at other times.

Granting that there are a host of other specific problems that surround the Buddhist notions of the karmic principle, the above mentioned area seems most pronounced. On the face of it, the problem seems to require the postulation of some sort of a subconscious mental area wherein temporarily non-functional thoughts might reside. Such a realm would solve many of the problems that the various entities mentioned above also attempted to solve. The point could be made that one of the perhaps several strains of thought that resulted in the later postulation of a store-house consciousness (_ālaya-vijñāna_) was the necessity to explain the momentary non-functioning of a given thought, defilement, etc. One vital component of this consciousness is the 'seed' or _bīja_. This component finds an early and clear exposition in the Kośa. In order to understand the Sautrāntika theory of _Bīja_, however, we have to focus on the purported Vaibhāṣika entities in opposition to which the seed was postulated. In the second chapter (Indrīya-nirdesa or Exposition of the Faculties) of the Kośa the Vaibhāṣika list of _citta_ and _rūpa viprayukta samskāras_ is given at length. Among this class of _dharmas_ (all of which are disputed in some way by

Vasubandhu qua Sautrāntika) we find *prāpti* and *aprāpti*, 'reach' and 'non-reach.' These *dharmas* were postulated in order to account for the phenomena outlined above--the presence, without functioning, of a given nature in a given stream of consciousness at a given moment. The Vaibhāṣikas claim that the presence or absence of such a nature is due to their being either the *prāpti* or *aprāpti* thereof. To the best of my knowledge, these two terms do not occur in this specific sense in the Pali materials. Despite Vasubandhu's rejection of these natures on the grounds that they can neither be perceived nor inferred, the Vaibhāṣika assertions about these controversial *dharmas* are given. The *prāpti* is said to be the cause that originates (*utpatti*-*hetu*) specific natures in a specific stream of consciousness and the cause that differentiates (*vyavasthā*-*hetu*) the Noble One from the average person.[19] The argument is that if there be no *prāpti* there would be no cause that differentiates the Noble person from the average person when the Noble one is having mundane thoughts.[20] The Vaibhāṣika position is that there is a qualitative difference between the stream of consciousness of the Noble person and that of the average person, even if the Noble person is momentarily characterized by having normal,

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[19] Kosa, II, kā. 36, Bhāṣya: *kas caivam āha--utpattihetuḥ prāptir iti kim tarhi vyavasthāhetuḥ prāpti/.*

[20] II, 36, Bhasya, cont'd: *asatyām hi prāptau laukika-mānasānām ārya-pṛthagjanānām ārya ime pṛthagjanā ime iti na syād vyavasthānam/.*

mundane thoughts. This qualitative difference he finds in the fact that the Noble one has the praptis of certain natures that result from meditational accomplishments, etc., while the average person does not. This is one of the first attempts in the Kośa to deal with the problematic area outlined above--How does a given nature inhere in a stream of consciousness without functioning at a given moment and thereby 'coloring' the stream? Obviously, one reason for claiming that the prāptis are natures that are not associated with thought is that such status enables the continual presence in the stream on the one hand without necessitating continual functioning in that same stream at all moments on the other. Further, when the Noble person is characterized by having mundane thoughts, his distinction from the average person does not end. Indeed, the difference between the two is maintained regardless of the nature of moment to moment thoughts, etc. by recourse to the entity prāpti which is not conjoined with thought.

Now, Vasubandhu's critique of the notion of prāpti continues on this question of exactly what is it that does differentiate the Noble from the average person? He says "The differentiation is merely the state of having destroyed or not having destroyed defilements."[21] Vasubandhu rejects the prāpti model for making such a distinction (without denying that there is a distinction and that it is one of

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[21] prahīṇāprahīnakleśatā viśeṣas etad bhavitum arhati/.

some weight) between the two and offers the following: This distinction can be maintained on the basis of having destroyed the defilements or not having destroyed defilements. The real distinction between the two has to do with the nature of the physical basis: "Verily, the physical basis of the Noble One has undergone transformation by virtue of the path of vision and the path of cultivation such that those defilements that are allayed no longer have the ability to shoot forth."[22] At this point, Vasubandhu begins the elaboration of the 'seed' description of the area in question: "For this reason, one is called a destroyer of defilement for those defilements when the physical basis has the seeds in an impotent [or: non-seminal] state, as in the case of burnt rice seeds."[23] "Therefore, the expression 'endowed with' is appropriate just when there is the seed, undiminished, undamaged and whole; there is no other substantial thing [involved in] the notion of 'endowment.'"[24] Hoping to beat Vasubandhu at his own game, the Vaibhāṣika asks: "What pray tell is this 'seed'?"[25] Vasubandhu's answer is crucial and reflects the Sautrāntika emphasis on canonical categories as opposed to

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[22] āśrayo hi sa āryānām darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvrtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyānām kleśānām prarohasamartho bhavati/.

[23] ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūta āśrayah kleśānām prahīnakleśa iti ucyate/.

[24] tasmād bījam evātra anapoddhrtam anupahatam paripustam ca vaśitvakāle samanvāgamākhyam labhate na anyad dravyam/.

[25] kim punar idam bījam nāma/.

scholastically derived entities: "[Seed is] that name and form [the five personality aggregates] capable of originating fruition, either directly or mediately, by reason of the stream of consciousness-transformation-distinction."[26] (The Vaibhāṣika questioning and the Sautrāntika answers follow.) "What pray tell is this 'transformation'? It is an alteration of the stream of consciousness. What is this stream of consciousness? It is the samskāras of the past, present and future made up of causes and fruits."[27] Adding the observation that the whole notion of endowment is a designational dharma and not a substantial one, Vasubandhu gives the Vaibhāṣikas the last word: "However, we maintain that both prāpti and aprāpti are substantial [dharmas]. What is the reason? That is our system."[28] On this rather weak note the portrayal of the first Vaibhāṣika descriptive model for the karma process ends. At the heart of this description is a theoretical entity (prāpti or aprāpti) evidently postulated in order to describe the manner in which untamed defilements are not continually operative in the consciousness and other related phenomena.

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[26] yannāmarūpam phalotpattau samartham sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt/.

[27] ko 'yam pariṇāmo nāma/ santater anyathātvam/ kā ceyam santatiḥ/ hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ samskāraḥ/.

[28] dravyam eva tu Vaibhāṣikāḥ ubhayam varṇayanti/ kim kāraṇam/ eṣa hi naḥ siddhānta iti//36//.

The next major treatment of an allied area occurs in the Karmanirdeśa, the Avijñapti-adhikāra section, the opening Kārikās and Bhāṣya of the fourth chapter, of the Kośa. This material forms the translated text in this study and will be treated in depth after a quick look at one other controversy intimately related to the depiction of the karma process. This argument concerns the notions of paryavasthāna and anuśaya (emergence and residue) and takes place early in the fifth chapter. The Exposition of the Residues or Anuśaya-nirdeśa.[29] The argument concerns the relationship between the residues or traces of defilement in a given stream of consciousness and their emergences into or pervasion of that stream. Moreover, the debate here has a past.

In the Kathā Vatthū (ca. 250 B.C.) we find several arguments about natures not associated with thought, residues and their emergences, etc.[30] For example, the Mahāsanghikas and Sammitiyas are said to have maintained that the residues of defilement are morally indeterminate and not associated with thought (abhyākata and citta-vipayutta). The Theravādin takes the position that the residues cannot be dissociated from thought or morally indeterminate because he will only admit that Nibbāna and rūpa have these characteristics. This answer will not do for the opponents, who want to know how, then, one explains the mutual presence of defilement and

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[29] Kośa, V, kās. 1-3, Bhāṣya and sub-commentary.

[30] See Chapter I, note 21, this study.

virtuous thoughts in an average person. Unless the defilement is dissociated from thought it will evidently pervade the moment to moment thoughts and thereby make a virtuous thought an impossibility in an average stream of consciousness. The Theravādin admits that there cannot be both virtuous and unvirtuous thoughts in or before the mind at the same time and is therefore forced to admit that the residue of defilement is not connected with thought (na citta-sampayutta). The opponent then concludes that if it is not associated with thought (na citta-sampayutta) then it must be citta-vipayutta (dissociated from thought). At this point, the Pali text of the controversy ends. However, if one turns to the Pali Text Society translation of the same material, one finds an extra paragraph, the thrust of which is to give the last word in this controversy to the Theravādin. The added material (for which there is no corresponding Pali) reads as follows (Theravādin speaking):

> If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of lust while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts, your denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is independent of mind.[31]

The same basic argument is found elsewhere in the Kathā Vatthū: IX, 4 concerns the assertion that anuśaya is without mental object (anārammaṇā); XIV, 5 concerns the assertion that residues are different than their emergences into (or

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[31] Aung and Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy . . . , p. 255. No corresponding Pali can be given since none exists.

pervasion of) consciousness. These controversies also are characterized by translation over and above the actual Pali material. The effect is to give the last word and apparent victory to the Theravādin

In the Kośa, Vasubandhu solves the problem very neatly. This solution is presented in the course of his criticism of the Vaibhāṣika position that anuśaya and paryavasthāna are the same. The Vaibhāṣika denial of a difference between the two contradicts a sūtra which clearly affirms their distinction from each other.[32] Vasubandhu's denial of the identity of residue and emergence thereof into consciousness does not, oddly enough, commit him to the position that they are different dharmas, one associated with thought (the emergence) and the other non-associated with thought (the residue). In other words, Vasubandhu's answer to the question first raised in the Kathā Vatthu--"Is anusaya citta samprayutta or citta viprayutta?"--is: "Neither." The residue is neither associated with nor dissociated from thought because it is not a real (dravya) dharma.[33] Further, the correct explanation of the matter is couched by Vasubandhu in terms of the 'seed' model introduced earlier in reference to the Vaibhāṣika

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[32]See Jaini, STB, p. 240 and Kosa, V, 2, Bhāsya: tasya tatkāmarāgaparyavasthānam sthāmasah samyaktvasusamavahatam sānusayam prahīyate iti/ "The emergence (into consciousness) of his desire for sensuality, when vigorously and rightly combatted, is destroyed along with its residue."

[33]na ca anuśayah samprayukto na viprayuktah tasyādravyāntaratvāt/.

notion of prāpti: "Neither is residue associated with nor dissociated from (thought) because it is not included among the substantial (dharmas)."[34]

> Verily, when defilement is dormant it is called residue, when it is awakened it is called emergence. And what is its dormant state? When it does not face (the consciousness) it endures in the seed state. What is its awakening? When it has presence in [or: faces] consciousness it is awakened. And what pray tell is the seed state? It is the power to originate defilement, which power is engendered by defilement, that pertains to one who has attained existence. This is like the case of the power to originate the stations of mindfulness, which [power] is engendered by the knowledge based on experience, like the power of the sprout to originate kernels of rice, which power is itself engendered by kernels of rice.[35]

By recourse to the seed model Vasubandhu has reduced a problem with a long Adhidharma history down to the five skandha level of analysis.[36] Instead of involving himself in the unpleasant implications of the proposed Vaibhāṣika entities, Vasubandhu offers us the model of a 'seed' (never purported as anything other than a power within the five skandhas, a designation (prajnapti) for an ultimately mysterious process[37] that goes on within the five skandhas. If any lesson is to

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[34]Ibid.

[35]prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam/ ka ca tasya prasuptiḥ/ asammukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ/ ko 'yam bījabhāvo nāma/ ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ/ yathā anubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanaśaktiḥ yathā cankurādīnām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti/.

[36]See notes 27 and 30 of this chapter.

[37]asamjñāyamānaḥ, glossed by Yasomitra as duravabodhā, difficult to cognize or understand at IV, kā. 4, Bhāṣya (vol. II, p. 587, line 4 of Śāstri's edition).

be drawn from Vasubandhu's approach to describing the process whereby certain types of deeds and tendencies reside in the stream of consciousness and have eventual emergence into consciousness, etc., it is that, beyond the five skandha level of analysis, a greater degree of descriptive specificity involves the postulation of entities the canonical legitimacy and logical consistency of which are questionable.

The upshot of Vasubandhu s description of the karma related processes that he designates by means of the seed image is to be no wiser about the mysterious mechanism than at the outset. Nor is the further characterization of the seed's fruitional dimension by means of the 'stream of consciousness-transformation-distinction' label one that itself sheds much light on the process. The least that can be said for Vasubandhu and the limits of his seed image is that he is in good company as far as recognizing the limits of description is concerned. Several voices from the Indian tradition acknowledge the deep or mysterious nature of the transformations involved in the workings of karma. Moreover, he is not alone in his awareness that at some point the best that we can do is designate the workings of the mind and personality by recourse to theoretical entities, the employment of which will hopefully aid us in the task which precipitated their postulation in the first place. Of the theoretical entities developed by Freud, for example, one authority has made the following observations:

> The reader should bear in mind that there are no sharp boundaries between the three systems. Just because they have different names does not mean that they are separate entities. The names, id, ego and superego, actually signify nothing in themselves. They are merely a short-hand way of designating different processes, functions, mechanisms, and dynamisms within the total personality.[38]

The tendency to reify or attribute substantial being to their theoretical entities is characteristic of the Vaibhāṣika school as it is portrayed in the Abhidharmakośa. A return to the more skeletal system of theoretical entities found in the canonical sūtras characterizes the Sautrāntika school as it is portrayed in the same text. These two tendencies are at play throughout the text, but especially so in the Avijñapti adhikāra[39] of the fourth chapter, the Exposition of Karma. The following pages are offered as a running commentary on the argument. As in the case of the prāpti and the anuśaya controversies, the area under consideration here is that of the manner in which virtuous or unvirtuous resolutions and deeds inhere in the stream of consciousness without ruling out the possibility of morally unlike thoughts also arising in that stream.

The Vaibhāṣikas postulate still another dharma to account for this phenomenon, the avijñapti rūpa or 'form that

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[38] Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 34-35.

[39] While the end of this division of the text is clearly stated, no formal announcement of its beginning is indicated. It is my impression that the introductory passage prior to the fourth Kārikā of the chapter can be taken as the effective beginning of the intentional treatment of the avijñapti. No other juncture suggests itself as either equally or more appropriate.

does not indicate.' Along with the corporeal and vocal vijñaptis (indications, intimations or representations), the avijñapti rūpa constitutes karma, volition and the act after having willed.[40] Prior to looking at the argument in favor of these entities and Vasubandhu's critique thereof, let us look more closely at the terms themselves and their etymologies. Vijñapti, from which avijñapti is formed by the addition of the privative suffix a, is a feminine abstract noun composed of the prefix vi, which is basically distributive in meaning, plus the causally strengthened verbal root, jñā. The root itself signifies knowing and has such derivational cognates as the Greek gnosis, the German kennen and erkennen and the English word ken, etc.[41] Various meanings are appropriate to the root plus the vi prefix. Among these meanings are: to distinguish, discern, observe, investigate, recognize, ascertain, know, understand, etc.[42] The causally strengthened form of the root plus prefix would carry the added meaning of "causing to distinguish, discern, etc. . . ." The past passive participle, for example, means made known, reported, informed, etc. The feminine noun in -ti can be

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[40] IV, kās 1 and 2, a: KARMAJAM LOKAVAICITRYAM CETANĀ TATKṚTAM CA TAT/ CETANĀ MĀNASAM KARMA TAJJAM VĀKKĀYAKARMAṆĪ//1// TE TŪ VIJNAPTYĀVIJNAPTĪ. See trans.

[41] Alex Wayman, "Notes on the Sanskrit Term Jnāna," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 75.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1955), p. 253.

[42] See entry "vi-jña" in Monier-Williams, Monier, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

defined as information, indication, report, etc. Literally, the sense is 'something that makes known' or indication. In contemporary Hindi journalism the term vijñapti is used in a way that is translatable as the French word 'communique.' Thus, after an important meeting between heads of state, etc., a vijñapti will be issued summarizing those aspects of the meeting about which the government wishes the public to know. In short, the vijñapti indicates something to someone or informs someone of something. Buddhist scholars have translated the term as 'intimation'[43] and 'information' (Fr.).[44] In a later usage, common to Asanga and Vasubandhu and other authors in the Yogacāra school, the term takes on a more specialized meaning. When used in the context of Vijñaptimātra(tā) it is perhaps best translated as 'mental representation.' Justification for this will be given in the fifth chapter of this study dedicated to a comparison of the term in its Mahāyāna and Non-Mahāyāna usages.

The term avijñapti is most intricately involved with the mechanism of karma and is perhaps best translated as 'non-indication.' The justification for this translation will be apparent as this study continues. For the time being, suffice it to say that the avijñapti is supposed to be a theoretical entity that arises within the phenomenal

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[43]See Aung Davids and Rhys Davids, trans., Points of Controversy . . ., passim.

[44]Poussin, L'AK, passim.

individual when there is a morally qualifiable thought, word or deed. This entity pertains to the individual but does not 'indicate' or make anything known to the external world. The term has been the center of a large amount of comment by Buddhist scholars. Scherbatsky, while not treating the *avijñapti* in any great detail, says the following of it:

> Avijñapti is a kind of Karma. Actions can be either mental (*cetanā*) or physical--corporeal and vocal acts (*kāyika* and *vacika-karma*). They are also divided into manifest acts (*vijñapti*) and unmanifested ones--*avijñapti*. The latter are, for our habits of thought, not acts, but their results, they are not physical, but moral. If a novice has taken the vows he has committed a physical, vocal action, which is *vijñapti*, but the lasting result is some moral excellence hidden in consciousness, and that is *avijñapti*. It constitutes a link between the act and its future retribution; it is, therefore, the same as *samskāra*, *apūrva*, *adrsta* of the Brahamanical systems. Although by no means physical, since it lacks the general characteristic of impenetrability (*sapratighatva*), it nevertheless is brought by the Sarvāstivādins (not by others) under the head of rūpa, because of its close connection with the physical act which it follows as a shadow cast from an object always follows that object.[45]

This characterization is accurate in parts, but I feel that Scherbatsky is in error when he suggests that its classification under *rūpa* was brought about solely because of its affinity with physical actions. More probably, it was brought under the heading of *rūpa* in order to assure its non-association with the flow of thoughts. The *rūpa* classification functions here in the same manner as the other attempts (*prāpti* and *anuśaya*) to include the 'carriers of karma' under the heading of the *citta-viprayukta-samskāras*. In all three

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[45]Scherbatsky, CCB, pp. 99-100.

cases there is the necessity of having the entity in question dissociated from thought.

McGovern treats the avijñapti in roughly the same detail:

> Avijñapti was a term of much dispute among the Buddhists, and there were even widely diverging opinions as to the general group under which this particular category should come. The term means 'not manifested,' or not expressed or latent. According to the Buddhists, every physical act, word or thought should have some corresponding result. In many cases the result was open and obvious. An act visibly modified the nature and position of the molecules. Sometimes, however, no such manifested (vijñapti) result would be observed. The moral theory of the Buddhists would not allow them to suppose that such an action had no result, even though no result were visible, so they invented the category of Avijñapti, which we may say corresponds to the Western idea of the general character of a man, inasmuch as the general character of a man is affected by his past actions, even though it seems to have no result.[46]

Further, he states: "This general character was affected by not only definite conscious acts, but also by acts performed unconsciously or in a state of confused thought."[47] This last remark is a slight misinterpretation of I, Kā. 11 which states that the avijñapti pertains to one even if he be in a state that is devoid of thought or if he be of momentarily distracted thought. That is, the avijñapti continues to pertain to one even if he has thoughts that are morally unlike the thought or act that gave rise to the non-indication.

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[46]William Montgomery McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy (London: Luzac & Co., 1923) I, 128-29.

[47]Ibid., p. 129.

A more detailed treatment of the *avijñapti rūpa* is to be found in Karunadasa's *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, which, while primarily concerned with Pali materials, nonetheless has several sections dealing with parallel developments in the Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition. While pointing out that "The Theravādins do not recognize under any guise the *avijñapti rūpa*, which for the Vaibhāṣikas is the one and only *dharmāyatana rūpa*,"[48] he does refer to a *sūtra* (Dīgha Nikāya, III, p. 217) that was cited by the Vaibhāṣikas in support of their inclusion of the *avijñapti* under both the *rūpa* and *dharmāyatana* headings.[49] Karunadasa points out that the Theravadins recognized 24 distinct kinds of derived-form (*upādā-rūpa*), 16 of which were further recognized as 'forms included within the realm of *dharmas*' (*dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna-rūpa*)--"They are cognized only by the mind (*mano*); their existence is known by a process of inference."[50] Included in these 16 *dharmas* were: the faculty of femininity (*itthindriya*), the faculty of masculinity (*purusindriya*), material faculty of life (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), the corporeal and vocal indications, three characteristics of matter (plasticity, etc.), four phases of matter (integration, . . . decay), space, nutrition and in some cases, a heart element.[51]

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[48]Karunadasa, BAM, p. 36.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Ibid., p. 35.

[51]Ibid., pp. 34-35.

The Vaibhāṣikas accept this category (forms that are not seen by the eye and do not offer impedence or obstruction) but include in it only the *avijñapti-rūpa*. As far as the 16 forms included under the heading of the *dharmāyatana* by the Theravādins are concerned, the Vaibhāṣikas either do not accept them or include them under a different heading. For example, they include the four marks of compounded natures under the heading of the *citta-viprayukta-samskāras*.[52]

Takakusu also gives a brief account of the *avijñapti-rūpa*:

> Of the eleven [form dharmas], the first five are sense-organs and the next five are sense-objects. The four gross elements--Earth, Water, Fire, Air--are represented by the sense-objects. In addition to these, there is a peculiar one. That is the 'form-element not manifested' outwardly (avijñapti-rūpa). When we will to act, the mental function itself is called will (cetanā). In Buddhism it is called will-action. This is usually expressed in words or in body, and is called word-action or body-action respectively. These two actions manifested outwardly, whether they are good or bad, present a corresponding and similar action in mind, and form an abiding impression or image. They are then called unmanifested action (avijñapti-karma). These actions being taken as form-elements are considered to be sense-objects though not manifested (avijñapti-rūpa).[53]

It should be borne in mind that the above general characterizations of the *avijñapti-rūpa* are drawn mainly from the material in the Kośa that forms the subject matter of this study. In this light, perhaps our first task is to consult the text itself in order better to appreciate the

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[52] Ibid., p. 41.

[53] Takakusu, EBP, p. 69.

positions involved and the doctrinal consequences and implications of those positions. A summary of the above material on the avijñapti is in order here. It (like prāpti and anusaya) seems to have been postulated to account for the widely accepted notion of a link up between thoughts, words and deeds on the one hand, and their fruitional or karmic consequences on the other. The necessity for it being a nature not associated with thought has been indicated above. In a sense, the Sautrāntika refutation of it (and its replacement by the Bīja/santāna-pariṇāma-viśeṣa model) takes on more significance when seen in the context of the other Sautrāntika critiques of entities postulated to account for the same phenomena. Thus, the Vaibhāṣikas are taken to task on all of the attempts to establish a substantial link up between deeds and their later fruition. To be convinced by Vasubandhu's anti-Vaibhāṣika arguments is to likewise see the Vaibhāṣikas in the untenable position of being unable to account for the principle of karmic retribution or at least the mechanism whereby certain aspects thereof are effected.

Turning directly to the Kośa, the first mention that we find of the avijñapti-rūpa is in the Dhātu-nirdeśa, the first chapter of the work, devoted to the exposition of the Dhātus or the "eighteen psycho-physical constituent elements of the personality in relation to the outside world."[54]

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[54]See entry "ḍhatu" in Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven, 1953).

Vasubandhu offers an explanation for the sense of the dhātu classification in Chap. I, Kā. 20: "Just as the many species of iron, copper, silver, gold, etc. in a mountain are called 'dhātus' (ores or elements), just so, in a physical basis or stream (of consciousness) the eighteen classes are called dhātus. Herein the aspects are called species."[55] The division represents the reduction of experience into six sense faculties, six kinds of objective elements and six kinds of consciousness.[56] Early in the Dhātu-nirdeśa the Vaibhāṣika conception of the Rūpa-skandha is given. It includes the five sense bases (those of the eye, ear, tongue, nose and body) and their respective fields (visible, audible, gustable, odorous and tangible 'forms') plus the avijñapti.[57] The eleventh Kārikā outlines the characteristics of the dharma. As can be seen from the translation of this Kārikā, the avijñapti is said to be an interconnection, of a morally qualifiable nature, that arises in dependence on great elements and pertains to one even if he be of distracted thought or momentarily in a state that is devoid of thought. The

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[55] yathaikasmin parvate bahūnyas tāmrarūpyasuvarnadi gotrāni dhātava ucyate ekasminnāśraye santāne vā aṣṭādaśa gotrāni aṣṭādaśa dhātava ucyate/ ākarās tatra gotrāṇi ucyante.

[56] Scherbatsky, CCB, p. 9.

[57] I, Kā. 9, a and b: RŪPAM PAÑCENDRIYĀNYARTHĀH PAÑCĀVIJÑAPTIR EVA CA/ Pañcendriyāni cakṣuḥ-śrotra-ghrāna-jihvā-kāyendriyāni pañcārthās teṣām eva cakṣurādināmindriyānām yathāsvam viṣayāḥ rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyākhyāḥ avijñaptis ca iti etāvān rūpaskandhaḥ/.

fact that it arises in dependence on primary elements is specified in order to distinguish it from the flow of prāptis. Thus, while it would seem that these two theoretical entities--the avijñapti and prāpti have remarkably similar functions, they are hereby distinguished. It seems that prāpti is a force (citta-viprayukta-samskāra) and avijñapti is more of a substantial thing. That Vasubandhu leaves the Vaibhāṣika portrayal of the avijñapti without making any comment thereon is perhaps understandable if we keep in mind that this chapter of the Kosa is dedicated to the explication of the dravya of dharmas.[58] When the Vaibhāṣika portrayal of its functions are listed Vasubandhu begins his critique of it.

The fact that the avijñapti arises in dependence on the four great elements means that in some sense, they cause it to come about. The manner in which they cause it to come about, or more correctly, operate as a causal condition for it, is briefly mentioned in the Bhāṣya on the Kārikā. It is said that they are the 'generative, etc. cause' of it. Reference to five varieties of causal condition (kāraṇa-hetu) is found at II, 65 and Bhāṣya thereon. The relevant sections are:

> THE ELEMENTS ARE THE CAUSES . . . OF THE BHAUTIKA [DERIVED ELEMENT] IN FIVE WAYS . . .
>
> The elements are the cause of the derived elements in

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[58] Akira Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (P. Pradhan Edition), Part I, Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, 1973), p. xxxiii.

five ways. Wherefore are they their cause? "By reason of generation, by reason of sustaining, by reason of supporting, by reason of maintaining and by reason of increasing." This is, moreover, the causal condition divided in five ways: Generative cause, because it is the origination of them, sustaining cause because the elements have influence on what is engendered and because there is a fruit of predominant activity, as in the case of the Ācarya being the sustainer [sub commentary: of the monk], supporting cause because of being the support, as the painting is supported by the wall, the maintaining cause because there is the uninterrupted cause, and the cause of increase because there is a reason for growth.[59]

These five divisions of the causal condition appear to be five ways in which the great of primary elements can be said to 'cause' or make possible the origination of, their derivatives.

The Bhāṣya on the Kārikā contains one qualification not made in the kārikā itself--the non-indication has the intrinsic nature of both rūpa and kriyā, form and function. The sub commentary explains this by pointing out that it has the nature of form, like the eye, etc., which quality it shares with the indication. It also has the nature of function or action which it also shares with the indication. However, unlike the indication, it does not indicate anything to another.[60] In regard to the 'summary' of the avijñapti

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[59]BHAUTIKASYA TU PAÑCADHĀ/ Bhautikasya tu bhūtāni pañcaprakāro hetuḥ/ katham/ jananānniśrayāt sthānād upasthambhopavṛṃhaṇāt/ so 'yam kāraṇahetur eva punaḥ pañcadhā bhinnaḥ 1. jananahetuḥ tebhya utpatteḥ/ 2. niśrayahetuḥ jātasya bhūtānuvidhāyitvāt puruṣakāraphalād ācāryādiniśrayavat/ 3. pratiṣṭhāhetuḥ ādhārabhāvāt citrakṛtyavat/ 4. upastambhahetuḥ anucchedahetutvāt/ 5. vṛddhihetutuḥ upavṛṃhaṇahetutvāt/.

[60]I, Kā. 11, Bhāṣya: rūpakriyāsvabhāvāpi satī vijñaptivaditi param na vijñāpayatītyāvijñaptiḥ/.

which makes up the last sentence of the translation of this material (I, Kā 11), the sub commentary adds that the Ācarya has described the avijñapti in this brief fashion for the reason of easy comprehension by the student.[61] Future references to the avijñapti will not be characterized by either brevity or ease of comprehension.

Discussion of the vijñapti and avijñapti is taken up again in the fourth chapter, the Karma nirdeśa or 'Exposition of Karma.' The first Kārikā of that chapter establishes the following: The diversity of the worlds is created by the karma of sentient beings.[62] Karma amounts to volition and that which is engendered by volition.[63] Volition amounts to mental karma, which gives rise to corporeal and vocal karma.[64] Kārikās two and three treat the corporeal and vocal indications. The Bhāṣya on the corporeal indication is quite lengthy and concerns itself with debate on the nature of the corporeal indication. The debate can be divided into two parts for the sake of analysis: I. The Vaibhāṣika denial of the apparently Vātsīputrīya position that the corporeal indication is motion (gati), and the assertion of shape as the corporeal indication; and II. The Sautrāntika denial of

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[61] samāsatastviti/ vistaraḥ--siṣyasukhāvabodhārtham saṃkṣepato vākyena tadavijnaptirūpam dārsayatyācāryaḥ/.

[62] KARMAJAM LOKAVAICITRYAM.

[63] CETANĀ TATKṚTAM CA TAT/.

[64] CETANĀ MĀNASAM KARMA TAJJAM VĀKKĀYAKARMAṆĪ //1//.

shape as a substantial *dharma* and consequently, as the corporeal indication. Let us first treat the Vaibhāṣika denial of motion and the assertion of shape as the corporeal indication.

I. Denial of motion as *kāya-vijñapti* and the assertion of shape (saṃsthāna) as same: Vaibhāṣika critique of a Vātsīputrīya position.

Vasubandhu mentions in the Bhāṣya on 2, b and c that some maintain that the corporeal indication is motion. The party maintaining this is identified in the sub commentary as the Vāstīputrīya. "They say that corporeal karma pertains to one in motion and not to one that is not in motion."[65] The Vaibhāṣika critique of this position rests on the basic argument that motion is not possible for a compounded thing because compounded things are momentary. Thus, it is incorrect to say that a fire moves through the grass. Rather, momentary flames arise and pass away in immediate proximity to one another, thereby creating the appearance of motion. This denial of motion is a logical result of the doctrine of the momentary existence of compounded things. In short, "Since all that is compounded does not exist after it has attained identity, it is destroyed in the same place where it was produced. Transference to another place is not valid for

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[65] *prasandamānasya hi kāyakarma no 'prasandamānasyyeti/* or, as per one manuscript variation: . . . '*prasandamānasya ta ucyante/*.

it."[66] Likewise, the possibility that the momentary states undergo some sort of 'alteration' (atha-anyathībhūtaḥ) is rejected by the Vaibhāṣika on the grounds that loss of character is not valid for a momentary state and would in fact amount to a new or different state. The opponent (previously identified as a Vātsīputrīya) objects to the Vaibhāṣika position of the spontaneous destruction of states (ākasmika-vināśa) on the grounds that the destruction of logs, etc. as a result of conjunction with fire, etc., is certainly perceived. The Vaibhāṣika points out that the spontaneous destruction hypothesis can apply equally well to the destruction of the logs and therefore, the conclusion that they are destroyed by the fire, etc. is based on inference and not on direct perception. The opponent's supposition that individual flames and sounds are destroyed by the flames and sounds that succeed them is likewise rejected on the grounds that successive sounds, thoughts, etc. are not simultaneous and are often of a different character. Thus, "In the case where keen sounds and cognitions arise and thereafter dull sounds and cognitions arise, how could the natures belonging to the dull class destroy the natures belonging to the keen class?"[67] The supposition

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[66] sarvam hi samskrtam ātmalābhād urdhvam na bhavatīti yatraiva jātam tatraiva dhvasyate/ tasyāyuktā deśāntara-samkrāntiḥ/

[67] yadā ca paṭubuddhiśabdānantaram apaṭubuddhiśabdau utpadyete tadā katham apaṭuḥ samānajātīyo dharmaḥ paṭīyāmsam himsyāt/.

that the destruction of states is due to the absence of a durative cause (avasthānahetvabhāvād) is also rejected since an absence is not able to be a cause. The sub commentary attributes this conception of destruction of states to a 'Sthavira-Vasubandhu,' reference to whom prompted Frauwallner to conclude that Asanga's brother Vasubandhu is not the author of the Kośa.

The Vaiśeṣika position that the destruction of flames is brought about by the function of the forces of dharma and adharma is rejected because these forces would have to have attainment of function and arrest of function from moment to moment, since the flames are momentary. This is followed by the remark: "And this conception of cause is able to apply to compounded things universally--enough of argument." I am of the opinion that 'this conception of cause' refers to the ākasmika (spontaneous) destruction of states. However, Yaśomitra, the seventh-century commentator, identifies 'this conception' as the Vaiśeṣika position. He equates 'this conception' with 'destruction as a result of dharma and adharma' and adds that it is able to apply to karma and all compounded things of at least two atoms in size. It seems odd that Yaśomitra is willing to grant the applicability of the Vaiśeṣika conception of cause when Vasubandhu (qua Vaibhāṣika) has just rejected the same. Moreover, his own following remarks make the identification of 'this conception' with that of the Vaiseṣikas even more improbable. For example,

after his comment that Vasubandhu means to say that the Vaiśeṣika conception is applicable to all compounded things he adds: "Hence, this is not to be said--that the destruction of the logs, etc. is because of conjunction with the fire, etc. and so forth. And thus, is the establishment of the momentariness of all compounded things; this is because, in regard to dharma and adharma, there is disregard for their destructive cause--thus he says 'enough of argument.'"[68] Obviously, it is not good practice to find fault with a seventh-century commentator's interpretation of Vasubandhu's meaning just for the sake of convenience. I am led to disagree with Yaśomitra's interpretation of Vasubandhu's meaning here because of the reasons cited above. Basically, I doubt that Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika or Vaibhāṣika) is willing to admit that the Vaiśeṣika conception of cause is appropriate here when he has just denied that the forces of dharma and adharma are capable of attaining function and having that function arrested immediately thereafter. The Vaibhāṣika argument against the thesis that motion is the corporeal indication is summarized as follows:

> Therefore, there is no destructive cause of states. They are simply destroying themselves because of transitoriness. The momentary transitoriness of them is proven because they are immediately destroyed after origination. And, because of the momentary transitoriness, motion is

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[68] ato na vaktavyam etat--agnisamyogāt kāṣṭādīnām vināśa itievamadi/ tataśca sarvasaṃskṛtasya kṣaṇikasiddhiḥ dharmayos tadvināśakāraṇāntarānapekṣyatvād ityalam vivādena.

impossible. However, there is the imputation of motion when there is immediate origination in another place, as in the case of the fire in the grass. And, by reason of the absence of motion, it is proven that 'the corporeal indication is shape.[69]

II. The Sautrantika denial of shape as a substantial *dharma*.

This presentation of the Vaibhāṣika position on the corporeal indication should dispel any doubts about the rigor and thoroughness with which Vasubandhu presents the Vaibhāṣika views. The fact that the Vaibhāṣika position is immediately criticized from the Sautrāntika perspective in the following material does not diminish the integrity of Vasubandhu's presentation of the Vaibhāṣika views. His criticism of the notion that shape is the corporeal indication is similar to his criticism of *prāpti* in the sense that he denies that shape is a substantial thing (*na dravyasat samsthānam*). Using the example of the whirling firebrand, Vasubandhu points out that the origination of points of fire, originated in various directions in immediate succession yields various shapes, long, short, square, round, etc.

The dual nature of the presentation (Vaibhāṣika position, followed by Sautrantika criticism) in the Kosa is exemplified by the introductory Bhāṣya material for Kā. 3, c. After denying that shape is a substantial thing, Vasubandhu

[69] *tasmānnāsti bhāvānām vināśahetuḥ/ svayameva tu vinās'ayanta utpannamātrād vināśayantīti siddha eṣām kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ/ kṣaṇabhaṅgācca gatyabhāvaḥ/ gatyābhimānastu deśāntareṣu nirantarotpattau tṛṇajvālāvat gatyabhāve ca saṃsthānaṃ kāyavijñaptiḥ iti siddham/.*

adds: "But if it were [a substantial thing], IT WOULD BE GRASPABLE BY TWO [SENSE ORGANS]." Here, as in the translation itself, the capitalized portion of the sentence is from the Kārikā itself. The remainder of the sentence, the hypothetical 'if' clause represents the Sautrāntika position. The phrasing of the Kārikā itself in the optative mode, while necessary grammatically, reflects the fact that Vasubandhu is here presenting a position, a hypothetical one, that will be criticized. Likewise, in the Kārikā from the first chapter initially describing the nature of the *avijñapti*, Vasubandhu's phrasing indicates that the content thereof is not necessarily in agreement with his own views. Thus, the description does not assert that the *avijñapti* *is* of such and such a nature, but that it is *said to be* or *considered to be* (lit. 'called') of such and such a nature. This again suggests that the Kārikās are a device used to get the Vaibhāṣika position on the table so that it can be dealt with from the Sautrāntika perspective if it is in conflict with Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika posture.

To return to the flow of the argument, Vasubandhu points out that shape is not substantial because it is not graspable by both the senses of touch and sight. That is, shape is not necessarily associated with a given tangible. A given tangible nature need not occur necessarily with reference to a given shape. Nor is shape found in atoms. Rather, "When there are many, set out in a certain manner,

there is the designation 'long, etc.'"[70] Another attempt to establish the substantial nature of shape is offered and rejected. "Suppose this--the notion of 'long, etc.' occurs when shape atoms are set out in a certain manner. That amounts to the falling of feathers since there is no proof of them [the atoms of shape]. If the intrinsic nature of them could be proven, then quantity would be appropriate to them."[71] And, of course, that there is a nature that has the intrinsic characteristic of a 'shape atom' cannot be demonstrated.

The last attempt to establish the substantial nature of shape is the suggestion that shape occurs along with color, non-differentiated from it. Vasubandhu objects to this view on the grounds that such a state of affairs would be contradicted by the obvious fact that earthen colored pots exist in a variety of shapes, yet they are all the same color. "Have we not said that when there is color, in the manner pointed out (originating in adjacent locations, etc.), the notion of 'long, etc.' is designated? Just as, while there are distinct ants in close proximity, one makes the

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[70] tasmād bahuṣveva tathāsanniviṣṭeṣu dīrghādiprajñaptiḥ/.

[71] atha matam--saṃsthānaparamāṇava eva tathāsanniviṣṭā dīrghādisaṃjñā bhavanti iti/ or, per manuscript variation, . . . dīrghādisaṃjñām labhanta/.

distinction of 'row, circle, etc.,' just so is it in regard to shape."[72]

In response to Vasubandhu's suggestion that shapes are notions or designations that arise upon the visual perception of color, the Vaibhāṣika points out that often, because of extreme distance or darkness, one cannot discern the color of an object, yet one can discern the length, etc., of a post, etc. How is this possible if shape arises in connection with the perception of colors by the eye? Vasubandhu responds that we form a mental conception (parikalpam kurvanti) of a given shape although the color is indistinct. "And this is widely known. And, whenever a mere mass that is indistinct is seen but discrimination [thereof] is not ascertainable, one says 'What is it?'"[73] Having exhausted all attempts to establish the substantial nature of shape, the Vaibhāṣikas then ask for the Sautrāntika depiction of the corporeal indication of karma. "Well then, having rejected the motion of the body and shape as well, what do your honors the Sautrāntikas designate as the corporeal indication? Indeed, they designate precisely shape as the corporeal indication.

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[72]nanu coktam yathā kṛtvā varṇe dīrghādisaṃjñā prajñapyate yathā ca pipīlikādīnām abhede paṅkticakrādīnām bhedaḥ prajñāyate tathā saṃsthānasyāpi/.

[73]veviditam caitadevam/ yat kadācid anirdhāryamāṇa-paricchedam saṅghātmātramavyaktam dṛśyate kimapyetaditi/.

However, it is not substantial."[74] For Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika), corporeal Karma is simply karma that is sustained by the body, of which volition is the leader or enlivener. The Vaibhāṣikas object that if there be no *vijnapti* then in the realm of desire there would likewise be no *avijnapti* since it was earlier said to arise in dependence on great elements. Further, it would be dependent for its presence on thought and therefore would not pertain to one of distracted thought or one who is without thought. And, this conflicts with the Vaibhāṣika portrayal given in the first chapter. Vasubandhu (qua Sautrāntika) is not overly concerned with maintaining the existence of the *avijñapti*, but offers an explanation thereof that is consistent with his denial of a substantial *vijñapti* anyway.

The last thing to be considered before the *Avijñapti-adhikara* proper is the nature of the vocal indication (*vāg-vijñapti*). The vocal indication of karma is the bursting forth (*dhvani*) of speech. Other sounds, such as that of wind in the trees, etc. are not considered as the vocal indication of karma. "Just the sound that has the nature of speech is the vocal indication."[75] The agreement on this point is a welcome respite from the debate and reflects the

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[74] *athedānīm kāyasya gatim nirākrtya samsthānam ca tatra bhavantaḥ sautrāntikah kām kāyavijñaptim prajñapayanti/ samsthānam eva hi te kāyavijñaptim prajñapayanti na tu punar dravyataḥ/.*

[75] *vāksvabhāvo yaḥ sabdaḥ saiva vāgvijñaptiḥ/.*

broad agreement within the Buddhist schools on this matter. The harmony of this description with Pali sources will be brought out in the comparative chapter. We now turn to the intensive treatment of the avijñapti, which topic is of primary importance for this study.

The material that culminates in the Avijñapti-adhikara contains references to several complex and controversial areas within the overall Buddhist salvational edifice and therefore we are required to go into several of these areas in some detail in order best to appreciate and understand the significance of many of the passages. Included in these controversial or complex areas are: the theory of the path and the breakdown thereof into such categories as mundane and supermundane, the path of vision and the path of cultivation, etc.; the theory of causes, conditions and fruits, etc.; and, the theory of the relationship between deeds, thoughts and words and their later fruition. Each of these areas of concern are characterized by a rich doctrinal history, specific areas of contention and a great deal of speculation about matters that do not admit of empirical verification. Such considerations result in an often technical exposition and the necessity for further equally technical digressions. Such is the nature of the material. Each of these areas will be treated as it arises in the text itself. For purposes of analysis the material can be broken down into two general categories: (1) The Vaibhāṣika arguments in

favor of such a theoretical entity and the Sautrāntika rejection of such an entity coupled with an alternative explanation for the processes and functions pertaining to the *avijñapti*, and (2) an analysis of the characteristics that would pertain to such an entity if one granted its substantial *dharma* status. These two general areas can be further divided. The following divisions are made for the sake of analysis and are suggested only by the nature of the material, not directly mandated by the text itself:

I. Vaibhāsika assertions and Sautrāntika denials and alternative explanations regarding the *avijñapti*.

   A. Vaibhāsika assertions supporting the substantial nature of the *avijñapti-rūpa dharma*.

      1. There is a canonical passage asserting the legitimacy of a class or *rūpa dharmas* that are neither 'shown' nor 'impeded.' The *avijñapti rūpa* is such a *dharma*.

      2. There is canonical reference to a form that is without fluxes. Certain classes of the *avijñapti rūpa* without fluxes are therefore canonically justified.

      3. There is canonical justification for the position that the merit which accrues from certain meritorious acts can increase even though the doer of the act may be characterized by thoughts of a nature morally unlike that of the thought that accompanied the original act. The *avijñapti rūpa* is the entity that operationalizes this canonically admitted process.

      4. Unless the existence of the *avijñapti* be admitted, there will be no way of accounting for the karmic retribution of an individual who himself does not do a morally qualifiable act, but employs another for its commission.

5. The Buddha did not deny the possibility of form dharmas within the dharmāyatana. Thus, the way is further paved for accepting the substantial status of the avijñapti rūpa.

6. Without recourse to the avijñapti-rūpa, there would be no way of establishing the appurtenance of all eight members of the Eightfold path to one in meditative and other states wherein three basically actional members of the path are not being practiced. Thus, one practicing right meditation would be engaging in neither right speech, bodily action or livelihood. The endurance of these three members is said to be insured by a non-indication thereof.

7. Unless there be a non-indication, there will be no mechanism that insures the inherence of the pratimoksa vow when that person has thoughts that are of a nature that is morally unlike that of the vow. (This argument contains a dynamic similar to that involved in the prāpti discussion and I., A, 3, above.)

These assertions are each countered by Vasubandhu from the Sautrāntika perspective. He also enlists the aid of mutually accepted sūtras, the opinions of former teachers and some opinions of the Yogācāras to which his overall perspective is amenable. In outline these counter arguments are:

B. Sautrāntika denials and alternative explanations regarding the avijñapti-rūpa.

1. The formal dharma that is neither 'shown' nor 'impeded' is held by the Yogācāras to be the form that is the field of samādhi which arises through the meditator's power of samādhi.

2. The formal dharma that is without fluxes need not be considered as the avijñapti rūpa but as the form that arises for the meditator as a result of a meditation that is itself without fluxes.

3. The process whereby an individual's merit increases even though he may be characterized by morally indeterminate or unvirtuous thoughts need not be explained by recourse to the avijñapti rūpa. Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of certain unidentified 'Former Teachers' that in this matter, there obtains a subtle transformation distinction in the stream of consciousness. This is a return to the model offered in the prāpti debate.

4. The assertion that a non-indication is needed in order to account for the applicability of the 'path of karma' to one who employs another to perform a morally qualifiable deed is likewise countered by reference to the subtle stream of consciousness transformation distinction.

5. Admitting that the Buddha did not deny the possibility that form dharmas are included under the heading of purely mental dharmas, Vasubandhu suggests that, far from legitimating the avijñapti rūpa, such a class as those suggested in I, B, 1 are to be understood.

6. In regard to the assertion that unless there be an avijñapti rūpa, there will not be the Noble Eightfold Path, Vasubandhu counters with observation that the one attained to the Path (including certain meditational states) undergoes a transformation of the physical basis such that thereafter he no longer engages in wayward speech, etc. Thus the member of the Path is a metaphor for or effect of certain unique transformations undergone as a result of spiritual practices.

7. The Pratimoksa vow is likewise saved by reference to pledging by a previous rite with volition. He points out that, in effect, the vow has been stationed on with mindfulness and has made a significantly dramatic impression in one's consciousness that, at the time of a contemplated action, one recalls the promise and is ashamed and therefore refrains from acting.

This section of the text ends on the following note: "Enough

of this prolixity! According to the Vaibhāṣikas there is a non-indication form that is substantial."[76] The remainder of the remarks on this entity should be understood to be hypothetical in nature. That is, further characterizations of the entity are usually phrased in 'if-then' terms--If there be such an entity, then it would have such and such a characteristic. This section of the text can be outlined along the following lines (the divisions are purely of convenience and not mandated in any particular way by the text itself):

II. Analysis of the avijñapti rūpa in terms of the characteristics that would apply to it if one granted it substantial status.

A. Discussion of the Great Elements in dependence on which the avijñapti would arise. Reference to distinctions of past, present and future Great Elements as well as to the various realms (desire, form, etc.).

B. Reduction of the entity to terms of vow, non-vow (restraint and non-restraint) and neither one nor the other.

C. The morally qualified nature of the entity, analysis of the realms to which variously qualified non-indications would pertain, etc.

D. Delineation of which individuals are endowed with which vows.

E. Relationship of origination of the Vows to the theory of the Path, including consideration of Path of Vision, Path of Cultivation, meditational intervals, Unimpeded path and Liberational Path, the Undaunted stage, etc.

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[76] alam vistareṇa astyeva dravyāntaram avijñaptirūpam iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ/.

F. Manners in which the virtuousness of natures may be determined--ultimate sense, in terms of intrinsic nature, in terms of mental association and in the sense of arousal.

G. Final remark about the endurance of an auspicious _avijñapti_ in the stream of consciousness of one who may be established in no other vow or form of restraint and the endurance of an inauspicious _avijñapti_ in the stream of consciousness of one who may be endowed with restraint or established in a vow.

This last remark captures much of the theoretical function of the entity and seems to reveal Vasubandhu's awareness that it was the need to account for precisely the presence of such unlike karmic and biographical traits in one stream of consciousness that precipitated the postulation of such an entity as the _avijñapti-rūpa_. We now move to a detailed consideration of each of the arguments. In each case, the basic point being asserted and the critique thereof will be examined. Peripheral considerations will also be mentioned. Where necessary additional material (much of which is drawn from the Kośa itself, some of which is drawn from Pali and Mahāyāna sources) will be provided in order to appreciate the overarching structure of which these particular passages are vital parts.

The discussion of the _avijñapti_ is introduced by a few Sautrāntika remarks in support of the denial of substantial status for that entity. They take this position because the non-indication is the mere non-doing of something, that it is a designation that arises in dependence on past great

elements and their nature is not found, and because it lacks the intrinsic nature of form.[77] The first half of Kārikā 4 introduces four of the above outlined arguments (I, A, 1-4) and states that there are other arguments as well. The Bhāṣya on this half of the Kārikā amounts to the following seven pages of the translation and contains the most vital material in the entire Kosa regarding that dimension of the karma process outlined in the first twenty pages of this chapter.

The first two Vaibhāṣika arguments in favor of the substantial status of the avijñapti-rūpa seek to establish the canonical justification for positing such an entity. The fact that it does not 'indicate' anything to anyone necessitates that it be 'not shown' (anidarśana). Moreover, the avijñapti does not come into contact with any of the five sense bases--it is neither obstructed, impeded, nor in contact with them.[78] The Rūpasamgrahasūtra, equated with Dīgha, iii, 217 by both La Vallee Poussin and Karunadasa, is the canonical referent for the position that there is a form that is both 'not shown and not impeded.' Further, there is scriptural authority for the position that there is a form that is without fluxes. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that this fluxless form must be none other than the avijñapti-rūpa.

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[77] sāpi dravyato nāstīti sautrāntikāḥ abhyupetyākaraṇamātratvāt/ atītānyapi mahābhūtānyupādāya prajñapteḥ teṣām cāvidyamānasvabhāvād rūpalakṣaṇābhāvācca/.

[78] See Chap. IV, pp. 163-64.

Yaśomitra explains that the fluxless form would be the non-indication associated with corporeal and vocal karma that pertain to one attained to the truth of the path.

Vasubandhu denies that these two references need to be understood as justifications for the postulation of a substantial dharma called avijñapti-rūpa. He points out that the Yogācāras teach that the form which originates in Samādhi and constitutes the field of that Samādhi is 'not shown or impeded.'[79] Likewise, that form is without fluxes when the meditation is without fluxes. In response to the possible query of how such meditational forms can be considered to be rūpa, Vasubandhu replies that they may be so considered in the same fashion that one imagines the avijñapti to be rūpa.

On the same issue of what constitutes form that is without fluxes, others teach that the form of the Arhat and external form are of such a nature because they do not provide a basis for the fluxes. These 'others' are identified by La Vallee Poussin as Darṣṭāntikas on the authority of an unidentified Japanese editor. This position is challenged by reference to another sūtra which asserts that form is with flux as long as there is the eye, as long as there are forms. The Dārṣṭāntikas (?) reply that in the latter sūtra, the term 'with flux' is used in the sense of non-opposition to fluxes. Thus their former opinion that the rūpa of the

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[79] tatra yogācārā upadisanti--dhyāyinām samādhivisaya-rūpam samādhiprabhāvād utpadyate caksurindriyāvisayatvāt anidarsanam desānavaraṇād apratighamiti/ See trans., p. 166.

Arhat and external rūpa are without flux is maintained. In further support of this position they refer to a sūtra that acknowledges that certain forms are with flux and indulged in and are further "the basis of deficiency and injury to the mind."[80] Thus the 'victory' would seem to go to the Dārṣṭāntika if indeed this is the party whose views are being represented.

The next Vaibhāṣika argument advanced in favor of the substantial nature of the non-indication rests on a sūtra, identified by La Vallee Poussin as Madhyamāgama, 2, 4, which affirms the increase of merit for the individual who has performed certain meritorious acts, even though that person be later characterized by morally unlike states of mind. That is, while actually performing the meritorious act, the person may be characterized by virtuous thoughts. At a later time the same individual may be characterized by absence of thought (as in deep sleep) or the presence of unvirtuous thoughts. Still, the merit that may accrue from the act is enhanced and indeed, rears more merit. In order to account for this canonically legitimated process the Vaibhāṣika takes recourse to the avijñapti-rūpa. Here, as in the other arguments against the postulation of the avijñapti-rūpa, Vasubandhu has the obligation to provide a sound explanation of the area of karmic continuity in question as well as

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[80] cetahkhilamrakṣavastu, referred to in Digha, iii, 237, acc. to Poûssin, L'AK.

debunk the Vaibhāṣika position. In this case his alternative explanation of the phenomena in question rests on the subtle transformation of the stream of consciousness distinction. In support of this vital aspect of alternative descriptive vocabulary he quotes the opinion of certain unidentified 'former teachers.' Deleting several ablative clauses, the passage reads: "For this is the true nature--that just as much as the gifts of the giver are partaken of . . . just that much do the streams (of consciousness) of the givers undergo a subtle and distinguished transformation, by means of which, in the future, they become capable of generating much fruition."[81] This passage introduces the term 'true nature' (dharmatā). It is interesting to note that the meaning of this term (like that of the term dharma itself) is far from settled. Yasomitra glosses the term as "The beginningless power of actions."[82] The French translation glosses the same with "dharmānām anādikālikā sakti" or "the beginningless power of dharmas."[83] The variation in the meaning of the term dharmatā hinges on what must amount to a manuscript variation of one letter. Is dharmatā the beginningless power of dharmas or the beginningless power of

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[81] dharmatā hyeṣa yathā yathā dātṛṇām dāyāḥ paribhujyante tathā tathā bhoktṛṇām guṇaviśeṣād anugrahaviśeṣācca anyamanasāmapi dātṛṇām tadālambanadānacetaparibhāvitāḥ santatayaḥ sukṣmam pariṇāmaviśeṣam prapnuvanti yenāyatyām bahūtaraphalābhiniṣpattaye samarthā bhavanti/.

[82] karmaṇām-anādikālikā śaktiḥ/.

[83] Poussin, L'AK, Vol. III, p. 20, n. 3.

karmas? Choosing between these two alternatives is quite difficult. One way of resolving the conflict would be to marshall scriptural references to the notion that the power of karmas has no definite beginning in time. Thus, the power of actions is 'beginningless.' Suggestions of such a position are implicit in what is known as the 'Buddhist Genesis' myth.[84] In this myth, a certain being who is greedy by nature plays a crucial role at the beginning of a given cosmic evolution. Indeed, the deeds of this individual are causal factors of such profane and ultimately defiled aspects of human existence as the body, sexual differentiation, private property, theft, the production of food and the need for a system of laws and legal sanctions. To ask why this being was greedy at the beginning of a given cosmic evolution is to get the answer that he was greedy as a result of his past karma. Thus, even the Buddhist creation myth suggests that karma and its power are without verifiable beginning--effectively, the power of karma is 'beginningless.' Moreover, it is one's past karma that effects the presence or absence of a given 'nature' or dharma in the stream of consciousness. Thus, the priority of karma would seem to obtain.

On the other hand, if the dharmas are something over and above a meditationally derived and salvationally oriented phenomenology of potential experience (and I do not think that they are), then their 'beginningless' nature might be affirmed. On the face of it, however, the position that the dharmas are

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[84] See A. Wayman, "Buddhist Genesis and the Tantric Tradition," Oriens Extremis, 9:1, 1962, pp. 127-32.

eternal entities that somehow have power as a characteristic seems to amount to the Sāmkhya position which was rejected by even the Vaibhāṣikas.[85] In effect, dharmatā, the nature of things, would amount to the transformation of certain beginningless natures. These natures must be either things in themselves or dependently originated natures. To maintain that they are eternal 'things' is to be committed to the heretical Sāmkhya position. To affirm that the dharmas are dependently originated is to raise the further question of "Dependently originated by reason of what?" The answer to this question must involve recourse to karma. Thus the primacy would fall to karma. All of this is rather speculative and raises some exceptionally weighty questions vis a vis Buddhist ontology and epistemology. I have offered the above observations as a possible point of departure. My predeliction for the interpretation of dharmatā as the beginningless power of karma's is undoubtedly informed by my understanding of the meaning of the dharma level of analysis of experience. Given the canonical passage which suggests that the dharma level of analysis of experience (the Dharma taught by the Buddha) is an edificational structure in terms of which turmoil can be effectively ended and the further suggestion that, once this edificational structure has performed its task, it can be left behind, I am forced to view the dharmas as the above characterized phenomenology of possible experience.[86]

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[85] On the Vaibhāṣika rejection of the Sāmkhya pariṇāmavāda see Kosa, V, kas. 25-26 and Bhasya, and the treatments thereof in Scherbatsky, CCB, pp. 76-91; Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 115-16; Poussin, L'AK, vol. IV, pp. 52-55.

[86] See Chap. III, pp. 52-53.

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Leaving aside these considerations of dharmatā and returning to the thread of the argument, we find that Vasubandhu raises a possible objection to his stream of consciousness transformation model for explaining the increase of merit: "How then, will a transformation of another's stream of consciousness be effected, given that it is subject to other states, as a result of a distinction in the stream of consciousness of another person?"[87] Vasubandhu replies to this objection by pointing out that it will occur in the same manner as it would if there were a non-indication involved. Both models reflect the same degree of verificational difficulty on this level. Vasubandhu then remarks that the efficacy in play in this highly mysterious process is that of constant repetition of volition, directed toward the Tathāgata and the monks as a basis that assures the necessary associations required to account for the increase of merit. He then points out the inability of the Vaibhāṣikas to explain the increase of merit in the case where the meritorious act has no apparent material aspect. Thus, inward rejoicing, etc., not necessarily accompanied by any particular vijñapti, will not be able to establish an accompanying avijñapti. Certainly they will not admit that no merit accrues from such an act, yet their position that the avijñapti arises in dependence on great elements

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[87] atha matam--kathamidānīm santānāntaraviśeṣād anyamanaso 'pi santānāntarasya pariṇāmaḥ setsyatīti/ See translation, p. 168.

necessitates the admission that in these cases, there is no avijñapti!

Others maintain that the increase of merit is due to the constant repetition of volitional thinking directed toward the particular gift in question. This position is rejected on the following grounds:

> When an earnest monk, endowed with moral habit, possessed of virtuous natures, after having partaken of the almsfood of someone, brings about, directly realizes with the body and abides in the mental samādhi that is immeasureable, then as a result of that immeasureable samādhi there is an influx of merit, an influx of virtuous (natures), and a stream of pleasantness for the patron who gave the gift.[88]

Now this sutra, identified by La Vallee Poussin as similar to Anguttara, ii, 54 and the Ratnaraśisūtra cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya,[89] clearly establishes the position that it is the recipient's unique qualities and meditative accomplishments that determine the merit accruing to the donor. Thus, Vasubandhu asks,"Now in this case, what distinction of volition did the giver have?"[90] For more information on the nature of the 'immeasureable samādhi,' see the material on the path and its various moments, below.

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[88]yasyograbhikṣuḥ śīlavān kalyāṇadharmā piṇḍakam paribhujyāpramāṇam cetaḥsamādhim kāyena sākṣātkṛtvopasampadhya viharati apramāṇastannidānadāyakasya dānapateḥ puṇyaabhiṣyandaḥ kuśalābhiṣyandaḥ sukhāsvadādhāraḥ pratikāṅkṣitavyaḥ iti/ See translation, p. 169 (emphasis mine).

[89]Poussin, L'AK, Vol. III, p. 21, n. 1.

[90]atra tadānīm datuḥ kaścetanāviśeṣaḥ/ See translation, p. 169.

The Vaibhasikas' next argument in favor of the avijñapti relies on the evidently accepted notion that one who does not carry out a morally qualifiable act himself, but hires another to do it, is still susceptible to the course of karmic retribution for that act. They account for this phenomenon by recourse to the non-indication. Vasubandhu counters this position by referring to the 'subtle stream of consciousness distinction' that is engendered for the employer at the time that the specific offense is carried out. The same principle of course applies to one who performs the act himself. Indeed, it is the transformation of the stream of consciousness that amounts to the 'karmapatha.' In this case, the path of karma is a metaphor for the subtle transformation of consciousness.

Vasubandhu's reference to the stream of consciousness transformation model to account for the effecting of the course of karma prompts the Vaibhāṣika to ask why Vasubandhu rejects the avijñapti and accepts the stream of consciousness transformation model, since both are equally difficult to comprehend. This reference to the 'incomprehensible' (asamjñāyamanaḥ) nature of the two models is glossed by Yaśomitra with durbodha, 'difficult to know (or understand)'. One is reminded here of the highly appropriate observation made in the Yoga Sūtrabhāṣya: "This course of karma is mysterious and difficult to discern" (Iyam karmagatir vicitrā durvijñānā ca). Vasubandhu's reply is that

the postulation of an entity other than the body or mind to account for the applicability of the path of karma to one who employs another to act is just not satisfactory. However, to say that such a person undergoes a transformation of the stream of consciousness is satisfactory.

Quoting a text identified by La Vallee Poussin as Samyuktāgama, 13, 18, the Vaibhāṣikas continue their defense of the *avijñapti-rūpa*: "Monks, the dharmas are an external base, not comprised within, not shown to and not impeded by the eleven āyatanas." But, he did not say that these *dharmas* did not possess any form. Citing the failure to *deny* the formal nature of these dharmas as justification for *asserting* the formal nature thereof is rather weak and could be dismissed as the faulty argument from silence that it is. Vasubandhu, however, is prepared to meet this albeit weak argument head on. His position is that if one needs to assert the formal nature of the *dharmas* of the *dharmāyatana*, then let the earlier characterized forms (the meditator's field of Samadhi, etc., as per pages 94-5) be those *dharmas*.

The next Vaibhāṣika argument asserts that unless one posits the *avijñapti-rupa*, there will be no way to account for the appurtenance of all eight members of the Noble Eightfold Path to the person who has attained the Truth of the Path. This state of having attained to the Truth of the Path, the last of the Four Noble Truths, is meditational

in nature and rules out the momentary engaging in the thira, fourth and fifth members of the Path (right speech, bodily action and livelihood). In order for the Path to remain intact with regard to that person the Vaibhāṣikas suggest that the earlier actional members thereof endure via their avijñaptis. Vasubandhu remarks that prior to completely developing the five non-actional members (right view, resolution, exertion, mindfulness and meditation) one has completed the purification of the three actional members. The Vaibhāṣika (according to the sub-commentary and La Vallee Poussin) responds to this observation by pointing out this was said with the purport that one had effected the detachment necessary for the purification of these three members by means of the mundane path (laukikamārga). Yaśomitra points out that the significance of this Vaibhāṣika response is that in the state of the mundane path there is the presence of indicational form that has the nature of speech and corporeal action.[91] Thus, that state is capable of giving rise to the avijñapti rūpa. Vasubandhu's response to this position regarding the avijñapti as that entity which sustains the eight members of the Path involves such notions as the nature of the physical basis of one who has attained to the path, the nature of the path and its divisions, etc.

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[91] Vaibhāṣikā pariharanti --laukikamārgavairāgyamiti vistaraḥ/ laukikamārgavairāgyāvasthāyām vāgādisvabhāvam vijñaptirūpam/

It is common for works dealing with the path in Buddhism to cite Obermiller's classic discussion of this topic and then move on to other considerations. This article, "The Doctrine of Prajnā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of Maitreya," Acta Orientalia, XI, 1933, 1-133, sheds much light on the distinctions that were made regarding the various moments of the path, the causal efficacy of states associated with the path, etc. In conjunction with the material in the Kośa it helps to supply the much needed structure in terms of which much of the remaining material in the *Avijñapti-adhikāra* can be understood. We are led to consider the various aspects and sub-divisions of the path by Vasubandhu's rebuttal of the last mentioned Vaibhāṣika argument. His explanation for the appurtenance of the eight members of the path is as follows:

> The one attained to the path acquires, without a non-indication, an inclination (āśayam) with a corresponding form and a physical basis (āśrayam), after the attainment of which he no longer engages in wayward speech, etc., but engages in right speech, etc., even after emerging (from the meditational state). Hence, taking the thing effected metaphorically when there is an efficient cause, the eight members of the path are established.[92]

Yaśomitra explains the 'inclination' referred to in this passage as the inclination not to engage in the killing of living beings, etc., or the inclination toward faith, etc.

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[92] *mārgasamāpanno vināpyavijñaptyā tadrūpamāśayam ca āśrayam ca pratilabhate yasya pratilambhāt vyutthito 'pi na punar mithyāvāgādisu pravartate samyagvāgādisu va pravartate/ ato nimitte naimittikopacāram krtvā astau mārgāṅgāni vyavasthāpyanta iti/* See translation, p. 172.

The 'physical basis' is glossed 'āśrayaparāvṛtti 'a physical basis characterized by revulsion of turning over.'[93] Elsewhere in the Kośa we learn more about this radical transformation. Appropriately enough, the revulsion of the physical basis is referred to in Vasubandhu's critique of the above mentioned prāpti. Rejecting the Vaibhāṣika postulation of this entity to account for the difference between the Noble person and the average person, Vasubandhu offers the following:

> Since the physical basis of the Noble person has been reversed in a certain fashion by reason of the efficacy of the Path of Vision and the Path of Cultivation, therefore there is no further ability of the destructible defilements to shoot forth. As rice seeds that are in a non-seminal (or impotent) state, just so one is called a destroyer of the defilements with reference to the defilements of the physical basis.[94]

Elsewhere in the Kośa (IV, 56 and Bhāṣya) a greater degree of specificity regarding this transformation of the physical basis is to be found. Speaking of the fields of activity wherein actions of a certainty will be fulfilled in this life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīyam karma), Vasubandhu lists five meditative achievements and their respective fruits. For example, the one attained to nirodha-samāpatti obtains the highest peace of mind. One undergoes the revulsion of the physical basis in the following manner:

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[93]Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v., parāvṛtti.

[94]āśrayo hi sa āryānām darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyānām kleśānam prarohasamartho bhavati/ ato 'gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūta āśrayaḥ klesānām prahīnakleśa ityucyate/

"For the one who has returned from the Path of Vision, as a result of destroying all of the defilements that can be destroyed by Vision, without remainder, there occurs a fresh stream (of consciousness) that is without blemish and characterized by revulsion of the physical basis."[95] Our investigation of the āśraya-parāvṛtti has lead us to consideration of the Path of Vision and raises the further question of the place of this Path in the overall salvational path. In regard to this area, the Obermiller article is of great value. It contains in one place much information consistent with that to be found scattered throughout the Kośa (as above) as a whole, and the sixth chapter, the Exposition of the Path and Persons (Mārga-pudgala-nirdeśa) in particular.

Of the three paths, appropriate to the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha and the follower of the Mahāyāna, respectively, we are here concerned with the former. The Abhisamayālaṃkara (AA) breaks the Path of the Śrāvaka down into five further paths. These are:

1. The Path of Equipage (Sambhāra-mārga)
2. The Path of Preparation (Prayoga-mārga)
3. The Path of Vision (Dārśana-mārga)
4. The Path of Cultivation (Bhāvanā-mārga)
5. The Path Beyond the Precepts (or Training) (Aśaikṣa-mārga)

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[95] darśanamārgavyutthitasyāviśeṣadarśanaprāhatav-yaprahāṇāt pratyagrāśrayaparivṛttinirmalā santati vartate/

Summarizing Obermiller,[96] the Path of Equipage amounts to the following: a degree of meditation on the Four Noble Truths and the four aspects of each and manifestation in the person of the desire to be liberated from the phenomenal world. This stage has certain synonyms and affiliated terminology: Mokṣabhāgīya,[97] Śraddhā Bhūmi, Stage of Preliminary Activity and Full Cognition of the Word of Dharma. Greater specificity about this stage is contained in the Kośa. The interested reader should consult Volume IV of L'AK, La Vallee Poussin's Summary of Notes on the Path which introduces the fifth and sixth chapters of his translation of the Kośa. And, if the identification of this Path with the Avatāra-bhumi of Asaṅga's Śrāvaka-bhūmi is correct (and I believe the similarity of the two warrants such an identification), even further specificity regarding moderation in food and other matters of practice can be obtained by consulting that work.[98] Vasubandhu evidently does not recognize a distinct Sambhāra Mārga. Akira Hirakawa's exceptionally thorough index to Pradhan's edition of the Sanskrit text does not include such a term. Vasubandhu does use the term Avatāra which strengthens the assertion of general agreement with the material in the Śrāvaka Bhūmi. Vasubandhu's discussion of the Prayoga marga indicates that the Sambhāra Mārga was

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[96]Obermiller, The Doctrine . . . ., pp. 18-20.

[97]conducive to liberation, of a class with liberation.

[98]Wayman, ASBM, pp. 61 ff.

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probably not referred to directly because it was his opinion that such 'Equipage' as is spoken of in the AA is obtained in a previous life. Thus, his discussion of the Path in any given life begins with the Path of Preparation. His theory of *Bīja* is again employed, here as a pure simile, to explain his position that three lives are the minimum necessary for liberation. The use of the seed as a simile for the [illegible]rma process stretched out over three lives, occurring this late in the text, indicates that the term has been earlier defended in great enough detail to now justify its employment in a more casual and unchallenged manner. Keeping in mind the qualifications made in the second and fourth chapters of the Kośa regarding the meaning of 'seed,' it is refreshing to find it employed as the purely descriptive image that it is meant to be:

> In one life one would give rise to the virtuous roots. In a second, the states conducive to penetration. In a third, the Noble path. The succession is comparable to the planting of seeds, the growth of what was planted and the origination of fruit. Verily, in this *dharmatā* the entrance, maturation and liberation of the stream of consciousness occur gradually.[99]

Yaśomitra's sub-commentary on this passage is detailed and of no small interest. While faithfully unpacking the simile of the seed, its growth and the fruit in terms of the origination of natures conducive to liberation, the states

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[99]*ekasmin janmani mokṣabhāgīyam kuśalamūlam utpādayet/ dvitīye nirvedhabhāgīyāni/ tṛtīye āryamārgam/ bījāvaropaṇaśasyābhivṛddhiphalotpattikramavat/ kramena hi santānasyāsyām dharmatāyām avatāraparipākavimuktayo bhavantīti/*

conducive to penetration, and the Noble Path, respectively, he appears to depart from the basic 'three life position' so clearly stated by Vasubandhu. He says: "However, it is acceptable that he who is equipped with the natures conducive to liberation in a former life give rise to the states conducive to penetration and the path in one life."[100] Again, the basic agreement with a path of Equipage is upheld. The past passive participle sambhṛtam employed by Yaśomitra has obvious affinity with the Sambhāra-mārga of the AA. This affinity notwithstanding, we still must square this last statement of Yaśomitra with the apparently differing position of Vasubandhu. One way of dealing with the apparent difference between the two is simply to admit that Yaśomitra did not agree with Vasubandhu on the issue of the necessity for at least three lives in order to achieve liberation. Perhaps developments in the dynamics of Indian Buddhism (specifically from the Mahāyāna dimension thereof) required a 'liberalization' on such matters as the immediacy of liberation which influenced Yaśomitra's apparent departure from the position of Vasubandhu. This is possible. Although Yaśomitra is traditionally held to be a Sautrāntika, who is to say that this position, which we have characterized as more of an orientation than some readily definable body of hard and fast opinion, did not undergo modification subsequent to Vasubandhu? And so, one way of rendering

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[100] yas tu pūrvasmin janmani sambhṛtamokṣabhāgīyo bhavati sa ekasminnapi janmani nirvedhabhāgīyanyāryamārgam ca utpādayatīty avagantavyam/

Yaśomitra's departure from the well-reasoned opinion of Vasubandhu is to write the departure off as a modification of Sautrāntika opinion. But, another way out of the apparent difference suggests itself. It is possible that when Yaśomitra refers to 'a former life' he may mean that the virtuous roots conducive to liberation have been germinating (in consonance with the image of the seed) for a number of lives. He does not specify that the virtuous roots were planted in any particular life. Thus, we would arrive at the conclusion that a given individual had 'planted' virtuous roots at an unspecified time in the past. The germination process may take several lives. As a seed may lie dormant for a long period of time before meeting with the appropriate conditions for successful germination, so, too, may karmic 'seeds' fail to meet the same. However, once the proper objective conditions (such as the appearance of a Buddha) prevail, the long dormant seed may sprout and reach fruition in a short period of time. Thus, the three life minimum would not necessarily be contradicted by such an interpretation.

Turning to the Prayoga-mārga as outlined in the AA, we find that it is substantially equal to the second life stage outlined in the last quoted passage from the Kośa. In both cases there is the origination of the four nirvedabhāgīyas or 'states conducive to penetration.' These are called Heat, Climax, Forbearance and Supreme Mundane Natures. "After the four degrees of the latter are brought to an end,

one becomes absorbed in a state of concentrated trance, which is called the 'Unimpeded' (ānantarya), through which one directly passes over to--The Darśana Mārga."[101]

The Path of Vision consists of a direct intuition of the Four Noble Truths (satya-abhisamaya). It is also called the Path of the Disciple, characterized by direct (sākṣāt) perception 'for the first time' of the Unreality of the Ego (pudgala-nairātmya). This stage seems to be a corrective of all of the defilements which can be destroyed by Vision (dṛṣṭiheya). There are two aspects of this Path, the Samāhitajñāna 'knowledge of the equilibrated (stage)' and the pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna 'stage of knowledge that is gained after.' Vasubandhu refers to the first of these two aspects of the Path of Vision as a bhūmi or stage. In the first stage, the samāhita or equilibrated, there are two further subdivisions: Unimpeded path and Deliverance path (ānantarya and vimukti mārgas). The Unimpeded Path is made up of eight kṣāntis or forbearances, the first four of which suppress the defilements that are to be destroyed by the vision process, the second four of which are forbearances regarding the knowledge of associated natures (anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti). As described by Obermiller, these last four forbearances seem to be the subjective awareness that one has had forbearance in regard to the Four Truths, each in its four aspects. At any rate, these eight kṣāntis make up the unimpeded part of the Path of Vision. The Vimukti or Deliverance aspect of

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[101] Obermiller, "The octrine of Prajnā-Pāramitā . . .," p. 21.

the same is made up of eight cognitions that the first eight forbearances have been maintained. It seems that the Darśana-mārga can also be viewed as having only two distinct moments--the Unimpeded and the Deliverance. The eight moments of each occur at the same time.[102] This position of the AA regarding the simultaneity of the eight moments of each of the two latter aspects of the Path of Vision is also mentioned in the Kośa (VII, 6, b) wherein it is said that the first fifteen moments of the Path of Vision occur so rapidly that even the adept who is capable of reading the thoughts of another has difficulty following the progress of one involved in this path.

The sixteenth or culminating moment of the Path of Vision seems to be equal to the first moment of the Path of Cultivation. Before moving on to the Path of Cultivation, the point should be made that Vasubandhu further qualifies the eight Forbearances as constituting the actual abrogation (_prahāṇa_) of the defilements. In this sense, they are unimpeded. The eight moments of _jñāna_ represent the knowledge that the defilements have been destroyed.[103] The distinction between path moments that destroy the defilements and those that do not becomes important later on in the characterization of the _avijñapti_.

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[102] Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajñā-Pāramitā . . .," pp. 21 ff.

[103] Poussin, L'AK, IV, vi, refers to Kośa, I, 40, c; IV, 11; V, 4; VI, 58; VII, 36, for greater specificity in this regard.

Further distinctions regarding the Path of Vision and the Path of Cultivation are made in the opening Kārikās of the sixth chapter:

> THE DESTRUCTION OF DEFILEMENTS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE RESULT OF VIEWING THE TRUTHS AND CULTIVATION.
>
> The defilements that are to be destroyed by vision and the ones that are to be destroyed by cultivation have been described at length. Now then, of the two, the path of vision and the path of cultivation, which is with-flux and which is without flux? That is to be explained here. Thus, this was said:
>
> THE PATH OF CULTIVATION IS OF BOTH NATURES, WHILE THE PATH OF VISION IS FLUXLESS. //1//
>
> The path of cultivation is twofold, mundane and supermundane. The path of vision, however, is supermundane only because it is opposed to (or antidotal for) the three realms. And, it is only supermundane because it completely destroys the nine types (weakest of the weak . . . strongest of the strong) of defilement that are destructible by vision. And, indeed, the mundane path does not have this power.[104]

The distinction between the mundane and supermundane paths of cultivation is an important one. The mundane path of cultivation seems to include the widely documented corpse meditations, etc. These meditational exercises, carried out to overcome distraction and certain kinds of attachment, can be seen as preparatory for the Path of Vision. Thus, La Vallee Poussin remarks: "Meanwhile, if the ascetic has not

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[104] KLEŚAPRAHĀṆAMĀKHYĀTAM SATYADARŚANABHĀVANĀT/ darśanaheyā bhāvanāheyāśca kleśā iti vistarenoktam/ tāvad idānīm darśanabhāvanāmārgau kim anāśravau sāśravau itivaktavyam/ ata idam ucyate--DVIVIDHO BHĀVANĀ-MĀRGO DARŚANĀKHYAS TVANĀSRAVAH//1// dvividho bhāvanā-mārgah laukikah lokottaraśca/ darśanamārgas tu lokottara eva traidhātukapratipakṣatvāt/ navaprakārāṇām darśanaheyāṇām sakṛtprahāṇācca/ na hi laukikasya eṣa śaktir asti//1//

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gotten rid of, by a mundane path of meditation, the passions that are not abandonable except by the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) before entering the Path of Vision, then, upon emerging from the Path of Vision, he still remains beset by innumerable kleśas: he does not cut off the attachment (rāga) that one experiences for the agreeable sensations which, except for that of 'I,' are real; in the same manner, antipathy (dveṣa) remains intact, etc. (v. 5 a, i, 40), which the path of meditation only can cut off."[105]

The supermundane Path of Cultivation enables the destruction of the same sort of defilements in their supermundane form, i.e., in reference to the realms other than that of Desire. Thus, La Vallee Poussin, summarizing the material of VI, 29, c and 55, states:

> Thus one must distinguish . . . the ascetic who, upon entering into the Path of Vision, is already delivered by the mundane path from the inferior categories of kleśa of the Realm of Desire (bhūyo-vītaraga, vitarāga or kāmavītarāga). One such ascetic, when he has traversed the path of vision, does not become a Srotaāpana; he becomes a Sakrdāgāmin or Anāgāmin according to the case. And he possesses, thanks to the path of vision, the supermundane and mundane possession of the destruction of the kleśas previously abandoned by the mundane path.[106]

Thus, the Path of Cultivation results in the allaying of both mundane (pertaining to the Realm of Desire) defilements that are destructible by cultivation as well as the supermundane varieties of the same if the practitioner has

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[105] Poussin, L'AK, IV, vi, my translation of French.

[106] Ibid., IV, ix-x, my translation of French.

accomplished the Path of Vision. The defilements that are destructible by means of the Path of Vision are, of course, the following: satkāyadṛṣṭi, the reifying view, mithyādṛṣṭi, deviant view, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, preoccupation with (speculative) views, antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, the view that grasps at extremes, and śīlavrata-paramarśa, preoccupation with rites and vows.[107]

The defilements that are destructible by cultivation are those such as lust, hatred, etc. The ascetic involved in the Path of Cultivation repeatedly contemplates the four truths.

> By that contemplation, the ascetic would abandon, in this order, the nine categories (strong-strong, medium-strong, weakest of the strong, etc., VI, 33) of defilements relative to the realm of desire, relative to each of the four dhyānas (stages and 'heavens' of the realm of form), relative to each of the four states of the four existences of meditation called 'the immaterials' which constitute the formless Realm (for the distinction between the samāpatti-dhyāna and the upapatti-dhyāna, viii, i); for example, he abandons all rāga beginning with that of the realm of sensible desires, then the realm of satisfaction that one experiences in the first dhyāna.[108]

Completion of both the Path of Vision and the Path of Cultivation would yield the fruit of Arhatship. This person would be beyond training--on the Aśaikṣa-mārga.

The above rather lengthy and outline treatment of the various paths of the Disciple was necessitated by Yaśomitra's remark that identified Vasubandhu's reference to

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[107] Kośa, V, ka. 3: DṚṢṬAYAḤ PAÑCA SATKĀYA-MITHYĀNTAGRĀHADṚṢṬAYAḤ DṚṢṬIŚĪLAVRATAPARAMARŚĀVITI . . . .

[108] Poussin, L'AK, IV, vii, my translation of French.

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the 'physical basis' with a 'physical basis characterized by revulsion.' In addition to placing this accomplishment within the overall Path, this material will serve us well when we turn to the various kinds of indications and non-indications that pertain to the different realms. This material is among the most complicated in the Kośa and its complete understanding requires some familiarity with the theory of the Path and its moments and aspects. The above material will thus be referred to several times in the course of this introduction to the translation.

Vasubandhu's final word on the eight members of the Path indicate that the members are a way of referring to the efficient causes that affect 'path-like' behavior: "Thus, when there is a sign and it is taken as the approach to the derivative of the sign, the eight members of the path are established (reaffirmed)."[109]

The last distinct argument in favor of postulating the avijñapti-rūpa concerns the endurance of the Prātimokṣa vow. The Vaibhāṣika asserts that "And were there no avijñapti, there would be no Prātimokṣa vow (or restraint thereof). Since there would not be that whereby one, after taking the vow and then being subject to morally unlike states of mind, would remain a monk or a nun. In a Sūtra the bridge is said to be dispassion because it opposes immorality. Nor do we say that the bridge is able to be a non-presence (or

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[109] ato nimitte naimittikopacāram kṛtvā aṣṭau mārgāṅgāni vyavasthāpyanta iti/

an absence), thus there is a non-indication."[110] This argument is a variation on the often raised question of how virtuous natures are able to reside in a partially defiled stream of consciousness or how unvirtuous natures are able to reside in a pure stream of consciousness. The final sentence of this argument as quoted above reflects the first textual emendation that I found it necessary to make. The Sanskrit (in both Pradhan's and Sastri's editions of the text) reads: _na vā bhavanti setur bhavitum arhati iti eva avijñaptiḥ_. I propose instead: _na vā abhāva setur_ . . ., etc. This emendation, like the earlier disagreement with Yaśomitra, is not a matter of good translational practice and is undertaken with some reservations. Nonetheless, I have the support of the French translation of La Vallee Poussin, which translation draws on numerous Tibetan and Chinese commentarial sources. His translation of the passage is as follows: "An absence is not able to be a thing; the _virati_ [sic for _virakti_] is thus a real _dharma_ (the _avijñapti_), and not merely the simple fact that one no longer engages in the action that he has renounced, as the Sautrāntikas believe."[111]

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[110]_prātimokṣasaṃvaraścāpi na syād asatyām avijñaptau/ na hi samādānād ūrdhvam tad asti yena anyamanasko 'pyayam bhikṣuḥ syāt bhikṣunī veti/ setuśca sūtre viraktiruktā dauḥśīlyavibandhatvāt/ na vā bhavanti setur bhavitum arhatity asti eva avijñaptiḥ/_ As indicated, I have emended the last sentence to read: _na vā abhāva setur bhavitum_ . . . .

[111]Poussin, L'AK, III, 17: "Une 'absence' (abhāva) ne peut etre und digue: la _virati_ est donc un _dharma_ reel (_avijñapti_), et non pas seulement le fait de ne plus accomplir l'action a laquelle on a renonce, ainsi que le Sautrāntika le soutient."

Vasubandhu rejects this argument in favor of the avijñapti and offers the following characterization of the means whereby the endurance of the restraint of the Prātimokṣa vow is assured: "There would still be the Prātimokṣa vow (or restraint), namely, having pledged by a previous rite with volition, through the suppression of the act, one restrains body and speech."[112] And, in order to account for its endurance in light of the fact that one may also be subject to morally unlike thoughts, he adds:

> By contemplating that, at the time of acting and stationing on it with mindfulness, having recalled the promise to refrain, one is ashamed. Because there is refraining from misconduct, this is what is meant by the taking on of it (the vow). Further, if it were by reason of the non-indication that misconduct is held in check, then not even one bereft of memory (or, one who had forgotten) would violate the rules (of training).[113]

This ends the particular arguments in favor of the avijñapti and their rejection or modification from the Sautrantika perspective.

The remaining material of the Avijñapti-adhikāra is concerned with the more technical aspects of such an entity. That is, if one grants or posits the avijñapti, then it can be analyzed in terms of the great elements in terms of which it

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[112] prātimokṣasaṃvaro 'pi syāt yayā cetanayā vidhipūrvaṃ kṛtvā 'bhyupagamaḥ pratiṣiddhāt karmaṇaḥ kāyavācau saṃvṛṇoti/

[113] tadbhāvanayā kriyākāle smarataḥ tatpratyupasthānāt setubhāvo 'pi syādakriyāṃ pratijñām saṃsmṛtya lajjito dauḥśīlyākaraṇāt ityarthameva tasyāḥ samādānam/ yadi punar avijñaptereva dauḥśīlyaṃ pratibadhnīyāt na kaścit muṣitasmṛtiḥ śikṣaṃ bhindyāt/

arises, the realms in which it arises, etc. Much of this material is non-challenged Vaibhāṣika opinion, or material about which Vasubandhu has raised questions at another place in the text. Thus, for example, the Vaibhāṣikas depict the avijñapti as arising in dependence on past great elements. This position was criticized briefly in the opening remarks of Vasubandhu's rejection of the avijñapti. The existence of past dharmas is of course the coping stone of the Vaibhāṣika edifice and is dealt with at great length in the fifth chapter of the Kośa, Kārikās 25-27 and Bhāṣya thereon. These arguments have been dealt with elsewhere and at great length.[114] For our purposes it is worth noting that the last argument that the Vaibhāṣikas make in favor of Vasumitra's depiction of the existence of past and future dharmas is the apparent inability to explain the karma process without recourse to such a theory. Vasubandhu dismisses this argument by recourse to the theory of anuśaya or residue. Our introductory material, pages 56-65, has made clear the reducibility of anuśaya to bija which is, in turn, reducible to the five personality aggregates and the stream of consciousness modification.

Thus, the remaining material of the avijñapti-adhikāra represents Vaibhasika opinion that is either dealt with elsewhere in the Kośa or criticized on grounds of internal

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[114] See sources cited in note 85, above (this chapter) and Louis de La Vallee Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma," Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, 5, 1936-7, 7-187.

inconsistency in the course of the exposition before us. In form, the exposition amounts to Vaibhāṣika answers to general questions. For example, Kārikās 4, c and d through 6 and the Bhāṣya thereon amount to an answer to the question, "If it is so (that there is a substantial dharma that is the avijñapti), and it is said to arise in dependence on great elements, does it arise in dependence on the same primary elements that the vijñapti arises in dependence on? Or, (does it arise in dependence on) others?[115] The answer is that it arises in dependence on others since the collocation (glossed by Yaśomitra as: "the collocation of the great elements, the earth element, etc., that make up the physical basis of the vijñapti") cannot be characterized by both gross and subtle fruit. In order to explain which elements the avijñapti arises in dependence on, the Vaibhāṣika continues, asserting that while as a general rule all derived rūpa arises in dependence on present elements, there are cases of derived matter (specifically, the avijñapti) that arise in dependence on past great elements.

This precipitates the request for further clarification regarding which derived matter arises on past elements and which does not. Kārikā 4, c and d provide the clarification. The text is straightforward here and requires no further comment except to note that the exposition is

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[115] yadasti, tacca mahābhūtānyupādāyetyuktam tat kim vijñaptimahābhūtānyevopādāyāvijñaptir utpadyate/ athānyāni/

obviously Vaibhāṣika since it rests on the postulation of past primary elements.

The next question concerns classification by realms. The indications of which realms arise in dependence on elements from which realms? Karma of body and speech that is with flux and pertains to the Realm of Desire arises in dependence on elements that likewise pertain to the Realm of Desire. This is the case up to the Fourth Dhyāna Realm, the last 'realm' before the Formless Realm wherein there is no rūpa, and, consequently, there are no primary elements. Corporeal and vocal karma that is not characterized by the fluxes arises in dependence on the great elements of the realm wherein one is born. Thus, it seems that while such karma has a causal relationship with primary elements that can only be characterized as 'with-flux,' it also transcends them in some way. The position that such actions would arise by dint of thought alone is rejected since they, as vijñapti, must arise in dependence on elements as well as thought.

The text continues with further qualification of the vijñapti and avijñapti. This introduces us to further categories of classification in terms of causal origination, contact with the six sense bases, etc. The first of these many classifications mentioned in the course of the exposition are that of upātta and anupātta, and that of niṣyanda and aniṣyanda. The upātta and anupātta distinction is made clear elsewhere in the Kośa. This material suggests that

'comprised' and 'non-comprised' are adequate translational equivalents. Monier-Williams suggests that the word upātta is probably contracted from upa-datta.[116] That in terms of which a given nature is comprised or not comprised is evidently the sense organ (including the mind). Thus, we find the following information at Kośa, I, 10 and Bhāṣya:

> SOUND IS EIGHTFOLD. It is fourfold since it it is either caused by upātta or anupātta great elements and it is either reckoned as the sentient being or not as the sentient being. And, because there is the further distinction that it is mentally cognized or not mentally cognized, it is eightfold. Among these, the sound that is caused by upātta elements is such as the sound of the hand or voice. The sound caused by anupātta grand elements is such as the sound of the wind and the trees of the forest. The sound that is the vocal indication is reckoned as the sentient being; other sound is not reckoned as the sentient being.[117]

Yaśomitra provides further clarification by pointing out that the essence of the distinction between upātta and anūpatta elements is their relationship with one of the six sense bases. Thus, elements that are indrīya-vinirbhaga, not isolated or separated from one of the six sense bases are upātta--comprised within or by that base. Elements that are isolated from the six sense bases are uncomprised within or by those bases (anūpatta). Thus, the Kārikā under consideration (IV, 5, d) asserts that "THE NON-INDICATION IS

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[116] Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit English Dictionary, s.v. upātta.

[117] ŚABDASTVAṢṬAVIDHAḤ/ upāttānupāttamahābhūtahetukaḥ sattvāsattvākhyaśceti caturbhiḥ/ sa punar manojñāmanojñābhedād aṣṭavidho bhavati/ tatropāttamahābhūtahetuko yathā --hastvākchabdaḥ anupāttamahābhūtahetuko yathā--vāyuvanaspatinadīśabdaḥ sattvākhyo vāgvijñaptiśabdaḥ asattvākhyo 'nyaḥ/

NON-COMPRISED." The non-indication pertains to the sentient being but is not held to be directly before any of the sense bases, including the mind. Again, the ever recurring theme of presence within the stream of consciousness on the one hand and non-association with moment to moment thoughts on the other manifests itself.

The sixth Kārikā introduces yet another distinction--that of the nisyanda phala, the fruit that arises from its affiliations: The non-indication is said to be of an affiliation-arising nature and reckoned as (pertaining to) the sentient being. A niṣyanda phala is one of five types of fruit or result that can arise based on the elaborate theory of causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya). Of the five, a niṣyanda phala is said to be the fruit of both a universal or prevalent cause and a cause of like type, sarvatraga-hetu and sabhaga-hetu, respectively. This distinction is made clear at Kośa, II, 53 and ff. and V, 54, a and b. The latter reference identifies the universal cause with certain of the anuśayas or residues, to wit, views and doubts that are abandonable by means of the Path of Vision, the nescience that is associated with them and nescience that is independent of them. Scherbatsky accurately summarizes the sense of the material on the sarvatraga-hetu:

> The elements of moral defilement (kleśa) are always present in a life (samtana), in a latent or patent condition. When latent they have the form of "residues" (anuśaya), they stick to the other elements, pollute them, bring them into commotion and prevent their coming to rest. This influence of the disquieting elements in life is termed "general cause"

(sarvatraga-hetu) because it affects the whole of the stream of life (santāna), all its elements become soiled. The primary cause of this unhappy condition is "illusion" (avidyā), the first, fundamental member of the wheel of life. It continues to exist and exhibit its influence as long as the "wheel" turns, and is gradually neutralized and finally stopped by an antidote in the form of transcending wisdom (prajñā amalā).[118]

The cause of like type (sabhāga-hetu) also produces an 'affiliational' fruit. It differs from the universal cause by virtue of its particular nature. Thus, a particular bit of rāga (passion) has as its cause non-universal passion in the form of defilement. This cause of like type is not a universal cause with regard to other defilement, such as doubt or views. Thus, particular defilement (non-universal forms of rāga, for example) only gives rise to behavioral rāga. It does not necessarily support other defilements such as the reificational view or the view that grasps the extremes. This distinction is made in Kośa, II, 57, c and Bhāṣya and sub-commentary.

Having established these characteristics for the avijñapti, the author then adds that the characterization of being upātta and naihṣyandikī in nature applies only to the avijñapti that pertains to one in a non-equilibrated stage. (On this distinction, see above, pp. 106-15.)

The characterization of the avijñapti that arises in or is engendered by samādhi (specifically, the restraint that arises by reason of dhyāna that is without fluxes) is quite different from that of the non-equilibrated avijñapti.

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[118] Scherbatsky, CCB, p. 35.

This *avijñapti* arises in dependence on elements that are *anupātta* and in this respect it resembles the non-equilibrated *avijñapti*. Neither are directly present before any of the six sense faculties. However, it differs from the non-equilibrated type in that it arises in dependence on non-differentiated or non-separated elements. Thus, when one gives rise to the seven restraints from idle chatter up to the refraining from killing living beings, they are originated in dependence on the same elements. This suggests that the seven restraints arise in immediate succession. The *avijñapti* that arises in or is engendered by *samādhi* arises in dependence on accumulational as opposed to affiliational elements. Karma that is accumulational (*upacayika*) or accumulated (*upacita*) is explained in Kārikā 120 of the of the fourth chapter:

> KARMA IS SAID TO BE ACCUMULATED BECAUSE OF BOTH VOLITION AND COMPLETION, BY REASON OF LACK OF REGRET AND REPENTANCE, BECAUSE THERE ARE ESCORTS AND RECAUSE OF MATURATION.[119]

The Bhāṣya and sub-commentary hereon indicate the following: The phrase 'because of both volition and completion' means that the act is carried out having willed it. It is neither carried out without forethought (*na abuddhipūrvakam*) nor carried out fortuitously (*sahasā*). The false speech (normally a sin) that results from the

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[119] *SAÑCETANASAMĀPTIBHYĀM NIṢKAUKṚTYAVIPAKṢATAḤ/ PARIVĀRĀD VIPĀKĀCCA KARMOPACITAMUCYATE*//120//

incorrect phrasing by reason of repetition (i.e., from having repeatedly recited an incorrectly handed-down text or having learnt the text in an erroneous fashion), while unvirtuous, is not accumulated.[120] Nor is the karma that results in a specific destiny considered to be 'accumulated' until each of the specific acts that yield that destiny are completed.[121] And, if there is no repentance or antidote the karma 'accumulates.' This raises the exceptionally rich question of the manner in which unvirtuous karma can be 'overstepped' so as to avoid fruition. This is an ancient notion in Buddhist thought. Reference to '*pāpassa kammassa samatikkamo*' (overstepping of evil karma) is found in Samyutta Nikāya, iv, 317. An excellent summary of the various notions about this possibility are to be found in La Vallee Poussin's notes on the passage in question in the French translation.[122] The 'escort' amounts to the unvirtuous ancillaries of an unvirtuous act and the virtuous ancillaries that accompany a virtuous act. The sub-commentary states that the ancillaries (*parivāra*) of an act amount to approving of that act. Finally, karma that has fixed forms

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[120] *yadabhyāsena bhāṣyakṣepanmṛṣāvādādyanuṣṭhānam kṛtam tadakuśalam na punar upacittam/*

[121] *kaścidekena sucaritena sugatim yāti kaścid yāvat tribhiḥ kaścidekena karmapathena kaścid yāvad daśabhiḥ/ tatra yo yāvatā gacchati tasmin asamāpte kṛtam karma nopacitam/ samāpte tūpacitam/ evam yāvad vipākadāne niyatamiti sambhavato yojyam/*

[122] Poussin, L'AK, III, 243, n. 2.

of retribution is said to be accumulated (*vipākadāne niyatam bhavati*).

The next material that requires comment is that offered in answer to the question of whether or not the origination of an indication necessitates a break in the continuity of the previous shape. The argument is complicated. On the one hand, if the Vaibhāṣikas admit that the continuity of the shape is interrupted, they are in contradiction of an earlier assertion to the effect that a maturational form (the body) does not rearise after it has been interrupted (see Kośa, I, 37). On the other hand, if one admits that the *avijñapti* arises in dependence on affiliational great elements, then one would be forced to admit the presence of two streams of shape--the maturational stream and the affiliational stream. This would suggest that when one pointed out something with the hand, the hand would increase in size because of the presence of two streams. The Vaibhāṣikas avoid this incongruous position by pointing out that there are spaces in the body such that the two-stream theory can be accommodated. The Bhāṣya on Kārikā 6 ends on this rather odd note and the text continues in a more expository vein.

Various numerical classifications of karma are offered which require no comment. The presence and the morally qualified nature of the *avijñapti* in the various realms is then discussed. The *avijñapti* is never a morally indeterminate nature. This is because of the weakness of morally

indeterminate thoughts. Worthy of note are the assertions that it is found in the Realm of Desire and the Realm of Form, but not beyond. Since it is a 'form' dharma, it cannot exist where there is no 'form.' Further, in the Realm of Desire it is basically impure by reason of the presence of lack of modesty and shamelessness (āhrīkya and anapatrāpya, respectively).

The next troublesome material occurs in Kārikā 8 and concerns the vijñapti. The Sanskrit of 8, a, reads Kame 'pi nivṛtā nāsti, and suggests the translation of "Moreover, in the Realm of Desire it is not obscured." But, if we look up the meaning of the term nivṛta (obscured) elsewhere in the Kośa, we find that such a translation is incorrect. The term is defined at II, 30 and Bhāṣya thereon as follows:

> THERE ARE EIGHTEEN (NATURES) APPROPRIATE TO THE OBSCURED.
>
> In the Realm of Desire, the thought that is associated with the reifying view and the view that grasps the extremes is 'obscured and morally indeterminate.' Herein (in reference to the obscured thought) there are eighteen natures--the ten present in every thought, the six present in every defiled thought plus adumbration and discursive thought. The views previously mentioned are not additional.
>
> OTHERWISE, TWELVE (NATURES) ARE HELD TO BE APPROPRIATE TO IT.
>
> The indeterminate thought that is other than obscured is called 'non-obscured and morally indeterminate.' Twelve mental natures are held to be appropriate to it--the ten present in every thought plus adumbration and discursive thought.[123]

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[123]NIVṚTE 'ṢṬĀDAŚA/ satkāyāntagrāhadṛṣṭisamprayuktam cittam kāmadhātau nivṛtāvyākṛtam/ tatrāṣṭādaśa caittāḥ--

Yaśomitra glosses the term nivṛta with kleśachādita (enveloped or covered by defilement). Now it is obvious that Vasubandhu does not mean that the vijñapti in the Realm of Desire (acts of body and speech of one who has not meditationally or otherwise 'removed' himself from the Realm of Desire) is not attended by defilements. How then do we square this position with the above proposed translation?

The discussion that follows this Kārikā suggests that his intention was to say that there is, in the Realm of Desire, no vocal or corporeal indication that is of the 'obscured but morally indeterminate class' (nivṛta-avyākṛta). Thus, since the correct term kāmadhātu is shortened to kāme (locative case) in the Kārikā, it is probable that the correct term nivṛtāvyākṛta was also shortened to nivṛtā (modifying a feminine noun) for purposes of meter. This interpretation is borne out by a following question: "Further then, what is the reason that, beyond the Brahma Realm, there is no indication and, in the Realm of Desire, no indication that is of the 'obscured and morally indeterminate class?"[124] Thus, the originally suggested translation should be corrected to read: "Moreover, in the Realm of Desire it is not of the 'obscured and morally indeterminate class.'"

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daśa mahābhūmikāḥ ṣaṭ kleśamahābhūmikāḥ vitarkavicārau ca/ dṛṣṭiḥ pūrvavadeva nādhikā bhavati/ ANYATRA DVĀDAŚĀVYĀKṚTE MATĀḤ/ nivṛtād anyad avyākṛtam anivṛtāvyākṛtam/ tatra dvādaśa caittā iṣṭaḥ--daśa mahābhūmikāḥ vitarkavicārau ca/

[124] kim punaḥ kāraṇam ūrdhvam brahmalokān nāsti vijñaptiḥ kāmadhātau ca nivṛtāvyākṛtā nāsti/

The Vaibhāṣikas defend their position that there is no vijñapti beyond the Brahmaloka on the grounds that a vijñapti can only be aroused by a thought that is characterized by adumbration and discursive thought (vitārka and vicāra). And, since traditional meditational theory maintained that these two are lacking beyond the first dhyāna realm, there can then be no thought that would give rise to a vijñapti. The reasoning behind the second assertion, that there is no vijñapti of the obscured but morally indeterminate class in the Realm of Desire, is a little more complicated and rests on the distinction between thoughts that are destructible by Vivion and those that are destructible by Cultivation (darśanaprahātavya and bhāvanāprahātavya, respectively). The material from II, 30 and Bhāṣya made clear that only the thoughts associated with two views, the reifying view and the view that grasps the extremes, are of the nivṛta-avyākrta class. Now these two views are destructible by vision and have an internal functional range. By themselves they do not promote any specific act of body or speech. Rather, mundane acts of body and speech relative to the Realm of Desire are promoted by more actional or behavioral defilements such as anger, envy, etc. Thus the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the thoughts that give rise to corporeal and vocal acts are informed by natures that must be destroyed through cultivation. Therefore, "arousal cannot be established" for an indication of the obscured

but morally indeterminate class of indication. This assertion, that arousal cannot be established for a vijñapti of this class, will come back to haunt the Vaibhāṣikas later on in what is one of the most complicated and difficult arguments in the translation (see Kārikā 10 and commentary thereon).

The Vaibhāṣika mention of 'arousal' prompts the further question: "Well, then, are the virtuousness and unvirtuousness of dharmas to be known only by dint of arousal?" This is answered in the negative and four manners or ways in which the moral quality of dharmas is to be understood are given. The translation of the first three manners or ways of determining the moral quality of natures is clear and requires no comment. The fourth manner by which the virtuousness of deeds is established requires some comment. It is asserted that corporeal and vocal karma and the motivations not associated with thought (citta-viprayukta-samskāras) are virtuous by reason of arousal. They are comparable to a milky dish prepared with medicine--the virtuousness resides in the medicine, not the milky dish itself.

The question is raised of how virtuousness can be said to apply to prāptis (reaches, as discussed above) that are aroused by thoughts of a class that is other than virtuous. The reply is as follows: "There is reconnection with virtuous roots (kuśala-mūla-pratisandhānam) by means of

doubt, and because there is return to the realm and because of falling away." The thrust of this remark was far from obvious until a note in the French translation, referring to IV, Kā. 80, lead to the following discovery. It appears that one who has cut off the virtuous roots by reason of unvirtuous karma is able to become reconnected with those virtuous roots in two ways--by reason of originating doubt in regard to cause and fruition and by reason of originating right view in regard to the same. The rationale behind this position is to me sufficiently obscure to cause the invocation of the 'phenomenological' suspension of judgement (admittedly, not in its most dignified form) and simply let the text speak for itself:

> For those who have cut off the virtuous roots, how is there further reconnection with them?
>
> CONNECTION OCCURS BY REASON OF DOUBT OR THE VIEW THAT IT EXISTS.
>
> Wherein doubt regarding cause and fruition is originated for one who has cut off the virtuous roots or the view that it is real is originated, that is, wherein right view is originated, therein it is said that the virtuous roots are reconnected by reason of further origination of their reaches. However, the direct realization of reconnection with the nine forms as a whole takes place gradually, in the same manner as strength is gathered after overcoming an illness.[125]

Some speculation may be made as to the reason for this odd position. On the one hand, it is not difficult

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[125] tesām samucchinnānām katham punar pratisandhih/ SANDHIḤ KĀÑKṢĀSTIDṚṢṬIBHYĀM/ yadā asya hetuphale vicikitsā ca utpadyate astidṛṣṭir vā samyagdṛṣṭir ityarthaḥ tadā punah tatprāptisamutpādāt pratisandhitāni kuśulamūlānyucyante/ navaprakārāṇām yugapat pratisandhānam kramena tu sammukhibhāvaḥ ārogyabalalābhavat/

to imagine that one who has cut off the virtuous roots might come to the startling realization that the law of cause and effect is real (astidṛṣṭi that is here samyag-dṛṣṭi). That this realization might cause one to 'change his ways' is a possibility. But, the reconnection with the virtuous roots by reason of doubt is harder to understand. The only line of speculation that presents itself relates to the notion of the volitional nature of karma. That the one involved may have sincerely doubted the efficacy of the karmic principle is a possibility. Thus, he entertained doubts 'regarding cause and fruition.' He may have willed the act and not bargained for the consequences. Thus, his doubt may amount to a form of 'special pleading' capable of effecting a 'second chance' (reconnection with the virtuous roots). Even I am unconvinced by this interpretation, but have nothing better to offer. It is probable that this apparently 'liberal' position is also bound up with Vasubandhu's rather controversial view that eternal doom is not a necessary consequence of cutting off the virtuous roots.[126]

Leaving aside the question of the eternal damnation of one who has cut off the virtuous roots, let us turn to the next material in the translation that seems to require comment. True to his Sautrāntika orientation, Vasubandhu quotes a sutra that raises serious objections to the earlier noted

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[126]See Kośa, IV, ka. 30 and ff; counterparts in Poussin, L'AK and Jaini, STB, pp. 45-49.

Vaibhasika position that the *vijñapti* is not aroused by a thought that is destructible by vision (*yad uktam*--"*darśana-prahātavyam cittam vijñapter asamutthāpakam*" *iti*) (see above, p. 131).

Vasubandhu's rejection of this position rests on a passage 'uttered by The Blessed One' (as yet untraced) that states: "And so, because of deviant view there occurs deviant conception, deviant speech, and deviant livelihood." Now, both deviant speech and livelihood are matters of karma--discrete corporeal and vocal indications. The Vaibhāṣika position denies that vision-destructible thoughts (such as those aroused by deviant view) are the arousers of *vijñapti's*. They immediately deny that their position is in contradiction with the passage just quoted and attempt to reconcile the two by recourse to an elaborate theory of a twofold causal arouser. There are, according to the Vaibhāṣika position, two thoughts that arouse a *vijñapti*--a causal arouser (*hetu-samutthāna*) and an arouser of 'the moment' (of action, *tatkṣana-samutthāna*). The corporeal or vocal indication comes about in reference to the arouser of the moment. These two causes are further qualified as, respectively, the promoter (*pravartakam*) and the concurrent (*anuvartakam*) causes. The first 'projects' (ā-kṣip) the action; the second is concurrent with the moment of action (*kriyākālānuvartanāt*).

The rationale for positing these two causes is made clear in the Vaibhāṣika response to Vasubandhu's inquiry

as to the efficacy (sāmarthyam) of the 'arouser of the moment.' It is pointed out that without this arouser, in the case of one who dies, the act would not take place, even though it had been 'projected' (tena hi vināsau mṛtasyeva na syād akṣiptāpi satī). Yaśomitra is even more explicit about the roles of the promoter and concurrent causes: "It is as follows--Someone says'I will go to the village,' but between the time of projecting the act and actually doing it, he dies. Because there is no concurrent thought there is no going."

Having established a rationale for positing these two causes, the Vaibhāṣika attempt to square their position with that of the sūtra continues. It is admitted that the promoter thought is destructible by vision, but denied that the thought concurrent with the action (vijñapti, corporeal or vocal) is also. Because one in the process of acting and speaking has thoughts directed outward, those thoughts are not of the 'vision destructible' class. Indeed, the Vaibhāṣikas assert that if it were the case that the concurrent thought were of the 'vision destructible' class, then it would follow that the form (the vijñapti-rūpa) established by it would also be destructible by vision. Vasubandhu is not shaken by this implication and asks, "What would that amount to?" The Vaibhāṣika reply is that Abhidharma would be contradicted, specifically, the position stated in Kośa, II, 40--"Form is neither destructible by vision nor

undefiled" (na drstiheyam aklistam na rūpam). Vasubandhu remarks that the position that rūpa is not destructible by vision must be proven (sādhya eṣa pakṣaḥ). The Vaibhāṣika replies that if it is the case that rūpa (the corporeal of vocal indication) is destructible by vision, then one would also have to admit that the elements (of the physical basis, as per sub-commentary) would also be destructible by vision, since they are aroused by the same thought. Vasubandhu denies this broader conclusion on the grounds that the elements of the physical basis are neither virtuous nor unvirtuous per se. Rather, it is the particular form that has the intrinsic nature of corporeal and vocal karma that is morally qualifiable (this, per sub-commentary). Thus, let it be the case that certain form is destructible by vision. To this the Vaibhāṣikas reply that while the elements of the physical basis are destructible (by cultivation) they cannot be destroyed by vision. This is because these elements in and of themselves are undefiled and morally indeterminate. Thus, they conclude that their position is not in contradiction with the sūtra quoted by Vasubandhu. After some expository material regarding the relationship between the promoter and concurrent thoughts, Vasubandhu raises the question: "Well then, is it that the vijñapti is (morally) like the promoter, or is it that it is (morally) like the concurrent thought?"

Now, if the Vaibhāṣikas admit that the moral nature of the indication is like that of the promoter thought, then they must admit, contrary to their position, that, in the Realm of Desire, there is a *vijñapti* that is of the 'obscured but morally indeterminate' class, since such thoughts are promoted by the reifying and extreme grasping views. They deny that they must admit this by taking the position that not all vision-destructible thought is necessarily a promoter thought. Thus, thoughts promoted by the three other deviant views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*, *dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*, and *śīlavrata-parāmarśa*) may be the promoters of corporeal and vocal activity. While these thoughts are destructible by vision (see Kośa, V, 3, 4, and 5 and Bhāṣya thereon), they are not of the obscured *and* morally indeterminate class. They are obscured and defiled. Thus, the Vaibhāṣikas could reason their way to reconciliation with the *sūtra* passage quoted above. Oddly enough, this line of argument is not pursued.

If the Vaibhāṣikas admit that the moral nature of the *vijñapti* derives from the quality of the concurrent thought, they would be forced to admit that if one taking the Prātimokṣa vow had a morally indeterminate or unvirtuous thought, then the act of taking the vow would not be virtuous. Hence, they admit that the moral quality of the corporeal or vocal act derives from the nature of the promoter thought but add the qualification that this is only the case when the promoter thought is of the class that is

destructible by cultivation. Oddly enough, this retreat seems unnecessary if their only interest is the continued denial of the impossibility of a _vijñapti_ of the obscured but morally indeterminate class. As was pointed out in the last paragraph, there are three vision-destructible thoughts that are not of this obscured but morally indeterminate class.

Vasubandhu then points out that the Vaibhāṣika attempt to square their denial of the obscured and morally indeterminate class of _vijñapti_ with the _sūtra_ passage that affirms the position that 'view' _does_ give rise to acts--an attempt that resulted in an elaborate division of arousing thoughts, etc.--is pointless. If the morally qualified nature of the _vijñapti_ derives from that of the promoter thought, then there was no point in elaborating the additional concurrent thought. If the Vaibhāṣika position is that a 'vision allayable' cause is not the promoter of the _vijñapti_, then why bring in the additional construct of the 'concurrent thought'? Moreover, all of these machinations do not fully effect the reconciliation with the _sūtra_ passage which precipitated them in the first place. If there is any place in the Kośa where the Vaibhāṣika position is not represented in the most favorable light, it is here. The earlier mentioned option (that not all vision-destructible thoughts are promoters, but some, specifically the three mentioned, are) would have resolved the conflict. It seems that Yaśomitra was aware of this possibility. In his

commentary on the passage that would legitimate the arousal of the indication by the three obscured but unvirtuous views makes this clear. He states: "The promoter of the indication is deviant view, etc., not the reifying, etc., view."[127] These observations notwithstanding, Vasubandhu ends his critique of the Vaibhāṣika position on this on the following note: The sense of the sūtra is "That it was declared in connection with an arouser that is interrupted by another."[128]

The text continues on a more expository note and treats the avijñapti, which is explained in terms of restraint, non-restraint and neither restraint nor non-restraint (samvara, asamvara and naivasamvaro-nāsamvara). The word samvara is translated as 'restraint.' Avijñapti, when considered as restraint, is of three kinds: the restraint of prātimokṣa, the restraint of meditation and that characterized by the absence of the fluxes. Of these three restraints, the first to be treated is that of or engendered by the prātimokṣa.[129] The term prātimokṣa is here used to indicate more than the serial confession of offenses or lapses of monastic or lay discipline. The use of the term prātimokṣa in the passages under consideration (virtually the only passages in the Kośa wherein the term appears) seems

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[127] mithyādṛṣṭyādikam eva pravartakam vijñapteḥ na satkāyadṛṣṭyādikam/

[128] (evam tu vaktavyam) anyavyavahitam hetusamutthānam sandhāyoktam iti/

[129] See E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1951), pp. 11-26.

to include the taking on of the vow to refrain from specific activities, the periodic confession of lapses therefrom, and the enduring moral restraint that pertains to one who has taken on such a vow. While a nominal eightfold division of the restraint of prātimokṣa is made, it is pointed out that, concretely (dravyatas), the restraint is fourfold. The four major divisions of the restraint of prātimokṣa are: 1. that of the monk, 2. that of the novice, 3. that of the layperson, and 4. that of the observer of the fast (bhikṣu, śramanera, upāsaka, and upavāsa, respectively). This is clear enough in the translation to render further comment unnecessary.

These four classes of prātimokṣa restraint are distinct from each other in that each one is taken on separately. Thus, although they differ from each other in the number of reprehensible actions from which one vows to abstain, the taking on of a more rigid restraint is not simply the addition of new members to a previous vow. Thus, when one takes on the vow of the monk and its associated restraints (refraining from ten reprehensible actions), one does not simply add on two additional restraints to a previous novice's vow. The entire vow process is repeated including the new members from which one vows to refrain. The reason for this seems to be that violation of one of the monk's vows need only result in loss of monk status. The individual would not thereby lose his former novice status.

One obtains one of the four statuses by abstaining from various reprehensible (varjya) actions. The lay

follower abstains from five reprehensible actions: the taking of life, taking what is not given, sensual misconduct, falsehood, and (drinking) intoxicating beverages. The observer of the fast refrains from eight kinds of reprehensible actions: 1. taking life, 2. taking what is not given, 3. incontinence, 4. false speech, 5. intoxicating beverages, 6. scents, garlands, unguents, dancing, singing and musical instruments, 7. use of elevated and large beds, and 8. from eating at the improper time. The novice abstains from these eight plus acceptance of silver and gold. This last restraint is unitary and would seem to amount to only nine restraints. This particular regime is made tenfold by making twofold the above restraint from scents, garlands and unguents (on the one hand), and dancing, singing and musical instruments (on the other). The status of a monk applies to the one who abstains from all reprehensible actions.

The prātimokṣa restraint is then discussed in terms of its indicational and non-indicational content. The initial or first vijñapti and avijñapti of one who takes one of the four basic prātimokṣa vows and accepts the restraint entailed thereby are said to constitute the actual 'course of karma' (karma-patha). This is because, thereby, one is delivered from sin. The act of taking on the restraint casts out sin. "The actual prātimokṣa vow (for saṃvara here) is called the 'course of karma' (proper) because it restrains body and speech; because this is what is

encompassed in the fundamental (course of karma)."[130] In the moments that follow the actual taking on of the vow or restraint there is present the actual restraint generated by the act. "In the second and following moments there is just the restraint of prātimokṣa, not the serial deliverance. This amounts to the 'pursuant' and not the fundamental course of karma" (dvitīyādeṣu kṣaṇeṣu prātimokṣasaṃvaram eva na prātimokṣa/ pṛṣṭhaṃ ca na maulaḥ karmapathaḥ/).

The term karmapatha refers to the overall course of karma and is distinguished into three basic parts later in the fourth chapter (Kārikās 66-69). These karikas distinguish a preparatory, fundamental, and pursuant course of karma (prayoga, maula and pṛṣṭha karmapatha). In addition to this breakdown of the course of karma into preparatory, fundamental and pursuant 'moments' or aspects, these and following kārikās outline the traditionally held virtuous and unvirtuous courses of karma with great specificity regarding the fruits which follow upon certain actions. Since this study is most directly concerned with understanding the underlying theory of karmic retribution, these matters of great detail (and, of course, dispute) are here mentioned but not treated at greater length.

A pertinent question arises in the text in reference to the various moral codes observed or undertaken by non-Buddhists (bāhyakānām). While it is admitted that those

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[130] prātimokṣasaṃvara ityapi kāyavāksaṃvaraṇāt karmapatha ityucyate maulasaṃgṛhitatvāt/

'outsiders' do engage in moral practices, it is denied that these moral codes or practices amount to the prātimoksa restraint. Why do these not amount to the serial or step by step release from sin? "Verily it does not conduce to the final deliverance from evil because it is based on gestation (or becoming)."[131] Yaśomitra adds the comment that, while they have liberation as their goal, they are afflicted with deviant view, etc. (moksārthinām api tesām mithyādrstyādi upahatatvāt).

The next material requiring comment is 17, d, which deals with the meditational and fluxless restraints. A passage from the second chapter of the Kośa (II, 51) defines the sahabhu hetū (conascent cause). The passage reads:

> What are the natures that are in conformity with volition?
>
> THE MENTAL NATURES, TWO RESTRAINTS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS (ORIGINATION, ETC.) OF THE MENTAL NATURES ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THOUGHT.
>
> All of the natures associated with thought, the meditational restraint, and the restraint that is without fluxes as well as that which is the origination and other characteristics of these are in conformity with thought.[132]

The reason that these two restraints are in conformity with thought while the prātimoksa restraint is not is

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[131] nahi tadatyantam pāpasya pratimoksanāya samvartate bhavasanniśritatvāt/

[132] ke punarete cittānuvarttino dharmāh/ CAITTĀ DVAU SAMVARAU TESĀM CETASO LAKSANĀNI CA/ CITTĀNUVARTTINAH/ sarve cittsamprayuktāh dhyānasamvarah, anāsravasamvarah tesām ca ye jātyādayah cittasya ca/

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that the restraint of the *prātimokṣa* operates even when there are morally unlike thoughts or no thoughts at all. Further the two, a meditational and a fluxless restraint, are called 'abrogation-restraint' (*prahānasamvarākhyām*). Thus, in addition to restraining one, these two also abrogate certain defilements in one particular meditational realm. The meditational and fluxless restraint are said to amount to abrogation of defilement in the 'undaunted' (*anāgamya*), the threshold meditation unique to the first *dhyāna* realm. According to Kośa, VIII, 22, each of the eight principal meditations has a threshold (*sāmantaka*). Of the eight thresholds, the first one (that pertaining to the first *dhyāna* realm) is called the undaunted, and is pure (*śuddhaka*, glossed at VIII, 5. Bhāṣya as 'conjoined with pure natures'), and without fluxes. La Vallee Poussin has adequately summarized much of the information on this undaunted stage:

> The fundamental meditations (maula), to wit, the four meditations of the Realm of Form or the four *dhyānas* and the four formlesshave a vestibule of preliminary meditation, *sāmantaka*. The *sāmantaka* of the first *dhyāna* has the name of *anāgamya*. . . . The ancient Abhidhamma teaches that the ascetic destroys the passions (*āsava*), that is to say is detached from all of the realms, in dependence on (that is to say, in producing the insight that eliminates the passions in) seven meditations (four *dhyanas*, three formless), Anguttara, iv, 422 to be corrected following iv, 426. . . . The theory of the *anāgamya* and of its employment in the detachment (*vairagya*) rests on the idea that the ascetic is not able to enter into a meditation without having gotten rid of the passions of the inferior realm, and that he is unable, in that inferior realm, to so rid himself of said

passions: therefore, the necessity for a preliminary meditation.[133]

The first half of kārikā 18 establishes that one fluxless restraint and one meditational restraint are called 'abrogational' restraints in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. The Bhāṣya on this material also points out that there is also a meditational restraint that is not abrogational in nature. The term 'abrogational' is defined in the Bhāṣya as follows: "Two restraints in the nine unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage are said to be 'abrogation-restraints.' One is a meditational restraint, one is a fluxless restraint; because by reason of them there is abrogation of immorality and the defilements that give rise to it."[134] In order to demonstrate that not all meditational restraint amounts to abrogation and that not all fluxless restraint amounts to abrogation, a fourfold alternative scheme is elaborated (catuṣkoṭikam kriyate). The first alternative amounts to a meditational restraint, fluxless, but not occurring in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. This would not be abrogational in nature. The second is the fluxless restraint (and therefore, not a meditational restraint) that occurs in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. This is abrogational in nature. The third

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[133] Poussin, L'AK, IV, 235-36 and notes.

[134] anāgamye tau dhyānānāsravasamvarau navasvānantaryamārgeṣu prahāṇasamvarau ityucyete tābhyām dauḥśīlyasya tatsamutthāpakānām ca kleśānām prahāṇāt/

is meditational restraint of one characterized by fluxes that occurs in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. It is abrogational in nature. The fourth is fluxless (and therefore, not meditational) restraint that occurs elsewhere than in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. It is not abrogational in nature.

The last half of kārikā 18 deals with the intrinsic qualities of restraint of the mind and the sense faculties. Both of these restraints are of the nature of awareness and mindfulness (samprajāna and smṛti). Kārikās 19, 20 and 21 discuss the various temporal distinctions that can be made in reference to vijñaptis and avijñaptis that pertain to the three classes of restraint. The individual who is neither intentionally committed to virtuous forms of restraint nor unvirtuous forms of unrestraint is called the 'one in the middle' or the 'one in-between' (madhyastha). While it is not necessary that such an individual be characterized by a non-indication, as soon as he commits an act of bad conduct or accepts any member of a given moral code, he becomes endowed with a 'middling' non-indication.

The final point to be made in the avijñapti adhikāra concerns the appurtenance of both virtuous and unvirtuous avijñaptis to a given stream of consciousness. Thus, one who is not established in restraint (or established in certain forms of non-restraint) may still be characterized by virtuous non-indications if there is the impetus of acts

of praise and admiration (or bowing to the Stūpas, as per the Tibetan translation). This variation was pointed out to me by Dr. Wayman and is understandable as a transmissional error. The Sanskrit of the editions before me reads '<u>stava-vandana-adikriyām</u>.' A scribal error resulting in the reading '<u>stupa-vandana</u> . . .' is easy to imagine granting the similarity of the Devanāgari script characters for <u>v</u> and <u>p</u>. The impetus of such acts insures some degree of virtuous <u>avijñapti</u> in the individual. By the same token, one who is presently established in restraint of one kind or another may nonetheless be characterized by unvirtuous non-indications as a result of the impetus of defilement appropriate to past unvirtuous actions. On this note, the treatment of the <u>avijñapti</u> ends (<u>avijnaptyadhikāraḥ samāptaḥ</u>).

It is hoped that this commentary has rendered more intelligible some of the more complex material in the text and translation. Of primary importance in this material are the Vaibhāṣika arguments in favor of positing such an entity and the Sautrantika criticisms of these arguments. Taken together with the material on the <u>prapti</u>'s and <u>anuśaya</u>, and bearing in mind the controversy about the existence of past and future dharmas, the material provided here suggests that one of the underlying areas of utmost doctrinal importance in the Kośa is the matter of the mechanism whereby the principle of karmic retribution is effected. If this study has isolated any of the key elements

in these disputes and made clear the significance of the *bīja* alternative developed by Vasubandhu, then a perhaps not insignificant contribution has been made to the field of Buddhist studies.

CHAPTER IV

A TRANSLATION OF THE AVIJÑAPTI-ADHIKĀRA

The theoretical entity with which this study is concerned is the avijñapti-rūpa proposed by the Vaibhāsika school. It is first mentioned in the Dhātu Nirdesa,[1] chapter one of the kośa. This passage (I, ka. 11) provides the definitional basis for the debate in the fourth chapter. It is therefore appropriate to give here a translation of this passage:

> THE INTERCONNECTION,[2] PURE OR IMPURE, ARISING IN DEPENDENCE ON GREAT ELEMENTS, THAT EVEN APPLIES TO ONE OF DISTRACTED THOUGHT OR OF NO THOUGHT, THAT VERILY IS CALLED THE NON-INDICATION.[3]//11//

The expression 'of distracted thought or of no thought' means 'of one having thought that is different from it.' The expression 'even of one who is without thought' means 'of one attained to the asamjñi-nirodha-samāpatti.'[4] By the word 'even' it is to be understood

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[1] Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. dhatu; Scherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 9.

[2] ANUBANDHA

[3] See Chapter III, pp. 73-77.

[4] See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. samāpatti, translatable as 'the cessation-attainment that is non-notional (or, non-ideational).'

that it also applies to one who is not of distracted thought or one who is with thought. It is called an interconnection. It is a stream (or continuous flow).[5] The expression 'pure or impure' means virtuous or unvirtuous.[6]

Since it is similar to the flow of praptis,[7] in regard to being virtuous or unvirtuous, it is said to arise in dependence on great elements for the purpose of distinguishing them. The Vaibhāṣikas say that the meaning of the expression 'arising in dependence on' has the sense of cause, because there is the presence of the generative and other causes.[8] Regarding the expression 'it verily is called the non-indication,' the word 'verily' (hi) is for the purpose of naming it; for the purpose of making it known. And, while it is the case that it has both a formal and functional self nature (svabhāva)[9] like the vijñapti, it does not inform another. Hence, it is the non-indication. The expression 'it is called' points out the words of the ācāryas. In short, the non-indication is a form, virtuous or unvirtuous, that proceeds from an indication or from meditation.[10]

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[5]pravāha

[6]kuśala and akuśala

[7]See Chapter III, pp. 56-60.

[8]Jananādihetubhāvāt, see Chapter III, pp. 74-76. for the analysis of the generative and other causes.

[9]rūpa-kriyā-svabhāva: having both a formal and functional nature. See Chapter III, pp. 76-77.

[10]samāsatas tu vijñapti-samādhi-sambhūtam kuśalakuśalam rūpam avijñaptiḥ.//

Aum, Homage to the Buddha

Fourth Chapter of the Kosa

The Exposition of Karman

Now, what is that by which the manifold diversity of the Sattva and Receptacle Worlds[11] is said to be created?[12] By no means whatsoever was it created in the manner of a prior cognition. How then (was it created)?

THE DIVERSITY OF THE WORLDS IS CREATED BY THE DEEDS

of sentient beings. If it is engendered by actions, why are saffrons, sandalwoods, etc. which are produced by the actions of sentient beings most beautiful while their bodies are not? Just those actions that are of such a class as mixed causations[13] are produced as the physical basis of sentient beings, composed of flaws and as experience which is pleasant and composed of recompense for it.[14] However, for the gods whose causations are not mixed,[15] both (experience and the physical basis) are pleasant.

What, further, is this karma? He said--

VOLITION AND THAT WHICH IS CREATED BY IT./

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[11]On the distinction between the two worlds, see Kosa, III, 1 and 45 and Bhāṣya and corresponding material in Poussin, L'AK.

[12]atha yad etat sattvabhājanalokasya bahudhā vaicitryam uktam tat kena kṛtam/

[13]vyamiśrakāriṇām

[14]bhogas ca ramyāstatpratikārabhūtaḥ.

[15]avyamiśrakāriṇām

It is stated in a sūtra[16]--"The two karmas are volition and the karma after having willed (it)." That which (occurs), having been willed, is that which is created by volition.

These two karmas become three--corporeal, vocal and mental.

In what manner is there the establishment[17] of these karmas? Is it from the physical basis?[18] Or is it from self nature?[19] Or, is it from arousal?[20] If from the physical basis, then only corporeal karma obtains, because all of them are based in the body. If from intrinsic nature, then only vocal karma obtains, since only speech has the intrinsic nature of karma. If from arousal, then only mental karma obtains, since they all have the condition of being aroused by the mind.[21]

The Vaibhāṣikas say that the establishment of the three is by means of the three causes in the given sequence.

Among these, further--

MENTAL KARMA AMOUNTS TO VOLITION.[22]

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[16] Anguttara, iii, 415, as cited in Poussin, L'AK.

[17] vyavasthānam

[18] kim āsrayataḥ

[19] svabhāvataḥ

[20] samutthānato

[21] sarveṣām manahsamutthitatvāt

[22] CETANA MĀNASAM KARMA

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That is, mental karma is to be understood as volition.

VOCAL AND CORPOREAL KARMA ARE ENGENDERED BY IT.//1//

That which is engendered by volition is called the karma after having willed it, and is to be known as corporeal and vocal karma.

THE TWO ARE INDICATION AND NON-INDICATION.[23]

The two, corporeal and vocal karma, are to be known as each (being) indication and non-indication. Among them--

THE CORPOREAL INDICATION IS HELD TO BE SHAPE.[24]

Just as, by virtue of thought the body has this or that shape, just so, shape is the corporeal indication. According to others[25] the corporeal indication is said to be motion. They say that corporeal karma pertains to one in motion and not to one that is not in motion.

IT IS NOT MOTION BECAUSE THE COMPOUNDED IS MOMENTARY.

What pray tell is a 'moment'? That which attains existence has immediate destruction; momentary means that this pertains to it. As in the case of the wielder of the club.[26] Since all that is compounded does not exist after

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[23]TE TU VIJNAPTYAVIJNAPTI

[24]KĀYAVIJÑAPTIR ISYATE SAMSTHĀNAM

[25]The Vātsīputrīyas according to sub. comm. See Chapter III, pp. 78-82.

[26]dandikavat; sub. comm. is silent on this comparison. Poussin, L'AK, vol. III, p. 4: ". . . ksanika, le dharma, ce qui possede le kṣana, comme dandika, qui porte un baton (danda).

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it has attained identity, it is destroyed in the same place where it was produced. Transference (or passage) to another place[27] is not valid for it. Therefore, motion is not corporeal karma.

That would be the case if the momentariness of everything were proven. Know that just that is proven. How so?

BECAUSE, THE PASSING AWAY

of a compounded thing is certain.

Indeed, the destruction[28] of states[29] is spontaneous.[30] What is the reason? While there is a cause for the effect, destruction is a non-state (or non-entity or non-presence[31]). And, what is to be effected for a non-entity? If, since a state remains the same, there be no destruction of one that has just arisen nor destruction of it later, then yon destruction is spontaneous.[32] Then, let states be characterised by alteration.[33] Alteration is not valid for a state. (This is not valid for a state) because loss of character therefrom is not valid. But certainly the

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[27] deśāntarasaṃkrantiḥ

[28] vināśa

[29] bhāvānām

[30] ākasmiko

[31] abhāva

[32] so 'sāvākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasya utpannamātrasya na syāt paścād api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvāt.

[33] atha anyathībhūtaḥ

destruction of logs, etc. as a result of conjunction with fire, etc. is perceived! And, there is no better authority than perception.

Now then, why does Your Honor think 'I see the destruction of the logs, etc. as a result of the conjunction with fire.'? (Why?) Because, they are no longer seen.[34] This, then is to be considered (or deliberated)[35]--Is it that destruction of the logs, etc. is due to the conjunction with fire, etc. and they are therefore no longer seen? Indeed, perhaps they are self-destroyed and others are not further produced and hence, they are not seen, as is the case when the flame is no longer seen as a result of conjunction with wind and the sound of the bell is no longer perceived as a result of conjunction with the hand and the bell. Therefore, the meaning is that the thesis is inferential.[36]//2//

Why is this a case of inference? (It is inference) in as much as it was said 'because nothing is to be effected for an absence.' Further,

> NOTHING WHATSOEVER WOULD HAVE IT (DESTRUCTION) WITHOUT A CAUSE.[37]

If destruction is due to sharedness with (or from similarity with) the cause, then the destruction of nothing

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[34] tesām punar adarśanāt

[35] sampradhāryam tāvad etat

[36] tasmād anumānasādhyo 'yamartham/

[37] NA KASYACID AHETOH SYĀT

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whatsoever would occur without a cause, like origination. And, since the cause is not beheld, we say that the destruction of the momentary thoughts, sounds and flames is spontaneous.

Suppose this, however--the destruction of a thought is a result of a following thought and the destruction of a sound is because of a following sound. That is not valid because there is non-simultaneity for the two thoughts of doubt and certainty. Indeed, it is not valid that the two thoughts, doubt and certainty, are simultaneous. It is also thus regarding pleasure and pain, passion and hatred. In the case where keen sounds and cognitions arise and thereafter, dull sounds and cognitions arise, how could natures belonging to the dull class destroy the natures belonging to the keen class? And how also in the cases of the other two (pleasure and pain, passion and hatred)?

Indeed, would one imagine that the destruction of the flames is due to the absence of a durative cause or by dint of the forces of dharma and adharma?[38] That is invalid, since a non-entity (or absence) is not able to be a cause. Nor, for that matter, can dharma and adharma, the two causes of origination and destruction, have arrest of function and attainment of function from moment to moment.[39] This

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[38]Identified in the sub. comm. as a Vaiśeṣika position. See Chapter III, pp. 80-81.

[39]vṛtti-lābha-pratibandhau

conception of the cause is able to apply to every case of a compounded thing. Enough of argument!

If it were the case that the destruction of logs, etc. was a result of (or caused by) conjunction with fire, then in the case where there arise the most intensely heated qualities brought about by the heating,

THE CAUSE WOULD BE A DESTRUCTIVE AGENT.

And, the very cause would be the agent of destruction. How is this so? As a result of combining grass, etc. with fire, qualities engendered by heat (or burning) arise; because of just such (a process) there is the destruction of them (the first heat generated products) when more and more heated natures arise: thus, the very cause would be their agent of destruction or it would be indistinguishable from the cause.[40] And, it is not valid to say that just what be the presence of them for such a reason is later the absence of them for just such a reason.[41] They (the Vaibhāṣikas) would imagine determinations regarding as much as a distinction of causes among flames.[42] What constructs would they conceptualize in regard to the heat engendered attributes

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[40] hetvaviśiṣṭo vā

[41] na ca yuktam--yata eva yādṛsād va teṣām bhāvaḥ tat eva tādṛsāc ca teṣām punar abhāva iti/

[42] The sub. comm. identifies the Vaibhāṣikas as the subject of the verb in the sentence: jvalāntareṣu ca tāvaddhetubhede 'pi parakalpānam parikalpayeyuḥ/

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as a result of the combination of corrosives, frost, harsh sun and water with earth?[43]

Inasmuch as boiling water diminishes, what herein do the conjunctions with fire accomplish? By its force, the fire-element increases; as a result of its force, the water becomes more and more diminished, until, in the end, it has become completely diminished and the continuum no longer continues. Herein, this is what the conjunctions with fire accomplish (or, do).

Therefore, there is no destructive cause of states. They are simply destroying themselves because of transitoriness. The momentary transitoriness of them is proven because they are destroyed immediately after origination. And, because of momentary transitoriness, motion is impossible.

However, there is the imputation of motion[44] when there is immediate origination in another place, as in the case of the fire in the grass.[45] And, with the absence of motion, it is proven that 'the corporeal indication is shape.'

The Sautrāntikas (however) say: "Shape is not substantial."[46] When color is originated, growing larger in one direction, one designates the form 'long,' seeing it

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[43] ksārahimasuktasuryodakabhūmisambandhāt tu pākaja-viśesotpattau kām kalpānam kalpayeyuh.

[44] gatyabhimānas tu

[45] trnajvālavat.

[46] nāsti samsthānam dravyatah

smaller, one designates it 'short,' when larger in four directions, 'square,' and when equally in all directions, as 'round.' So it is in all cases. Seeing a firebrand (moving) in one direction, from one spot to the immediately adjacent one, quickly and without interruption, one recognizes (or ascertains) 'length,' seeing it thusly in all directions, one recognizes 'round.' Shape is (therefore) not substantial (not a substantial thing).[47] If it were,

IT WOULD BE GRASPABLE BY TWO.

Indeed, having seen with the eye, length is ascertained, and having touched with the tactile sense, the grasp of the second would obtain. But, the grasp of the base of form is not by means of the second (sense mentioned).

Whereas the grasp of 'long, etc.' occurs in the case of a tangible, so it would also be brought about in the case of color. In that case, mere memory, based on association, occurs. While it occurs because of association, the grasp is not due to direct perception, just as, having seen the form of fire, there is memory of its warmth and having smelled the flower, there is memory of its color.

Here it is valid that memory of one occurs by means of invariable association; however, a given tangible never occurs necessarily in the case of a given shape whereby the recollection would be necessary.

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[47] <u>na dravyasat samsthānam</u>

Hence, if it were true that were a necessary association, then recollection regarding shape would necessarily occur. It would be likewise regarding color.

But, when there is a shape, it is not invariable that is possesses a certain color.

And thus, it is not the case--recollection of shape from touch is not valid. Were it valid, then, within a variegated thing, where there are many colors in one shape, after having seen it, a multiplicity of shapes in one spot would obtain. And, like the case of color, that is not valid.[48]

And therefore, shape is not substantial.

And, whatever form that offers resistance (is impeded),[49] that is surely found in the atom.

AND, IT IS NOT IN THE ATOM.

Nor is shape, 'long, etc.' found in the atom.[50] Therefore, just when there are many, set down in a certain manner, there is the designation of 'long, etc.'

Then, suppose this--the notions of 'long, etc.' occur when there are atoms of shape[51] set out in a certain manner.

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[48] tac ca ayuktam varṇavat.

[49] yaścāpi kiñcit sapratigham rūpam asti tad avaśyam paramāṇau vidyate/

[50] na ca saṃsthānam paramāṇau vidyate dīrghādi/

[51] saṃsthānaparamāṇava

That amounts to the mere 'falling of feathers'[52] since there is no proof of them (atoms of shape). If intrinsic characteristics were proven, then quantity would be appropriate to them. But, since the self nature of particles of shape is not proven, as in the case of color, how can there be a quantity of them?

If then shape occurs undifferentiated from color, (why is it that) different shapes are seen in earther colored pots? Have we not said that when there is color, in the manner pointed out (originating in adjacent locations, etc.), the notion of 'long, etc.' is designated? Just as, while there are distinct ants in close proximity, one makes the distinction of 'row, circle, etc.,' just so it is in regard to shape.

But, isn't it also the case that, when it is dark or because of distance, while not seeing the color, still the length, etc. of a post, etc. is seen? Even though the color at this time and place is indistinct, people make the distinction of long, etc., like the conception of an army of ants. And, it is well known to be thus. And, whenever a mere mass that is indistinct is seen and discrimination is not ascertainable, one says 'what then is it?'

Well then, having rejected the motion of the body and shape as well, what do your honors, the Sautrāntikas

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[52] _so 'yam kevalam pakṣapātaḥ_..., i.e., an empty and arbitrary position.

designate as the corporeal indication? Indeed, they designate just shape as the corporeal indication. However, it is not substantial.

While designating it thus, what do they consider as the corporeal karma? Corporeal karma is karma that is sustained by the body, and it is volition that is always the enlivener (leader) of the body.

And now, vocal and mental karma are to be understood in the same manner.

What then is meant when one says "Karma is volition and karma after having willed."? First there is a determination volition--"I will do such and such." After having willed, an action volition is originated. That by which the body is moved is that karma which is called 'the karma after having willed.'

If that is the case, then we say that, since there is a lack of an indication, there would be no non-indication pertaining to the realm of desire. Hence, great faults are adhered to and there will be further counter-consequences. If, because corporeal karma has been explained thus, the non-indication were due to a special volition, then it would be subordinate to thought, like the equilibrated non-indication.

It will not be thus because there is a special casting of the non-indication by a special volition. And so, in the case of casting it, the indication would cause the force

to be beheld by the original volition. Still, the Vaibhāṣikas depict shape as substantial and the corporeal indication has the nature of shape.

> THE VOCAL INTIMATION IS JUST THE BURSTING FORTH OF SPEECH.//3//[53]

Just the sound that has the nature of speech is the vocal indication.

The non-indication was previously mentioned (Kosa, I, kā.11). The Sautrāntikas say that it is not (a) substantial (dharma), because they take the position that it is merely the non-doing of something. (Further, they take that position) because it is a designation that, in fact, arises in dependence on past great elements, and their true nature is not found (i.e., there is no such thing), and because the characteristics of form (rūpa) are lacking.

The Vaibhāṣikas say that it exists. How is it ascertained?[54]

> BECAUSE THERE IS A THREEFOLD AND PURE FORM DECLARATION, BECAUSE THERE IS INCREASE AND A PATH FOR THE ONE WHO DOES NOT (HIMSELF COMMIT THE) ACT, ETC.[55]

A threefold form is declared in the sūtra--"There is form that is visible and impeded, there is form that is not shown and impeded, and there is form that is not shown and

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[53] VĀGVIJÑAPTIS TU VĀGDHVANIḤ//3//

[54] katham jñāyate/

[55] TRIVIDHĀMALARŪPOKTIVṚDDHYAKURVATPATHĀDIBHIḤ/

not impeded."[56] And, a form that is fluxless[57] was declared by the Blessed One--"What are the natures that are fluxless? In whatever form there is not originated any past, future or present antipathy, in whatever...all the way up to vijñāna, the natures are said to be fluxless."[58] And, except for the non-indication, there would be no form that is fluxless.

And, the increase was declared--"By these seven things of material origin, which are creative of merit, the merit of the son of the family or the daughter of the family who is endowed with faith, continually and uninterruptedly enhances and rears merit, when that person is sleeping, standing, or moving. It is the same with the seven of non-material origin." And, except for the non-indication, the enhancement of merit for one who has other states of mind would not be possible.[59] And, were it not for the non-indication the 'course of karma' (karma-patha) would not be effected for the one who does not act himself, but causes actions to be done by others. Indeed, the course of karma would not be

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[56] respectively, sanidarśanam and sapratigham, anidarśanam and sapratigham, and anidarśanam and apratigham. See Chapter III, p. 93.

[57] anāsravam, see Chapter III, pp. 93-95. See Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. āsrava for concise treatment of the āsravas, the channels or fluxes that characterise the laukika individual. See also Kosa, V, kās. 36 and 37 and Bhasya for more on the three (avidyā-, kāma-, and bhavāsravas).

[58] Poussin, L'AK cites Ekottaragama, 2, 24. See Chapter III, pp. 93-95.

[59] See Chapter III, pp. 95-100.

applicable to the one who intimates an order, because he did not do the act as intimated in the order. But, we say that it is effected for him because there is a special characteristic (evidently, the non-indication).

And, it was said by the Blessed one--"Monks, the dharmas are an external base, not comprised within, not shown to, not impeded by the eleven Āyatanas."[60] But, he did not say that it did not possess any form. And, what would be the motive (for such a statement) if a non-indication, included within the dharma-ayatana, were denied?[61]

And, without the non-indication there would be no Eight-membered Path. Because, for the one attained (to the truth of the Path)[62] there is no validity to (the third, fourth and fifth members) (right) speech, bodily action and livelihood. But, then again, it was said "The complete development of right view, resolution, exertion, mindfulness and meditation accrues to the one who sees thus and knows thus. Prior to this, his right speech, bodily action and means of livelihood have been completely purified and cleansed."[63] This was said with the purport that one has

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[60]Dharmā bhiksavo bāhyam āyatanam ekadasabhir āyatanair asamgrhītam anidarsanam apratigham iti/ Identified in Poussin, L'AK as Samyuktagama, 13, 18; See Chapter III, p. 102.

[61]tatra kim prayojanam syād yadi dharmāyatanāntargatam avijñaptirūpam naśyet/ See Chapter III, p. 102.

[62]Samāpannasya, see Chapter III, pp. 102-115.

[63]Evidently a Sautrāntika objection to previous sentence which the Vaibhāsikas reply to in the following sentence (acc. to sub. comm., pariharati).

previously performed the detachment by means of the mundane path.[64] And, were there no non-indication, there would be no Prātimokṣa Vow. For, whoever, after taking it, would change his mind (poss. have other states of mind) would not be a bhikṣu or a bhikṣuni. In the sutra, the bridge is said to be virakti (freedom from passion, dispassion) because it opposes immorality. Nor is it that a non-presence is able to be the bridge. Thus, there is such a non-indication.[65]

Here the Sautrāntikas say--"This is a many sided argument, an involved argument, but it is just not so. What is the reason? Because of what was said as far as 'because there is a three-fold form utterance.'

In this case, the Yogācāras teach--"Through the meditator's power of Samadhi the form which is samadhi's field arises. Because it is not the field of the eye-organ, it is called 'non-shown,' and because it is not hindered by place it is called 'not impeded.'"

If it now be thought--: How can that (which has just been described) be called rūpa?" (one could say) "In the same way that the non-indication (can be called rūpa), that's how!"

Now, as regards that which was said, to wit, 'because it is said that there is a fluxless form,' the Yogācāras describe precisely the form that results from the force of

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[64]See Chapter III, pp. 102-15.

[65]See Chapter III, pp. 116-17 for the emendation of this sentence.

meditation as 'fluxless' when the meditation is without fluxes. According to others, the form of arhats and external form (are fluxless) because they do not provide a basis for the fluxes.[66]

(If that is so) why then was it said in a sūtra--"Which natures are with flux? Just as long as there is the eye, just as long as there are forms."[67] (The maintainer of the thus challenged opinion, to wit, the 'Others,' respond:) Herein,[68] however, 'with-flux' is declared because there is non-opposition to the fluxes.[69] Well then, in that case, something (tad) would be, in rotation (or alternately, paryāyena) with fluxes and without fluxes. So what? (Well,) there would be a confusion of characteristics. Since, as something is with flux, just so is it never without flux. What is the confusion? And, (further) if the base of form, etc. were exclusively with-flux, for what reason would they be specified as here in this sūtra?--"Whatever forms with-flux are indulged in are the basis of deficiency and injury to the mind."[70]

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[66]Poussin, L'AK identifies the 'others' as Darstāntikas.

[67]sāsravā dharmāh katame/ yāvadeva caksur yāvad eva rūpāni iti vistarah/

[68]Reading tatra for tat, as per manuscript variation.

[69]sub. comm.: "Since it is the special property of thought and mental natures to oppose the fluxes." (cittacaittaviśeso hi āsravapratipaksa iti/)

[70]yāni rupāni sāsravāni sopādānīyāni cetahkhilamraksavastu iti vistarah/ See Chapter III, pp. 93-95.

And in relation to what was said, to wit, 'because of saying there is an increase of merit,' former teachers point out--

> For this is the true nature[71]--that just as much as the gifts of the donor are partaken of, just that much, as a result of the distinguished qualities of[72] the enjoyer and distinguished assistance, do the streams (of consciousness) of the givers, even if they be subject to other states of mind, which have been pervaded by the volition to give aimed at those (enjoyers) undergo a subtle and distinguished transformation,[73] by means of which in the future they become capable of generating much fruition.

This was mentioned obscurely in the passage "Just as merit increases so does merit arise."

Suppose it be questioned:--"How then, will a transformation of another's stream (of consciousness) be effected, given that it is subject to other states, as a result of a distinction in the stream (of consciousness) of another person?" It is the same as in the case of the non-indication.

How then will the non-indication establish a different dharma in one stream (of consciousness) as a result of a distinction in another's stream? How will the same thing occur in the cases of immaterial things effecting merit? The associations occur, even in dream, as a result of constant repetition of volition aimed at those[74] as its

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[71] Dharmatā; see Chapter III, pp. 95-99.

[72] guṇaviśeṣāt, glossed in sub. comm. with 'dhyānapramāṇādi,' 'the extent of dhyana, etc.'

[73] sukṣmaṃ pariṇāmaviśeṣaṃ; see Chapter III, passim.

[74] sub. comm. identifies 'those' as the Tathāgata and the monks.

basis. According to the proponents of the non-indication, since there is no indication (vijñapti) in regard to a case where there is no material derivative, how in that case could there be a non-indication?

According to others, it (the increase of merit), in regard to material things effecting merit, is due to the constant repitition of volitional thinking aimed at this (particular material gift).[75]

Why then is this said in a sūtra?--

> When an earnest monk, endowed with moral habit, possessed of virtuous natures, after having partaken of the almsfood of someone, brings about, directly realises with the body and abides in the mental samadhi that is immeasureable, then as a result of that immeasureable samadhi[76] there is certainly an influx of merit, an influx of virtuous (natures), and a stream of pleasantness for the patron who gave the gift.

Now, in this case, what distinction of volition did the giver have? Therefore, only the distinguished transformation of the stream (of consciousness) is valid.

In relation to what was said, to wit, 'How will the course of karma be accomplished for the one who causes another to act?,' the course of karma is here depicted as follows: After a specific attack (or offense) by means of the employment of another for it, a subtle stream of

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[75] sub. comm. identifies the gift as an ārāma, etc.

[76] See Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, s.v. apramāṇa and Chapter III, pp. 99-100.

consciousness distinction[77] is engendered for the employer. This transformation-distinction becomes quite capable of turning out fruition, even in the future.

And, this rule (or principle) should be known to apply in the case of the fulfillment of an action for the one who acts by himself.

It is yonder distinct transformation of the stream (of consciousness) that is called 'the course of karma' (karma-patha), because it is the cause's approach to the effect. And (it is so called) because it has as fruition their activity, namely corporeal or vocal, as the proponents of the non-indication have the non-indication.

The Bhadanta claims that, given the skandhas, one is called the killer, effected by the sin of taking life in past, present and future volition, when it occurs to him 'I will Slay,' 'I now slay,' 'It has been slain.'

However, the course of karma does not arrive at completion by (just) this much. The reasoning intended in this case (i.e. Bhadanta's) amounts to this:--There would be immediate retribution for those connationally thinking that a mother, etc. (i.e., the five) had been slain, although urging against the killing: it would ensue that with so much volition the person would be killed by himself (i.e., the victim would think, 'I am being killed,' and so would be responsible for his own death).

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[77] suksmah santāna-parināma-viseso, the construct used by Vasubandhū tō replace the Vaibhāsikā avijñapti.

Is this hostility that the non-indication is cast off and the distinct transformation of the stream (of consciousness) is assented to, while it is (in fact) just as incomprehensible?[78]

You should know that there is hardly any animosity; however, to say "When there is completion of the activity[79] by the body following upon thought, a different nature, separate from the two (the body and thought) is originated for the employer," is not satisfactory. But, to say: "The completion of an act, proceeding from the endeavor done by someone, amounts to a transformation of the stream (of consciousness), for the person," this is satisfactory; because of the origination of fruition in the future as a result of the stream of thought and mental natures.

And, having finished saying that, what is now said? "Because there is an absence of an indication," etc. Since there is an absence of it (vijñapti) there is an absence of the non-indication.[80]

Regarding what was said (by the Vaibhāṣikas) to wit, "Wherefore was the non-formal character (or state) of the dharma-āyatana not declared?" (we say) that which was

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[78]asamjñāyamānah, glossed in sub. comm. with durbodha, see Chapter III, p. 101.

[79]kriyāparisamāptis, glossed in sub. comm. with karmapathaparisamāptiḥ, see Chapter III, pp. 140-41.

[80]tadabhāvād avijñapter abhāvaḥ/, see Chapter III, pp. 99-100.

declared herein as form that is not shown and not impeded, let that be comprised within the dharma-āyatana.[81]

In regard to what was said (by the Vaibhāṣikas), to wit,: "And there would be no Eight membered Path." As long as you are talking about a member, (we ask) how there are the members of right speech, conduct and livelihood for the one who is 'attained to the path' (mārgasamāpannasya). Does yonder one utter speech, or perform actions or search about for robes, etc.? He (the Vaibh.) says no. Well then, how is it? He obtains (or appropriates) its form, a fluxless non-indication. As a result of obtaining (or appropriating) these (non-indications), even after emerging from (the samapātti) he no longer engages in wayward speech, etc., but engages in right speech, etc. Thus, when there is a sign and it is taken as the approach to the derivative of the sign, the avijñapti is established (or reaffirmed).[82]

If that is so, then why should it not be accepted as here follows? The one attained to the path acquires, without a non-indication, an inclination with a corresponding form and a physical basis,[83] after the attainment of which the one attained to the path no longer engages in wayward

[81] See above, notes 60 and 61, and Chapter III, p. 102.

[82] ato nimitte naimittikopacārād avijñaptau tadā vyākriyate.

[83] mārgasamāpanno vināpyavijñaptyā tadrūpamāsayam ca āsrayam pratilabhate..., see Chapter III, pp. 102-15.

speech, etc. but engages in right speech, etc., even after emerging (from the meditational state). Hence, when there is a sign and it is taken as the approach to the derivative of the sign, the eight members of the path are established (reaffirmed).

According to others, however, it is said that that which is declared to be a member of the path would merely be non-commission (of some act). That which he obtains, i.e., the non-commission restraint, as a result of the assistance of the path, would be without fluxes as a result of being acquired in dependence on the path without fluxes.

Indeed, natures (dharmas) are not universally recognized (or reckoned or counted) as possessing substance (substantial reality).[84] Thus it is with the 'Eight natures of the world'--to wit, gain, loss, honor, dishonor, blame, praise, pleasure and pain. And, herein, (specific) loss, namely, that of robes, etc., is not another separate dharma.

There would still be the Prātimokṣa restraint, namely, having pledged by a previous rite with volition, through suppression of the act, one restrains body and speech.

And, is it not the case that one characterised by having other kinds of thoughts would not be restrained?[85]

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[84] na hi sarvatra dravyamanto dharmāḥ parisaṃkhyāyante/

[85] anyacitta na saṃvṛtaḥ syād iti cet/ Having rejected the avijñapti as the mechanism whereby the restraint endures, Vasubandhu must account for the fact that one who has taken the vow will still be restrained thereby even if he has morally unlike thoughts.

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(We say) no. By contemplating that, at the time of acting by stationing on it with mindfulness, having recalled the promise to refrain, one is ashamed. Because of refraining from misconduct this is what is meant by the taking on of it (the vow). Further, if it were because of the non-indication that misconduct is held in check, then not even one bereft of memory (or, one who had forgotten)[86] would violate the rules (of training).

Enough of this prolixity,[87] according to the Vaibhāṣikas, there is a 'non-indication form' that is within substance (substantial).[88]

If that is so (that there is such a substantial dharma), and it is said to arise in dependence on great elements, does it arise in dependence on the same primary elements as the indication? Or, (does it arise in dependence on) others? It arises in dependence on other great elements. (This is the case) because it is not possible that a collocation[89] be characterised by both subtle fruit and gross fruit.[90] Is it this way? To wit--when the indication is present then it occurs in dependence on present elements?

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[86] musita-smṛtiḥ, see Chapter III, pp. 117-18.

[87] alam vistareṇa

[88] asti eva dravyāntaram avijñaptirūpam iti vaibhāṣikaḥ/

[89] sāmagrī, see Chapter III, p. 120.

[90] sukṣmaphalā and audārikaphalā.

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Generally,[91] it is thus with all derived rūpa, however, some present and future (derived matter) arises in dependence on past great elements.

How then, is it?

> AFTER A MOMENT THE NON-INDICATION IS ENGENDERED BY PAST GREAT ELEMENTS FOR THE ONE IN THE REALM OF DESIRE.//4//

After the first (or initial) moment the non-indication originates in dependence on past great elements for the one in the realm of desire. They occur in the sense of a basis for it.[92] The present great elements occur in the sense of a 'locus of support'[93] (for the non-indication); because they are, in this order, a motivating cause and supportive (or sustaining) cause[94] of it. This is in the same manner as the throwing hand and the span of ground are (the like causes) of the continued motion of the wheel on the ground.//4//

Now then, the corporeal and vocal karma that come from where arise in dependence on great elements that come from where?[95]

> CORPOREAL AND VOCAL KARMA THAT ARE WITH-FLUX ARISE IN DEPENDENCE ON ELEMENTS OF THEIR OWN/

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[91] prāyeṇa

[92] tāni asyā āsrayārthena sambhavanti/

[93] sanniśrayārthena

[94] pravṛttyanuvṛttikāraṇatvād yathākramam

[95] atha kutastyāni mahābhūtānyupādāya kutastyam kāyavākkarma/

The corporeal and vocal karma that pertain to the realm of desire arise in dependence on just the great elements that pertain to the realm of desire. Similarly, (the corporeal and vocal karma) of those dwelling in up to the fourth dhyana arise in dependence just on those (elements?) dwelling therein.[96]

FLUXLESS, WHERE ONE IS BORN.

However, whatever non-fluxional karma one born in some stage engenders, that should be known to arise in dependence on those (great elements) dwelling therein. (This is) because (fluxless vocal and corporeal karma) is exclusive of the Dhātus; because there are no great elements that are fluxless; and because they originate by virtue of that. Herein the karma's called indication and non-indication are to be known.

> THE NON-INDICATION IS NON-COMPRISED//5//
> AND WHEN IT ISSUES FROM ITS AFFILIATION
> IS RECKONED AS THE SENTIENT BEING.

Moreover,

> IT IS BORN FROM ELEMENTS THAT ISSUE FROM
> THEIR AFFILIATIONS AND ARE COMPRISED.[97]/

The non-indication occurs in dependence on elements that are 'affiliation-issuing' and in dependence on thought and mental natures. This is the sort that belongs to

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[96] tadbhūmikāni eva upādāya

[97] NISYANDOPĀTTABHŪTAJĀ. See Chapter III, pp. 121-24 for the meaning of nisyanda and upātta.

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(the non-indication) that dwells on a non-equilibrated stage.[98]

THE NON-INDICATION THAT IS ENGENDERED BY SAMĀDHI IS ENGENDERED BY ELEMENTS THAT ARE ACCUMULATIONAL, NON-COMPRISED AND WITHOUT PARTS.//6//

The vijnapti that is meditational and fluxless restraint is engendered in (or by) samādhi.[99] It is originated in dependence on great elements that arise in samādhi, that are accumulational and are not comprised. And, the refraining from killing living beings is originated in dependence on precisely those non-distinguished elements in dependence on which refraining from everything up to idle chatter is originated. What is the reason? Because, there is no distinction between the elements, like the case of thoughts.[100]

When there is the vow of Prātimoksa, however, the seven non-indications are originated in dependence on some one or other great elements.[101] However, the indication issues from its affiliation.[102] And just the corporeal (indication) is comprised.[103]

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[98] asamāhitabhūmikāyā esa prakarah// See Chapter III, pp. 102-15 for more on the samāhita and asamāhita bhūmis.

[99] dhyānānāsravasamvarā vijñaptiḥ samādhijā/

[100] cittavad bhutābhedāt/

[101] The pratimoksa vow and its associated restraint is taken serially, therefore, the seven avijñaptis arise on different great elements.

[102] vijnaptis tu naiḥṣyandikī/ See Chapter III, pp. 121-24.

[103] upāttā tu kāyikī/ See Chapter III, pp. 121-24.

Well then, when it is arising, is this intimation produced after having broken the continuity (or stream) of the previous shape? Or, is it not so? Because, if it is so, then because there is no further continuity of a maturational form that has been interrupted, a non-Vaibhāṣika position would be entailed.[104]

However, if it arises not having broken off (the continuity of the previous stream), how would one prove a second shape when the mass of elements is single? At that time, these and those naturally issuing (great elements) would arise, in dependence on those on which the indication arises.

If it is thus, and the indication arises based on a member, then thereby that member would have to become larger because it is pervaded by the great elements. And further, when it is not pervaded, would one indicate by means of the whole (or total) member? Because of the hollowness of the body there is space (or room) for them.[105]

And so it is that you should know that karma is explained alternatively as two-fold, three-fold and five-fold. Thus, as volition and the act after having willed. Further, the act after having willed is twofold--corporeal and vocal karma, and volition (then amount to the three-fold classification). Further, corporeal karma is two-fold--

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[104]See Chapter III, p. 127.

[105]See Chapter III, p. 127.

'indication karma' and 'non-indication karma.' Likewise, vocal karma is twofold: (these) plus volition amounts to the five-fold classification. Furthermore, the non-indication is two-fold--virtuous and virtuous.

THE NON-INDICATION IS NOT (MORALLY) INDETERMINATE[106]

What is the reason? Because, the indeterminate thought is of little strength, hence its power is unable to arouse karma, and when it had ceased, (karma) would be obliged to follow suit.

OTHERWISE, (IT IS) THREE-FOLD

Otherwise, karma is three-fold--virtuous, unvirtuous and indeterminate. What is other than that (i.e., what karma is other than the non-indication)? The indication and volition are (other than it).

FURTHER, IN THE REALM OF DESIRE (IT IS) IMPURE

In the realm of desire karma is to be known as basically unvirtuous, but not so in the other realms. This is because of the destruction of unvirtuous elements there, i.e., destruction of lack of modesty and shamelessness.[107] In contrast, virtuous and indeterminate karma penetrate everywhere.

THERE IS ALSO THE NON-INDICATION IN THE REALM OF FORM.

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[106] NĀVYĀKṚTĀSTYAVIJÑAPTIḤ

[107] akusulamūlānām prahīnatvād āhrīkyānapatrāpyos ca/

That is, in addition to it being in the realm of desire. This is the meaning of 'also' (api). There is no non-indication in the formless states because there are no elements (bhūtas) there. For, a restraint of body and speech can only occur where there is the functioning of body and speech.

If that is so, then for the one who has attained (that realm) would (the elements) be without fluxes, like the non-indication? No, because it (the non-indication) has no occurrence in the dhātu.

Indeed, a non-indication that arises in dependence on great elements pertaining to the realm of desire is not able to pertain to the formless realm--the elements have nothing in common (they are of different type).

And, as a result of turning away from all forms, the formless attainment is not capable of producing rūpa. This is because all notion of rūpa is lacking.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, morality is the adversary of immorality. Not only does immorality pertain to the realm of desire, but further, the formless realm is at a remove from the realm of desire by distancy of basis, aspect, aim and opposition.[108]

Hence, they say that there is no non-indication therein.

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[108] āśraya, ākāra, ālambana and pratipakṣa, respectively.

THE INDICATION PERTAINS TO TWO REALMS THAT ARE CHARACTERISED BY DISCURSIVE THOUGHT.//7//

The indication, however pertains just to the realms that are characterised by discursive thought. That is, it is found in the realm of desire and the first dhyāna and not beyond that.//7//

NOR IS IT OBSCURED[109] IN THE REALM OF DESIRE.

However, the indication is not obscured in the realm of desire. It is also (obscured) in the Brahma World. For, the vocal karma[110] of Mahābrahma gave rise to deception. For, it is traditionally held that in his own assembly he insulted himself for the purpose of insulting the Venerable Asvajit.

Were there no vocal indication beyond that (Brahma world), then how therein does the base of sound have the external great elements as its cause?

Further, others say--In the second and following dhyānas there is an indication that is 'non-obscured and indeterminate.'[111] It is neither virtuous nor defiled. What is the reason? Because the one who has attained (to these realms) does not direct his mind to the lower realms or thoughts of such a class (as defiled or virtuous),

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[109] NIVṚTĀ, see Chapter III, pp. 128-29.

[110] The text has kāya-karma, which I amend to vāk-karma in keeping with the sense of the passage. See Poussin, L'AK, vol. III, p. 32 and n. 1.

[111] anivṛtāvyākṛtā, neither virtuous nor defiled, see Chapter III, pp. 128-29.

whereby an indication (that is defiled or virtuous) would be aroused; because of the inferiority (of the virtuous thought of the lower realm)[112] and because of having destroyed (the defiled thought).[113]

They (the Vaibhāṣikas)[114] proclaim the former opinion.[115]

Further then, what is the reason that there is no indication beyond the Brahma World and none of the 'obscured and indeterminate' class in the realm of desire?

BECAUSE, AROUSAL CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED

Since an indication is aroused by a thought that is characterised by adumbration and discursive thought,[116] (arousal cannot be established). And that (i.e., a thought so characterised) is not present in the second and following Dhyānas. And, (the obscured and indeterminate class of vijñapti is not found in the realm of desire) because it is established by what can be eliminated through cultivation and because there is the inward facing of what can be eliminated by vision.[117]

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[112] nyūnatvāt

[113] prahīnatvāt

[114] as per sub. comm.

[115] i.e., that there is no vijñapti beyond the First Dhyāna Realm.

[116] vitarka and vicāra

[117] darśanaprahātavyasya antarmukhapravṛttatvāt/ See Chapter III, pp. 128-38.

Well then, are the virtuous and unvirtuous natures of dharmas to be known only by virtue of the arousal (cause)? One says 'no.' How then? (They are to be known) in four manners (or ways): 1. in the supreme sense 2. in the sense of self-nature 3. in the sense of (mental) association and 4. in the sense of arousal.[118]

Among them, first,

LIBERATION IS AUSPICIOUS IN THE HIGHEST SENSE.

For, Nirvāṇa is the allaying of all suffering, because it is the highest peace. It is virtuous in the supreme sense, like the absence of illness.

IN THE SENSE OF SELF NATURE, THEY HAVE MODESTY AND SENSE OF SHAME AS ROOT.//8//

The three roots of virtue and modesty and sense of shame are virtuous by self nature; since they do not depend on arousal through other (mental) associations, like the case of the correct medicine.[119]

THAT WHICH IS CONNECTED WITH THEM,[120] BY REASON OF ASSOCIATION.

Just those natures that are connected with the roots of virtue, modesty and sense of shame are virtuous by means of association; because there is the lack of virtuousness in

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[118] paramārthatas, svabhāvatas, samprayogatas, and samutthānatas, respectively.

[119] pathya-auṣadhavat

[120] TADYUKTĀ

natures that are not associated with those, like the case of a medicine mixed with a beverage.[121]

DEEDS, ETC. (ARE VIRTUOUS) BECAUSE OF AROUSAL.

Corporeal and vocal karma and the motivations not associated with thoughts, such as birth, etc., reach,[122] the cessational and non-ideational attainments which are aroused by natures connected with the roots of virtue are virtuous by reason of Arousal, like a milky dish prepared with medicine.

But, how can virtuousness be said to pertain to reaches that are aroused by thoughts that are of a different class (i.e., other than virtuous thoughts)? (The virtuousness of such can be said to pertain) in the following manner--there is reconnection with virtuous roots by means of doubt, and because there is the return to the realm and because of falling away.[123] And, just as the virtuous was explained, so

THE UNVIRTUOUS IS IN OPPOSITION.

How so? Samsāra is unvirtuous in the supreme sense, since, by reason of having a nature that is the functioning of suffering, there is the utmost lack of tranquility (or peace). The roots of unvirtuousness have as intrinsic nature the lack of shame and immodesty. Natures associated

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[121] _auṣadhamiśrapānīyavat_

[122] _prāpti_, see Chapter III, pp. 56-60.

[123] For more on reconnection with the virtuous roots, see Chapter III, pp. 131-33.

with them (are unvirtuous) by reason of association. Corporeal and vocal karma, birth, etc.[124] and 'reaches' that are aroused by them (are unvirtuous) by reason of arousal, and are comparable to an illness and an unfit medicine.

If that is so, then would anything whatsoever that is 'with-flux' be (morally) indeterminate or virtuous, since it would belong within samsāra? This has been stated only for the supreme case, but whatever 'fluxuational' nature has not been ascertained as regards fruition (or maturation) is said to be 'indeterminate.' And, because there is maturation that is desired (agreeable, respected, cherished),[125] it is called virtuous.

If, however, an indeterminate in the highest sense is sought for, then--

THE TWO SUPREME INDETERMINATES ARE THE TWO CONSTANTS.//9//

Two uncompounded natures are incontrovertibly 'unobscured and indeterminate'--to wit, space and the cessation not based on knowing each case.[126]

This is to be considered--If the virtuousness and unvirtuousness of corporeal and vocal karmas are due to the force of arousal, then why do the great elements not have

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[124] jātyādi

[125] iṣṭavipākatvāt kuśalam iti ucyate/

[126] ākāsam and apratisamkhyānirodha

(the qualities of virtuousness and virtuousness)?[127] (They are not so qualified) because, the intentions of the actor are on the karma, not the great elements.

There is no intention regarding a non-indication of the (agent) who is in an equilibrated state.[128] Nor is the non-equilibrated thought the arouser of it (the non-indication), because it pertains to one in a realm (or stage) of a different class. Hence, how is there the virtuousness of it?

There is reduction to the absurdity that the divine eye or divine ear are virtuous.[129] So, one must work at this.

This was said--"The thought that is destructible by vision is not the arouser of the indication."[130] Why then was it said by the Blessed One--"And so, because of deviant view there occurs deviant conception, deviant speech and deviant livelihood" and so forth. That is not contradictory.//9//

THE AROUSER IS TWO-FOLD, DESIGNATED THE CAUSAL AROUSER AND THE AROUSER OF "THAT MOMENT."

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[127] yadi samutthānavasāt kusalākusalatvam kāyavākkarmaṇaḥ kim na mahābhūtānām/

[128] samāhitasya

[129] That the Divine Ear or Eye cannot be morally determinate is established in VII, kā. 45 and Bhāṣya, and II, kā. 72 and Bhāṣya.

[130] See Chapter III, pp. 133-38.

The arouser is two-fold--the causal arouser and the arouser at that moment. This is because, among the two, the vijñapti comes about in just a moment.

> OF THE TWO, THE FIRST IS THE PROMOTER, THE SECOND IS THE CONCURRENT.//10//

The causal arouser is the promoter; because it projects. The arouser of the moment is the concurrent (cause); because it is concurrent with the moment of action.

What then is the efficacy of it (of the arouser of the moment) in regard to the action? Verily, without it, in the case of one who dies, it (the action) would not take place, even if it had been projected.[131]

If it is the case that (there is no vijnapti without the concurrent cause), then how will there be (an indication) when there is the origination of a vow for one who is in a state devoid of thought? It is most clear that it pertains to one who is with thought, and that is its efficacy.//10//

And of these,

> THE PROMOTER IS CONSCIOUSNESS THAT IS DESTRUCTIBLE BY VISION.[132]

The promoter of an indication is a thought that is destructible by vision; because, the promoter thought is the initial cause (nidāna) of the adumbration and discursive thought that arouse the indication. But, the anuvartakam

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[131]tena hi vināsau mṛtasyeva na syād akṣiptāpi satī/ Chapter III,

[132]PRAVARTAKAM DṚṢṬIHEYAM VIJÑĀNAM, see Chapter III, pp. 133-38.

(concurrent thought) is not destructible by vision and a promoter cause is not present at the time of acting for the person who has his thoughts turned outward. (And if the concurrent thought were vision-destructible) then the rūpa established by it (the indication)[133] would (also have to be) destructible by vision.

What would that amount to? Abhidharma would be contradicted.[134]

And because there is no cessation of rūpa by means of wisdom or nescience, rūpa is not destructible by means of vision.

This position must be proven.[135]

Well then, would the elements (of the physical basis)[136] be vision-destructible, since they are aroused by the same thought? It would not be thus, insofar as they are neither virtuous nor unvirtuous.

Still, let it be so (that the elements of the basis are vision-destructible).[137] But, that is not possible! This is because they are neither vision-destructible nor indestructible. What is the reason? Because, undefiled natures are not opposed by either wisdom or nescience.

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[133] kāya-vāg-vijñaptirūpam, as per sub. comm.

[134] A Vaibhāṣika assertion, as per sub. comm.

[135] sādhya eṣa pakṣaḥ, see Chapter III, pp. 135-37.

[136] as per sub. comm.

[137] atha vā punar bhavantu, see Chapter III, p. 136.

Hence, having (so) treated the causal arouser, there is no contradiction between the sutra and the exposition.[138]

FURTHER, BOTH MENTAL PERCEPTIONS (OR CONSCIOUSNESSES) ARE CULTIVATION-DESTRUCTIBLE.

Further, both mental consciousnesses, to wit, the promoter and concurrent thoughts, are cultivation-destructible.

HOWEVER, THE FIVE ARE CONCURRENT.//11//

The five sets of perception are exclusively concurrent. Hence (regarding the classification of methods of destroying, thoughts conform to), this four-fold classification: Exclusively promoter, the thought that is vision-destructible, exclusively concurrent, the five sets of vijnana; both mental consciousnesses, cultivation-destructible; and, neither vision nor cultivation-destructible, the fluxless.//21//

Then, I would know, as the promoter is, is the concurrent thought also? It is not identical.

SINCE, IN REGARD TO A PURE, ETC., PROMOTER THERE COULD BE A THREE-FOLD CONCURRENT THOUGHT.

In the case of a virtuous promoter the concurrentthought could be virtuous, unvirtuous or indeterminate. Likewise in the cases of an unvirtuous and indeterminate promoter.

THOSE OF THE MUNI ARE EQUIVALENT.

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[138] ato hetusamutthānam adhikṛtya sūtre paṭhān nāsti virodhaḥ/ See Chapter III, p. 134.

However, the concurrent (thought) of the Blessed Buddha is the same as the promoter--virtuous when it is virtuous and indeterminate when it is indeterminate.

> OR, (THE THOUGHT OF THE MUNI) IS AS PURE AS POSSIBLE.

Or, the concurrent thought of the Blessed One is virtuous when the promoter is indeterminate. But, there is never a virtuous promoter and an indeterminate concurrent. Since it is said that the instruction of the Buddhas is non-stooping (or unwithering). According to those who maintain the Nikāyas as canonical,[139] the Buddhas do not have any indeterminate thoughts, since the streams of consciousness of the Buddhas are exclusively virtuous streams of consciousness because of being always equilibrated. Thus, it is said in a sūtra:

> The Naga is equilibrated when walking, when standing the Naga is equilibrated, when sleeping the Naga is equilibrated, also when seated.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, this is said because the non-directed thoughts (of the Buddha) are undistracted; however, they deny that there are no indeterminate thoughts of the Buddhas, since there are thoughts that are born of maturation, that are related to dignified posture and that are creative.[140]

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[139]Nikāyāntarīyaḥ

[140]vipākaja-īryāpathaka-nirmāṇa-cittāni, all of which are said to be morally indeterminate at Kośa, II, kās. 66-72.

And, since the promoter and the concurrent thoughts are cultivation-destructible, they are all to be understood as virtuous, unvirtuous or indeterminate.

NOR ARE THE TWO BORN OF MATURATION.

Nor is the concurrent or promoter thought born of maturation, since (a maturation born thought) is carried along without instigation.

Well, then, is it that the indication is like the promoter, or is it that it is like the concurrent thought? From which is it? If you say that it is like the promoter, then here (in this realm) there would be an indeterminate indication that is also obscured because it would be promoted by the reifying view or/and the view adhering to the extremes.[141]

But, one must express the qualification that not all thought of the 'vision destructible' class is of the promoter class.[142]

And if (the indication derives its morally qualified nature) from the concurrent thought, then no virtuous prātimokṣa indication would obtain for the one who has unvirtuous thoughts or indeterminate thoughts (at the time of taking on the vow).[143]

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[141] See Chapter III, pp. 136-39.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid.

The indication is (morally) like the promoter, but not when the promoter is vision-destructible; because there is a remainder (of promoter thoughts) that are cultivation-destructible.[144]

If the virtuousness, etc. of the indication is not by reason of the concurrent thought, then this (Vaibhāṣika assertion)[145] is inadmissible: "It was declared in the sūtra in connection with the causal arouser, not in connection with the cause of the moment,[111] and hence, there is no indication of the obscured and indeterminate class in the realm of Desire." This, however, is admissible: "It was declared in connection with an arouser that is interrupted by another."[146] The refutation rests.

However, the previously mentioned

NON-INDICATION IS TO BE KNOWN AS THREEFOLD:
VOW, NON-VOW AND OTHER (OR RESTRAINT, NON-RESTRAINT AND OTHER).

There is the restraint, non-restraint and that which is neither of the two--neither restraint nor non-restraint. The restraint amounts to the restraint and prevention of misconduct.

Further, among them--

THERE IS THE RESTRAINT CALLED PRĀTIMOKṢA, THAT ENGENDERED BY MEDITATION AND LIKEWISE, THAT WHICH IS WITHOUT FLUXES.//13//

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[144]Ibid.

[145]Ibid.

[146]Ibid.

The restraint is threefold: 1. the restraint of prātimokṣa, which is the restraint of those here, pertaining to the Realm of Desire. 2. the restraint of meditation, which is the morality pertaining to the realm of form and 3. the fluxless restraint which is the morality that is without fluxes.

Further, among these--

THAT CALLED PRĀTIMOKṢA RESTRAINT IS EIGHTFOLD

1. the restraint of the monk
2. the restraint of the nun
3. the restraint of the learner
4. the restraint of the male novice
5. the restraint of the female novice
6. the restraint of the male layperson
7. the restraint of the female layperson
8. the restraint of the one who observes the fast[147]

This is the eightfold restraint that is called the restraint of prātimokṣa.

This, which is nominally eightfold,

IS CONCRETELY FOURFOLD.

1. the restraint of the monk
2. the restraint of the novice
3. the restraint of the layperson
4. the restraint of the observer of the fast

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[147] bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, śikṣamāṇa, śrāmaṇera, śrāmaṇerī, upāsaka, upāsakī, and upavāsa, respectively.

Thus, the prātimokṣa restraint is concretely fourfold, because these are the prominent characteristics. The restraint of the nun is not different from the restraint of the monk, nor are those of the learner and the female novice different from those of the male novice. Nor is the restraint of the female layperson different from that of the male layperson.

How is this ascertained?

> BECAUSE, THERE IS THE ALTERATION OF THE NAME BASED ON SEXUAL CHARACTERISTIC.

The term 'sexual characteristic' refers to the indication (of sex) whereby male and female are differentiated. Since it is according to sexual characteristic that there occurs the alteration of name between monk and nun. How so? Because, in the event of an exchange of sexual characteristics, a monk is called a nun and a nun is called a monk. In the same fashion, a male novice is called a female novice and the female novice is further called the learner and the male novice. Nor, in the event of an exchange in sex is there cause to renounce the former vow, nor is there cause in regard to a vow that was not taken before. Therefore, the intrinsic nature of these four restraints is not different than that of the three (i.e., the vows of the monk, novice and layperson).

The restraints that are undertaken, i.e., the novice's restraint after the lay follower's restraint and after that, the monk's restraint, are they said to be

different from one another because of the conjunction of the augmentations of the restraints (or abstentions), like five, ten and twenty and like a dinar coin and a satera coin?[148] Or is it that they are each brought about individually complete? He said--

INDIVIDUALLY.

Verily, they are distinct, (each) engendered having individual characteristics. In the three vows there are abstentions from the taking of life and so on, up to abstaining from intoxicating beverages. Likewise the remaining ones.

But, what distinguishes them? The distinction between them is due to the distinct occasions (or motives).[149]

How is that so? Because, just as many be the rules of training undertaken, just so, averting much conceit and intoxication, many occasions for the taking of life, etc. are averted. And, in regard to these occasions for restraints (or abstentions), because of the difference in occasions, a distinction of restraints (or abstentions) operates. And, if it were not thus the case,[150] then the breaking of the vow of the monk would also break the three,

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[148] See Chapter III, pp. 139-41.

[149] <u>nidānas</u>

[150] i.e., if it were not the case that each of the three vows and their restraints were each distinct, then to break a more rigorous vow would result in the loss of others previously undertaken.

since this one would be included in the other two. And that is not maintained. Therefore, the restraints are individual.

AND THEY ARE NON-OPPOSING.//4//

And, the three occur together. There is no renouncing of a former (vow) because of taking on a later vow. If it were not so, then there would be non-upāsaka status after giving up the vow of the monk.

How does this upasāka arise, how, from the upasāka dwelling up to that of the monk?

> AS A RESULT OF ADHERING TO THE ABSTINENCE FROM FIVE, EIGHT, TEN AND ALL AVOIDANCES, THERE IS THE STATE OF A LAY FOLLOWER, AN OBSERVER OF THE FAST, THE NOVICE-PROBATIONER[151] AND MONKHOOD.//15//

This is to be understood in the order enumerated. One is established in the restraint of the lay follower due to the accomplishment of abstention from five reprehensible[152] natures--from taking life, from taking what is not given, from sensual misconduct, from falsehood and from intoxicating liquors.

The state of the observer of the fast is due to engaging in abstinence from eight (reprehensible natures)--from taking life, from taking what is not given, from non-celibacy, from false speech, from intoxicating liquors, from

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[151] Śrāmanera-uddeśa, a subordinate monk who has not reached full bhiksu status. The use of this term in the kārikā may have been for metrical reasons. The Bhāṣya reverts back to the more common term, śrāmaṇera.

[152] varjya

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scents, garlands, unguents, dancing, singing and musical instruments, from elevated and large beds and from eating at the improper time.

One becomes a novice due to engaging in abstinence from ten (reprehensible things)--from just those (last eight mentioned) and from the acceptance of gold and silver. By making the (abstinence from) dancing, singing, musical instruments, scents, garlands and unguents twofold there are ten.

It is just by engaging in abstinence from all reprehensible acts of body and speech that one is said to be a monk.

It is this prātimokṣa restraint which

IS SAID TO BE MORALITY, RIGHT CONDUCT, ACTION AND RESTRAINT.

Morality is due to engaging in abstinence from wicked actions; the etymology is based on the word 'śitala' (which means cooling). According to the words of the verse, "the body of the one engaged in pleasant morality does not become harassed." It is good conduct because it is praised by those endowed with wisdom. It is karma because it has the intrinsic nature of acting (or deeds).[153]

But, is it not the case that the non-indication is said to be akriyā (nonacting); how then is it kriyā (acting)?

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[153]kriyā-svabhāvāt karma/

By means of adopting it, those possessed of shame do not do that called 'evil' and so it is called 'non-doing.'

But, also it (the prātimokṣa saṃvara)[154] is accomplished[155] by indications and thoughts, so it is called 'acting.'

And, according to others, it is action because it is the cause of action and because it is the fruit of action. It is called restraint because it restrains body and speech.

Thus far, the restraint of prātimokṣa is spoken of without distinguishing.

FURTHER/ THE FIRST INDICATION AND NON-INDICATION AMOUNT TO THE PATH OF DEEDS THAT IS THE PRĀTIMOKṢA.[156] //16//

The first indication and non-indication of the one engaged in the restraint is said to be the prātimokṣa; because by means of it there is (one by one) deliverance from sin. The meaning is based on (the idea of) expelling. In intrinsic meaning (as a lexicon) is like the (derivative words) vaikṛta and vaiśāsa, because of the vṛddhi rule.

That called the restraint of prātimokṣa is called the karmapatha (path of action) because there is restraint of

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[154]as per sub. comm.

[155]kriyate.

[156]PUNAḤ/ ĀDYE VIJÑAPTYAVIJÑAPTĪ PRĀTIMOKṢAKRIYĀPATHAḤ //16// In the Bhasya, kriyāpatha is replaced by the more common karmapatha. For more on the karmapatha and its division into prayoga, maula and pṛṣṭa, see Chapter III, pp. 141-42.

body and speech; because it amounts to the fundamental course of karma.[157]

In the second and following moments there is just the restraint of the prātimokṣa, not the prātimokṣa itself. This amounts to the pursuant and not fundamental course of karma.//16//

Who then becomes endowed with which of these restraints?

EIGHT ARE ENDOWED WITH THE RESTRAINT OF PRĀTIMOKṢA.

Eight groups are endowed with the pratimoksa restraint--the monk, the nun...up to the observer of the fast as the eighth.

Well then, I would know, do the heretics (non-Buddhists) have an undertaking of morality? There is (a morality) for the non-Buddhists, but it is not the vow of prātimokṣa. What is the reason? Because, it does not conduce to the final deliverance from evil because it is based on gestation (or becoming).[158]

ONE IS ENDOWED WITH IT BY MEANS OF THAT WHICH IS ENGENDERED BY MEDITATION.

'Engendered by meditation' means engendered after or in meditation. He who is endowed with meditation is of a certainty endowed with the restraint of meditation. Here, the threshold (sāmantakam) is also said to be meant; just as, when one says 'village,' the village environs are also meant.

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[157] maula-saṃgrhitatvāt, see Chapter III, pp. 141-42.

[158] bhavasanniśritatvāt, see Chapter III, pp. 142-43.

One says 'there is a field sown with grain and a field sown with rice in that village.'

THE NOBLE BEING (IS ENDOWED) WITH THE FLUXLESS (RESTRAINT).

The Noble individuals are endowed with the restraint that is without fluxes. There are those undergoing training and those beyond training.

This was said--"Two restraints following on thought define two sahabhūhetus."[159] What are these two? Of these three (i.e., the restraint of prātimokṣa, the restraint of meditation and the fluxless restraint),

THE LAST TWO ARE CONCOMITANTS OF THOUGHT.//17//

The meditational restraint and the fluxless restraint (are concomitants of thought). The prātimokṣa restraint is not (a concomitant of thought). What is the reason? Because, it functions even when there are other kinds of thought or no thought (at all).

Further, just two meditational and fluxless restraints receive the appellation 'destruction-restraint.'[160]

In which station (are they)? It is said that--

IN THE 'UNDAUNTED' (STAGE) TWO RESTRAINTS BORN OF THE UNIMPEDED PATH ARE CALLED 'DESTRUCTION.'

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[159] Kosa, II, kā 51, see Chapter III, pp. 143-44.

[160] punas tau eva dhyānānāsravasamvarau prahāṇa-samvarākhyām labhete//17// See Chapter III, pp. 143-46.

In the undaunted[161] (stage) two restraints, one of meditation and one fluxless, are called destruction in regard to the nine unimpeded paths; because by means of the two there is the destruction of immorality and the defilements that give rise to it.

Thus, also saying 'There would be a meditation restraint that is not destruction restraint (too),' a fourfold alternative scheme[162] is constructed--the first alternative is the meditation restraint that is with fluxes, excepting the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. The second is the fluxless (restraint) in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted (stage). The third is (the restraint) with fluxes in the unimpeded paths of the undaunted stage. The fourth alternative is the fluxless restraint other than the unimpeded paths of the undaunted (stage).

Likewise, one can say 'There would be a fluxless restraint that is not destruction restraint,' in the manner of the fourfold alternative scheme.[163]

Indeed, this was said by the Blessed One--

Goodly is the restraint by the body, likewise,
goodly is the restraint by speech,
goodly is the restraint by mind,
goodly is restraint in every place.[164]

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[161] anāgamye, locative of anāgamya, the threshold or samantakam unique to the first dhyāna realm. On the characteristics of this stage, see Chapter III, pp. 143-45.

[162] On this catuṣkoṭi, see Chapter III, pp. 145-46.

[163] See Chapter III, pp. 144-46.

[164] Poussin, L'AK cites Saṃyutta, i, 73, Dhammapada, 361, Udānavarga, vii, 11 as sources of this quote.

And, this was said--"He dwells restrained with the restraint of the eye organ."[165]

What are the intrinsic qualities of these two, the restraint of the mind and restraint of the faculties? The intrinsic quality of them is not the non-indicational morality.[166] What then (is their intrinsic quality)?

THE TWO, RESTRAINT OF THE MIND AND RESTRAINT OF THE FACULTIES, AMOUNT TO AWARENESS AND MINDFULNESS.//18//

So as to reveal their dual nature, it is not to be understood (simply) in the order given: each one is taken twice. Restraint of the mind has the nature of mindfulness and awareness.[167] So too does the restraint of sense organs have both as intrinsic nature.//18//

This is to be pondered--Who is endowed with which indication or non-indication at which time? Herein--

THE ONE ESTABLISHED IN PRĀTIMOKṢA IS ALWAYS ENDOWED WITH A PRESENT NON-INDICATION BECAUSE OF NOT RENOUNCING IT.

The person who is said to be established in the Prātimokṣa is constantly endowed with a present one (non-indication) as long as he does not renounce it.

AFTER THE FIRST MOMENT, ONE IS ENDOWED WITH A PAST (NON-INDICATION).//19//

After the initial moment, (one is) endowed with a past (non-indication) also. It is to be understood as

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[165] Poussin, L'AK cites Anguttara.iii.387.

[166] na etau avijñaptiśīlasvabhāvau/

[167] smṛti and samprajāna, respectively.

controlled (thus) in every case since there is the proviso 'because it is not renounced.'//19//

Just as the one established in the restraint of Prātimokṣa was declared,

> JUST SO IS IT ALSO FOR THE ONE NOT ESTABLISHED IN RESTRAINT.

Indeed, just as long as the one not established in restraint does not renounce non-restraint, just so long is he endowed with a present non-indication. After the first moment, he is also endowed with a past one.

> THE ONE ENDOWED WITH MEDITATIONAL RESTRAINT IS ALWAYS (ENDOWED WITH) PAST AND FUTURE (NON-INDICATIONS).

The one who procures the meditational restraint is always endowed with past and future non-indications; because he does not renounce them. Since, in the first moment he obtains the past meditational restraint which was renounced in another life.[168]

> HOWEVER, THE NOBLE PERSON IS NOT (ENDOWED WITH) ANY FROM THE PAST IN THE INITIAL MOMENT. //20//

The Noble person is, however, likewise endowed with fluxless non-indications. There is this distinction--In the first moment he is not endowed with any as regards the past; because previously that path had not been originated.//20//

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[168] prathame hi kṣaṇe sa janmāntaratyaktam dhyāna-samvaram atītam labhate/ Yaśomitra adds that one could also obtain the past meditational restraint that was renounced in this life.

THE ONE ON THE EQUILIBRATED PATH AND
THE PATH OF THE NOBLES ARE BOTH CONJOINED
WITH A PRESENT (NON-INDICATION).

The two who are established in the equilibrated path and the path of the Nobles, endowed with meditational and fluxless restraints, are endowed with a present non-indication when they are as described, so long as they have not emersed.[169]

This much is the exposition of those who are established in restraint and non-restraint.

Well then, what of those situated between (these two positions)?

IF THERE IS ONE, IN THE BEGINNING, THE
ONE SITUATED BETWEEN HAS A 'MIDDLING'
NON-INDICATION.

He who is neither established in restraint nor non-restraint is one situated between. He does not necessarily have a non-indication. However, he who has that which is included under bad conduct, limb of morality, etc., is endowed, in the beginning with a middling (non-indication).

Because the present non-indication is between the past and the future,

AFTER (THE FIRST MOMENT) HE IS ENDOWED WITH
A NON-INDICATION THAT PERTAINS TO TWO TIMES.//21//

After the initial moment (one is endowed) with a past and present (non-indication). It proceeds because it was said that it is not renounced. Is the one not established in

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[169] vyutthita

restraint endowed with any virtuous non-indications, and further, is the one established in restraint endowed with any unvirtuous ones? Yes. And sir, at what time and for how long? He said--

> THE ONE NOT ESTABLISHED IN RESTRAINT IS ENDOWED WITH AN AUSPICIOUS NON-INDICATION AND THE ONE ESTABLISHED IN RESTRAINT IS ENDOWED WITH AN IN-AUSPICIOUS NON-INDICATION AS LONG AS THEY HAVE (RESPECTIVELY) THE IMPETUS OF KINDNESS AND THE IMPETUS OF DEFILEMENT.//22//

For he who is not established in restraint there is originated a virtuous non-indication as a result of doing acts of praise and admiration by means of the impetus of pure heartedness. And, for the one established in restraint an unvirtuous non-indication is originated by means of the impetus of defilement as a result of performing the deeds of killing, binding and beating. As long as these two forces operate (or proceed), there are the non-indications. In the first momen (one) is endowed with just a present non-indication. In other moments (one) is also endowed with a past one.

The exposition of the non-indication is concluded.[170]

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[170] avijñaptyadhikāraḥ samāptaḥ//22//

CHAPTER V

VIJÑAPTI AND AVIJÑAPTI IN THREE SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM: A COMPARISON

In addition to playing a significant role in the Kośa, the terms *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* (or their Pali equivalents) are of importance in other Indian Buddhist texts as well. In order best to appreciate the treatment and refinement that they receive in the Kośa, additional Indian Buddhist treatment of these entities is given here. Comparison with Pali and Mahāyāna sources sheds much light on these terms as well as certain crucial issues regarding the status of the *dharmas* in general. Sources for this comparison include, on the Pali side, *adhidhamma* texts and commentaries thereon by the famous Pali commentator, Buddhaghosa. The work of Buddhaghosa is especially pertinent because, as a near contemporary of Vasubandhu, his work reveals a critical approach to the dharmas analagous to Vasubandhu's. On the Mahāyāna side of the comparison, texts of the Vijñaptimātra tradition will be appealed to. Among these texts are the Mahāyāna-samgraha of Asaṅga with commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava,[1] and the

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[1]Ettiene Lamotte, trans., *La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga* (Mahāyānasamgraha) (Louvain: Beureaux du Museon, 1938).

Vimśatikā- and Trimśatikā-kārikās of Vasubandhu, two seminal texts of the Vijnaptimātratā tradition. These texts reveal the radically new meaning given to the term vijñapti as well as support the Kośakara/Asaṅga brother identity suggested in the second chapter of this study. Let us now turn to the comparison itself.

The complexity of the material in the Kośa on the avijñapti might suggest that we are in for more argumentation about this mysterious dharma and the karma process. However, this is not the case. The amount of available Pali and Sanskrit material on the avijñapti rūpa is minimal.

On the one hand, the term does not occur in a technical sense in the Pali material at all. Karunadasa's exceptionally thorough and valuable study, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter, reveals that "the Theravadins do not recognize the avijñapti rūpa under any guise."[2] The comparison with post-Abhidharma material is also easily done. To the degree that the Vaibhāṣika tradition endured after the Sautrāntika critique of Vasubandhu, the avijñapti, too, would endure as a theoretical entity, presumably along lines pointed out in the Kośa. Indeed, evidence that the Vaibhāṣika school did endure and in fact rose to the defense of its entities is to be found in the Abhidharmadīpa with the Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti. Unfortunately, as Jaini has pointed out,[3] the sections

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[2]Karunadasa, BAM, p. 40.

[3]P. S. Jaini, The Abhidharma-dīpa with the Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti, intro.

of the Dīpa manuscript analogous to the avijñapti-adhikāra of the Kośa are no longer extant. Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu mentions that Samghabhadra composed a treatise to refute the Sautrāntika bias of the Kośa. It is tempting to speculate about the possibility of the identity of the Dīpa and the 'Samaya of Light,' but even Jaini, the editor of the former, will assert no more than that the text is in the Samghabhadra, Neo-Vaibhāṣika tradition.

As far as treatment of the avijñapti in other schools of Indian Buddhism is concerned, the following remarks are in order. Harivarman, in his Sattyasiddhi, relegates the avijñapti to the class of citta viprayukta samskāras. The treatment that the term would receive in Prajñā-parāmita and Mādhyamika texts is easily deduced--it would be void of self-existence (svabhāva) and not worthy of further comment, if treated at all. Interestingly enough, in the seventeenth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās, Nagārjuna does treat a theoretical entity, the avipranaśa, mentioned in the third chapter of this work. The fact that he does not treat the avijñapti-rūpa in this context casts some doubt on the assertion of Murti to the effect that the Abhidharma being criticized by Nagārjuna is that of the Vaibhāṣikas.[4]

To the degree that Yogācāra Buddhism follows the thought of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the avijñapti will be conspicuous by its absence. In short, the heyday of the

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[4]Murti, CPB, pp. 68-69.

avijñapti-rūpa is coterminous with that of the Vaibhāṣika school. It is a characteristically Vaibhāṣika entity and it would appear that its fate is bound up with that of that school.

The comparative material available on the term vijñapti does not admit of such brief treatment. On the one hand, the Pali material on the term viññatti is considerable and leads us into areas of doctrinal development not unlike those in the Kośa. On the other hand, we are confronted with an entire genre of texts, those of the Vijñaptimātra school, in which the term vijñapti takes on a radical new meaning. Let us first turn to the Pali materials.

Both Karunadasa and Jaini have gathered most of the relevant material together in their studies.[5] Of the two vijñaptis, the kāya- and vāc-, we will first treat the vāc- or vocal indication.

The treatment in the Kośa was relatively straightforward--the vocal indication amounted to the bursting forth of speech (VĀGVIJÑAPTIS TU VĀGDHVANIḤ//3//). That sound has the intrinsic nature of speech is the vocal indication (vāksvabhāvo yaḥ śabdaḥ saiva vāgvijñaptiḥ//3//).

The Pali material is more complicated than this and can be divided into two categories--the earlier abhidhamma accounts and the later commentarial accounts of Buddhaghosa and others. Our primary source for the older abhidhamma accounts is the Dhammasangani (Dhs.), the composition of

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[5]Karunadasa, BAM, passim; Jaini, DTCVS and STB.

which can safely be put between the completion of the Nikāyas as a fixed body of thought on the one hand, and the composition of the Kathā Vatthu on the other. C.A.F. Rhys Davids suggests ca. 350 B.C. as a probable date. In the Dhs. the vocal indication is discussed in Book II, chapter two, in the section dealing with derived form (upādā-rūpa). The vocal indication is intrinsically bound up with the nature of speech but is not the speech itself:

> What is that form which is intimation by language (vāciviññatti)?
> That speech, voice, utterance, noise, making noises, language as articulate speech, which expresses a thought whether good, bad, or indeterminate--this is called language. And that intimation, that making known, the state of having made known by language--this is that form which constitutes intimation by language.[6]

An additional passage in the same chapter of the Dhs. also asserts that the vocal indication is conascent with thought (citta-sahabhū) and of a nature that follows that of thought (citta-anuparivatti).[7]

Further, the two indications are included in the realm of dharmas that are cognized by the mind and not the other senses (Dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna).[8] These remarks raise the crucial question of the relationship of the indication to the speech. What is the relationship between the vocal indication, a 'form' that is cognized by the mind,

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[6]C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (Dhamma-sangani) (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1900), p. 193.

[7]Ibid., pp. 205-06.

[8]Karunadasa, BAM, p. 71; Rhys Davids, trans., A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, pp. 173-74, 249 and 287.

and the speech with which it is so intimately connected? As Karunadasa points out, similar problems arose concerning the relationship between the corporeal indication (again, a nature cognized by the mind) and the bodily gestures with which it is associated. Since the solution to both of these problems is nearly identical, let us briefly note the Dhs. definition of the kāyaviññatti.

> What is that form which is bodily intimation? That tension, that intentness, that state of making the body tense, in response to a thought, whether good, bad, or indeterminate, on the part of one who advances, or recedes, or fixes the gaze, or glances around, or retracts an arm, or stretches it forth--the intimation, the making known, the state of having made known--this is the form which constitutes bodily intimation.[9]

It should be noted here that, while the Dhs. adopts the common sense view regarding motion, the corporeal intimation is not said to be the same as motion. Moreover, the indication is not the same as the tension, etc. of the body. While the latter are visible and therefore seen with the eye, the indication itself is included in the dhammāyatana and is therefore cognizable by the mind. The key to understanding the relationship between these two natures and the human activity from which they are inferred lies in the distinction between the (pari) nipphana-rūpa-dhammas and the anipphana-rupa-dhammas (formal natures that are 'perfected' or 'complete,' and formal natures that are not). Of the 23 (or 24, depending on the recognition of the hadaya vatthū)

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[9]Rhys Davids, A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. 193.

formal natures that are said to arise in dependence on the great elements (mahābhūtas), the commentators, including Buddhaghosa, recognized fourteen as being parinipphana (nipphana is used interchangeably with this term in Atthasalini[10]). As such, they are characterized as impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated, subject to decay, the production of dispassion, etc.[11] Various commentators add different qualifications to these dhammas. Anuruddha, a twelfth-century commentator, adds the qualification that the parinipphāna-rūpa-dhammas are salakkhana-rūpas, forms that bear the marks of conditioned natures. The fourteen upādā-rūpa-dhammas so classified are the first five sense organs, the first four objective fields, itthindriya, purusindriya, jīvitindriya, kabalikāra-āhāra and hadaya-vatthu. The remaining ten upādā-rūpa-dhammas--the two indications, three characteristics and four phases of matter, and space--are anipphana, not complete or perfect in some sense. Of these ten we are concerned with the two indications. If they are anipphana, does that mean that they are not compounded, dependently originated, etc.? If we agree with Sumaṅgala, a twelfth-century commentator, that the nipphana-rūpa-dhammas arise by reason of four generative conditions--citta, kamma, utu and ahara--are we forced to conclude that the vocal and corporeal are not so aroused since they are

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[10]Karunadasa, BAM, p. 42.

[11]Ibid., pp. 42-43.

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contrary to the former (<u>tabbiparīta</u>)?[12] As far as the compilers of the Kathā Vatthu were concerned, any nature not <u>nipphana</u> would necessarily be <u>asaṅkhata</u>. The way out of this apparent contradiction is identical in reference to both the Pali commentarial and Sautrāntika traditions--the postulation of <u>paññatti</u>-(<u>prajñapti</u>, Skt) <u>dhammas</u>. Still, there is the question of the relationship between these two <u>anipphana-rūpa-dhammas</u> and the physical basis from which they proceed. This relationship is clarified in two works of Buddhaghosa, the Atthasālini, his commentary on the Dhs., and the Visuddhimagga, a text of independent structure and orthodox content. In the Atthasālinī the distinction is made between the body itself and the intimation.

> Now the body produced by consciousness, that is not 'intimation.' But there is a certain peculiar, unique mode of change in the primaries set up by mind, through which, as a condition, mobility is able to strengthen, support and agitate the coexistent body. This is intimation.[13]

A more detailed explanation of this 'unique mode of change' is to be found in the Visuddhimagga (Vsm.):

> The corporeal indication is an aspect-modification of the wind element aroused by a promoter thought to move forward, etc., which aspect-modification is a condition for the stiffening, upholding and movement of the formal body. Its essence is displaying intention, its manifestation is the state of causing

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[12] See C.A.F. Rhys Davids, ed., <u>The Visuddhi-magga of Buddhaghosa</u> (London: Pali Text Society, 1920), pp. 450-41,590, and 702.

[13] Maung Tin and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., <u>The Expositor</u> (Atthasālinī) (London: Pali Text Society, 1920-21), I, 111.

bodily excitement, and its proximate cause is the thought motivated wind element.[14]

The distinction of the kāyaviññatti as a 'modification of an aspect' of the consciously originated wind element (citta-samutthāna-vāyodhātuyā . . . ākāra-vikāro kāyaviññatti) is itself in need of some further consideration. Karunadasa, drawing on the vast Pali commentarial tradition, explains the ākāra-vikāra as follows:

> What we should not overlook here is that what is called kāyavinnatti is not a rūpa-dhamma in its usual sense. It is not something which is distinct and separate from the air-element and its concomitants. It signifies only a particular situation or position--ākāra-vikāra--of the latter. It is a name given to the latter when they are in a particular position. Apart from the air-element and its concomitants, of which it is an ākāra-vikara, there is no separate rūpa dhamma called kāyavinnatti, just as much as there is nothing called table apart from a collection of rūpa-dhammas (material elements), organized and arranged in a particular order.[15]

Thus, the corporeal indication amounts to an anipphana-rūpa-dhamma, a paññatti or designation for nipphana-rūpa-dhammas when they are in a particular position. With these qualifications in mind we can turn to Buddhaghosa's treatment of the vāciviññatti:

> Vocal indication is an aspect-modification of earth element aroused by a promoter thought of speech utterance, which aspect-modification is a condition for the knocking together of indulged in matter. Its essence is displaying intention, its manifestation is the state

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[14]Slightly modified version of translation to be found in Nyānamoli, trans., The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) 2nd ed. (Colombo: A. Semage, 1964), pp. 449-50; see Rhys Davids, ed., The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, p. 448.

[15]Karunadasa, BAM, p. 75.

that is the cause of speech utterance, its proximate cause is the thought originated earth element.[16]

The commentaries on the Vsm. go to great lengths to point out that while these two viññattis are aspect-modifications of the wind and earth element, respectively, all four elements are present in equal number in the individual. At the time of acting, one of these elements has greater capability, not quantity. The rationale for relating the corporeal indication to the wind element is that the wind element is associated with movement. Likewise, the 'knocking together' of material elements that results in the production of voice is by reason of the capability of the earth element.

With these technical considerations in mind, we can summarize the Abhidhamma view by noting the postulation of paññatti dhammas which functions in this tradition much in the same fashion as Vasubandhu's reduction of Vaibhāṣika entities to prajñapti status. While both Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa agree as to the association of the corporeal and vocal indications with their respective physical activity, Buddhaghosa's analysis of the exact relationship between the act and the vocal indication is more detailed. Both Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa are aware of the non-substantial nature of shape. Vasubandhu's arguments have been given in the translation and commentary and are highly

[16]Slightly modified translation of Nanamoli, The Path of Purification, p. 450; see Rhys Davids, ed., The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, p. 448.

comparable to Buddhaghosa's position. The Dhamma-saṅgani included certain shapes in the rūpa-āyatana. Commenting on this passage,[17] he remarks that they were included "as a concession to popular usage (voharato)."[18] Technically, only color belongs in the realm of rūpa. "Among these expressions, because it is possible to know 'long,' etc., by touch, but not 'blue-green,' etc., therefore, in reality 'long' is not directly (nippariyayena) a visible object, neither is short or similar terms."[19] This is nearly identical to Vasubandhu's argument against the Vaibhāṣika position that the corporeal indication is shape, a substantial dharma. Karunadasa quite correctly raises the question of the historical origins of the tendency to relegate certain dharmas to the status of prajñaptis.

> Whether it was an introduction from an outside source, or one of their own creations, the Theravadins could easily accommodate it into their system. For, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas, they do not interpret kāya-viññatti as a figure (santhāna) of the body. Nor did they recognize avijñapti-rūpa. Hence they could conveniently relegate santhāna to the domain of paññattis without thereby undermining the basis of any other established doctrine.[20]

The 'other established doctrine' mentioned here is, of course, the avijñapti rūpa. From all of the above comparative material a few wider conclusions can be drawn

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[17] Maung Tin and Rhys Davids, Trans., The Expositor, p. 415.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Karunadasa, BAM, p. 52.

regarding the dynamics operating within both Pali and Sanskrit abhidharma traditions. The earlier abhidharma (-dhamma) was characterized by something less than total consistency on the one hand and the multiplication of theoretical entities (qua dravya, salakhana, sabhāva dhammas/dharmas) on the other. Both traditions gave rise to critical and systematizing minds. Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa are two of the more prominent figures embodying a critical overview of their respective traditions at roughly the same point in time (ca. fifth century A.D.). They are united in their recognition that sound theory is not necessarily developed by multiplication of the number of substantial entities, but rather, by the creative synthesis and analysis of the canonically given 'primes' in the descriptive system.

Turning to the Mahāyāna sources we find that the term vijñapti plays a seminal role in the Yogācāra/Vijñaptimātra tradition. In this context, I have found it generally appropriate to translate the term vijñapti as '(mental) representation.' The rationale for this choice will become apparent in the course of the comparison. Prior to an analysis of the material, drawn from the writings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, a question relating to Kośakara/brother of Asaṅga identity must be dealt with. Does the radically different use to which the term vijñapti is put in the Mahāyāna works of Vasubandhu diminish the possibility that we are dealing with the same writer who composed the Abhidharmakośa? Is

it likely that the same author would use one term in two such widely different ways? These apparent difficulties to the identification that has been defended throughout this study are, in fact, easily dealt with. If we bear in mind the radical nature of Vasubandhu's conversion to the Mahāyāna, then we must also accept his conversion to a new meaning system--a new cognitive, normative and descriptive system. Without sacrificing his critical faculties, he might very well have found the need to derive a new 'vocabulary' appropriate to his new doctrinal posture. It is now appropriate to describe this new posture, known as Vijñaptimātra.

The opening verse of the Triṃśikāvijñapti-kārikā of Vasubandhu provides appropriate access to the doctrines of the school:

> Whatever approach (or conceptualization) occurs of Self and natures, that verily occurs as a transformation of the vijnāna.[21]

Sthiramati's commentary adds that the 'conceptualization of Self and natures' amounts to the mental representation (vijñapti) of a self and the designation (prajñapti) of dharmas (sa punar ātmavijñaptiḥ dharmaprajñaptiśca). Jumping to verse 17 of the same work we find the following:

> The transformation of the vijñana is the (false, mental) construction; what is constructed does not thereby exist. Therefore, this all is mental representation only (vijñaptimātrakam).[22]

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[21] ātmadharmopacaro hi vividho yah pravartate/ vijñāna pariṇamo 'sau

[22] vijñānapariṇāmo 'yam vikalpo yadvikalpyate/ tena tannāsti tenedam sarvam vijñaptimātrakam//17//

In short, the contents of our consciousness are not the things of the external world, but, just that, the contents of our consciousness. Thus, all conscious experience is mental representation. This position was developed in light of the principle of the three-svabhāvas developed by Asaṅga. Evidence of Vasubandhu's commitment to the trisvabhāva distinction is readily available in the form of his own Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha. The three characteristics are: the imagination (of unreality), the dependently originated, and the fully perfected (parikalpita-, paratantra-, and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, respectively). The imaginary or imagined character is explained in the Triṃśikā, kā. 20, as follows:

> Whatever thing is mentally constructed by whatever mental construction, that is just imagined, the self-existence is not found.[23]

Vikalpa has its origins in conditions and amounts to a dependently originated character.[24] Thus, the dependently originated character of vikalpa establishes the appearance of the 'thing' in consciousness. There may be no self-existent entities to which our mental constructions correspond, but there is the dependently originated appearance (abhāsa) of such things in our consciousness.

The fully perfected character is explained by Vasubandhu as follows:

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[23]yena yena vikalpyena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/ parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate//20//

[24]paratantrasvabhāvastu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ/

> When the dependently originated character is completely devoid of the former (imagined character), it is fully perfected and thus, neither different nor non-different the dependently originated.[25]

On the other side of the three svabhāva coin we find three niḥsvabhāvas, three non-characteristics. Within the imagined character, there is an absolute lack of the marks (lakṣaṇas) thereto imputed (there is no 'self' in the five personality aggregates). Within the dependently originated character there is a lack of svabhāva (the natures that arise in vikalpa are dependently originated). And, in the fully perfected character, there is the absolute lack of any svabhāva (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). 'Suchness' is all that can be said to pertain to ultimate reality.[26] But, to the degree that we have experience and engage in conceptualization, to that degree is the world effectively 'mental representation only' (vijñapti-mātratā).

The consciousness that we experience is characterized by vikalpa (conceptualization). This vikalpa normally mistakes the dependently originated character (the abhāsa or appearance content of conscious) for an existing object. The mentally represented world of experience occurs in consciousness and has two apparent aspects--the vijñapti is composed of vijñāna and the appearance of a vijñeya. According to Yamada,

> Thus, it becomes clear that when there is the primary vijñāna, it manifests itself as the double-faceted

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[25] niṣpannas tasya pūrvena sadā rahitatā tu yā//21//

[26] See Triṃśikāvijñapti-kārikās 23-5.

> vijñapti and simultaneously the secondary vijñāna is cognizing the vijñeya which is one of the facets of the primary vijñāna. And there is no temporal difference involved. The vijñeya is not the external object in itself, because it is what has been mentally reconstructed (parikalpitatvāt). Hence, according to Vasubandhu, the vijñeya does not exist.[27]

One last element needs to be introduced before our treatment of Vijñaptimātra turns to a text of Asaṅga that refers to eleven general types of vijñaptis. This element is the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), a consciousness born of karmic activity and consequently maturational (vipāka) in nature. Kārikā 2 of the Triṃśikā describes it as containing all of the seeds (sarvabījakam). Sthiramati glosses this as follows: "It is the storehouse because herein reside all of the seeds of defiled natures."[28] The dichotomizing tendency in consciousness is the result of defilement, some of which is cultivation-destructible and some of which is vision-destructible.

Once the radical nature of the conversion of Vasubandhu is taken into account and the radical new meaning that he gives to the term vijñapti is understood, it is pertinent to point out those aspects of his thought that endured the transition basically intact. His theory of Bīja has found a fertile home in the Ālayavijñāna. Other abhidharma material such as the citta-samprayukta-saṃskāras

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[27] Isshi Yamada, "Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu," paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies, New York, 1972 (xeroxed), p. 22.

[28] tatra sarvasāṃkleśikadharmabījasthānatvād ālayaḥ/

appear in identical form in both the Kośa and the Trimśika, as has been pointed out by Dr. Wayman.[29]

Turning to the Mahāyānasamgraha of Asaṅga, we find that the concept of vijñapti is utilized to provide yet another description of the world of experience consistent with the above mentioned trisvabhāva analysis, vijñapti-mātratā orientation, and the postulation of the ālayavijñāna. In the second chapter of the text the question is posed: How are the characteristics of the knowable to be seen? (katham draṣṭavyam . . . jñeyalakṣaṇa).[30] Asaṅga answers by stating that summarily the knowable can be understood in three ways, and proceeds to present the trisvabhāva analysis referred to above. Unlike many other statements of trisvabhāvatā, this one opens with the paratantralakṣaṇa, the dependently originated character. This departure from the more common order of the three characteristics takes us directly into the material with which we are concerned--the eleven mental representations which are said to constitute all dependently originated experienced that is experienced as the 'imagination of unreality (abhūtaparikalpa-saṃgṛhita). Thus, these eleven mental representations make up the sarvam of experience when it is incorrectly imagined that we experience things in themselves rather than mental

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[29]Alex Wayman, "The Meanings of the Term Cittamātra," paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies, New York, 1972 (xeroxed), p. 10; see Trimśikāvijnapti-kārikās, 11-14.

[30]Lamotte, trans., La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asaṅga, p. 86.

representations. These eleven kinds of mental representation are:

1-3. dehadehibhoktṛ-vijñapti: the mental representation of a body, a possessor of the body and an experiencer. Vasubandhu's commentary identifies these three as the five dhātus (the eye, etc.), kliṣṭamanas, and manodhātu, respectively. Each of the three latter are mentally represented as the three former.

4. tadupabhukta-vijñapti: the mental representation of that which is experienced by the above. Vasubandhu identifies this as the mental representation of the six external bases of perception or consciousness, i.e., colors, sounds, etc., up to dharmas appropriate to manovijñāna.

5. tadupabhoktṛ-vijñapti: The mental representation of the experiencer of 4, above. Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva both identify this mental representation with the six forms of consciousness, from visual up to mental.

6. kāla-vijñapti: The mental representation of time. Vasubandhu identifies this with the mental representation that arises because the flow of samsāra is uninterrupted (samsārapravāhāsamuccheda).

7. samkhyā-vijñapti: The mental representation of number. Vasubandhu identifies this mental representation with simple counting (gaṇana). Asvabhāva regards this mental representation as arising with the appearance of 1, etc.

8. deśa-vijñapti: The mental representation of locality. Vasubandhu sees this mental representation arising in reference to the (dependently originated) receptacle world.

9. vyavahāra-vijñapti: The mental representation of discourse. Asvabhāva sees this mental representation arising upon there being discursus that is seen, heard, sensed or cognized (dṛṣṭaśrutamatavijñātavyavahāra).

10. svaparaviśeṣa-vijñapti: The mental representation of a distinction between self and other. This is the mental representation of self and others that arises as long as there is belief in 'I and mine.'

11. sugatidurgaticyutyupapatti-vijñapti: The mental representation of good destiny, bad destiny, death and origination. Asvabhāva sees these mental representations as manifesting themselves as gods, humans, hell beings, animals, and hungry ghosts.[31]

One is almost immediately tempted to ask 'What is the rationale behind these eleven kinds of mental representation?' In addition to being the mental representations that arise when certain seeds are present in the storehouse consciousness, these eleven constitute the dependently originated aspect of experience when it is predicated with the characteristics that are no more than the imagination of unreality

[31] Ibid., pp. 88-89.

(abhūta-parikalpa). In short, the everyday experience of the average uninstructed person should be accounted for by these eleven kinds of conscious activity. The text itself draws attention to the fact that the first five (amounting to the seven vijñānas, the six forms of sense data and the six kinds of resultant consciousness) can be considered exhaustive: "on saura que les autres idées (nos. 6-11) sont des modalitiés (prabheda) des cinq premieres."[32] However, reasons for the elaboration of the six are also given. Thus, the mental representation of time is due to the fact that samsāra is beginningless and never is interrupted, that of number because the realm of sentient beings is incalculable, that of locality because the receptacle world is incalculable, and so on. Thus, these six additional representations refer to predominant dimensions of experience--the temporal, quantitative, spacial, interactional, individuational and retributional. Whereas the first five describe the content of experience from a perceptual perspective, the six correspond to something like universal categories that also pertain to the conscious individual. The setting of these universals in a Samsāra that is endless, containing incalculable sentient beings, relations, variety of experience, and forms of retribution is not without its salvational implications. That the list ends on the note of the various forms of good and bad destinies should serve

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[32] Ibid., p. 31.

as a reminder that the rationale behind this and other 'phenomenologies of experience' to be found in the Buddhist tradition is ultimately a soteriological rationale. Once again, we have an apparently meditationally derived description of experience geared toward an ultimately religious goal.

In the case of the Yogācāra tradition (or at least that dimension of it treated here) that religious goal included overcoming the hindrance of the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa) as well as the hindrance of defilement (kleśāvaraṇa). The realization of vijñaptimātratā--that the world that we experience is experienced as our consciousness--was inextricably bound up with overcoming the defilement of the knowable. Indeed, if the only point of the Vijñaptimātra school is that we sense our perceptions there would be very little to threaten the common sense view. However, it is the case that certain texts (among them, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, especially the section under discussion) in the Asaṅga/Vasubandhu lineage go beyond the modest position that we only experience our perceptions and actually deny the external object.

In order to support the denial of the external object the simile of a dream is used. "Just as the consciousness (of the non-objectivity of the visions of the dream) is lacking during the dream, but would arise after awakening, just so, the consciousness (of the non-objectivity of the waking

state) is lacking in those who have not been awakened by the knowledge of reality, but appears in those who know reality."[33] A mirror simile is quoted from the Saṃdhinir-mocana Sūtra further to establish the denial of the external object. But, as Dr. Wayman has pointed out, the "Saṃdhinir-mocana was silent about the external rather than in denial of it."[34] The intentions of the author of the Saṃdhinir-mocana notwithstanding, it is true that in one lineage after Vasubandhu there is a denial of the external object. Among the more convincing of the arguments in denial of the external object is a list of four jnānas that pertain to the Boddhisattva who comprehends the non-objectivity of the mental representations. The first of these is the Viruddhavijñānanimittatva-jñāna, the knowledge that one nimitta can give rise to opposing perceptions. In this case, a river is seen by a preta as full of pus, by an animal as a place to drink, by a human as fit for quenching thirst, bathing and cleansing, and in the case of certain deities it is not seen at all. Asserting that such contradictory consciousness could not diverge from one real object, both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva conclude the necessity for denying the external object. Among the other jñānas referred to to establish the denial of the external object, there is the Anālambhanavijñaptyupalabdhitva-jñāna, the knowledge

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[33] Ibid., p. 93, my translation of the French.

[34] Wayman, "The Meanings of the Term Cittamātra," p. 6.

that a mental representation can obtain in the case where there is no corresponding object. In support of this argument, Asvabhāva points out that "it has been proven by the Sautrāntika (Kośa, V, 58) that the past and the future are conceived without their objects."[35]

To return to the comparison itself, it is safe to say that the term vijñapti took on a radically new meaning in the Vijñaptimātra tradition--a tradition that bears the stamp of Vasubandhu's genius. This nature has played the role of a mere designational dharma in the Pali and Sanskrit abhidharma traditions and that of a highly sophisticated description of experience in the Māhāyana. The varying roles are indicative of different meaning structures, with which Buddhism abounds.

[35] Lamotte, trans., La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asaṅga, p. 106, my translation of the French.

CONCLUSION

I began this study with the hope that I could learn something about the Buddhist depiction of the mechanism whereby deeds achieve their karmic fruition. In the end I am not much wiser than I was at the beginning regarding this mysterious process. What I did discover, however, is that a rich and ongoing critical tradition existed in both the Pali and Sanskrit abhidhamma/abhidharma traditions. I am far from convinced that abhidharma amounts to a formulation "that would give least offense to the weak-minded."[1] Moreover, I can no longer see abhidharma as some kind of aberration in the overall Buddhist tradition, " . . . a system of speculative metaphysics--a theory of Elements (dharmas) based on an imperfect understanding of the utterances of the Buddha about the skandha, dhātu and āyatana."[2] Murti has the audacity to assert that "the rise of the Mādhyamika system is at once the rise of Buddhism as a religion."[3] These and other misrepresentations of Abhidharma thought and development constitute impediments to the correct understanding of the traditions. It is hoped that some of the considerations raised in this

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[1]Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 44.

[2]Ibid., p. 41.

[3]Ibid., p. 6.

study will both dispel the notion that Abhidharma Buddhism is in some way second class, and stress the need for these texts to be considered as highly relevant documents in the study of the history of Buddhist thought.

Moreover, I have attempted to demonstrate that the abhidharma is not of one piece, but represents both early clearly systematizing tendencies on the one hand, and later critical, refining tendencies on the other. We were able to detect the beginnings of such an orientation as early as ca. 50 A.D. in the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya of Dharmatrāta. It seems safe to say that critical posture toward the dharmas and specific systematizations of them is as characteristic of abhidharma thought as the widely noted tendency to compile lists, categories, etc. One possible explanation for the often reductive characterization of the abhidharma enterprise is the identification of all abhidharma with that which preceded Nāgārjuna. Now it is true that some of the seven accepted Pali Abhidhamma texts are rather tedious and are made no less intractable by English translations liberally laced with dots and references to earlier passages of identical or near identical content. Without diminishing the integrity or importance of these texts, it is safe to say that more synoptic treatments of the material were prompted by this earlier style. I am unable to comment on the stylistic nature of the seven Sanskrit abhidharma texts because they are available only in Chinese translation. What is of most significance is the fact that a critical and

synoptic figure arose in both the Pali and Sanskrit traditions in roughly the fifth century A.D. The contributions of these two, Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu, amount to a unique chapter in the history of Indian Buddhism.

While the critical faculties and encyclopedic mind of Vasubandhu were eventually to be of service in the Yogācāra/Vijñaptimātra school, the legacy of Buddhaghosa remains in the Theravadin tradition and provides impetus for later Pali commentators such as Anuruddha, Sumaṅgala and Kassapa. The development of the theory of paññatti and anipphanna dhammas in the Pali tradition mirrors the critical dimension of the Sautrāntika thought in relation to many of the Vaibhāṣika entities. Such developments raise the question of historical origins and are appropriately the subject matter for another study. Admittedly this area of development does not amount to the 'reformation' so often attributed to Nagārjuna, but does represent those moments in the abhidhamma/abhidharma traditions when critical thought turned back upon the very structures that were its doctrinal inheritance.

Among the more weighty questions that arise in this study is--'What in the world is a dharma?' Indeed, why did Buddha apparently enumerate certain natures as pertinent categories in the description of experience and not others? This is not to ask why a dharma theory was erected, but rather to ask why certain natures were included and not others. This area too is properly the subject for another

study, one prepared to deal with contemporary sources in both the Brahmanical and Jaina traditions.

The mere assertion that the dharmas are void of self-existence sheds very little light on these and related problems. It must be pointed out that to the degree that the traditional meditational theory, with its theory of vision and cultivation-allayable defilements, was put into practice, the dharma level of analysis plays a highly significant role. Just as the knowledge that the upraised cobra is void of self-existence in no way prevents him from striking me, so, too, is such knowledge in regard to the defilements of little use if I am beset by them. The instrumentality of the dharma level of analysis of experience in the actual task of allaying the defilements cannot be overestimated. Abhidharma represents the structure within which this vital Buddhist task was carried out. One aim of this study has been to point out the integrity of abhidharma and its centrality within the Buddhist tradition.

In addition to these pan-Abhidharmic considerations I have attempted to capture the spirit of the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika debate on a fundamental aspect of Buddhist thought--the principle of karmic retribution. If some light has been shed on the various 'vocabularies' postulated to explain this process, then a not insignificant contribution to our understanding of Indian Buddhism has perhaps been made.

APPENDIX

...र्तनी ।

एवं च प्रज्ञप्तिभाष्यं सुनीतं भवति—"चतुःषष्टिः कल्पाः शुभकृत्स्नानामायुःप्रमाणम्"१ (   ) इति ॥ १०२ ॥

अभिधर्मकोशभाष्ये लोकनिर्देशो नाम
तृतीयं कोशस्थानं
समाप्तमिति२ ।

ये धर्मा हेतुप्रभवा हेतुं तेषां तथागतो ह्यवदत् ।
तेषां च यो निरोध एवंवादी महाश्रमणः ॥ इति ।

भवन्ति, सप्ताप्संवर्तन्यः, एका वायुसंवर्तनीति चतुःषष्टिः संवर्तन्यो भवन्ति। तस्माद् यदुक्तं प्रज्ञप्तिभाष्ये –*चतुःषष्टिः कल्पाः शुभकृत्स्नानामायुःप्रमाणमिति*, तत् सूक्तं *भवति*। यथा "ऊर्ध्वं तु परीत्ताभेभ्य आश्रयः। द्विगुणद्विगुणः" (अभि० को० ३.७७) इत्यत्रोक्तं शुभकृत्स्नानां चतुःषष्टियोजनानां शरीरप्रमाणम्। शरीरप्रमाणेन च तेषामायुःप्रमाणमुक्तम्। "आयुस्तु कल्पैः स्वाश्रय०" (अभि० को० ३.८०) इति वचनात्। एकैका संवर्तनी महाकल्प इति कृत्वा। इयता हि कालेन तेषामायुषः परिसमाप्तिरिति ॥ १०२ ॥

आचार्ययशोमित्रकृतायां स्फुटार्थायाम्
अभिधर्मकोशव्याख्यायां
तृतीयं कोशस्थानम् ॥

१. शुभकृत्स्नानां देवानामायुः०—का० ।
२. ०श्रीलामाबाकस्य यदत्र पुण्यम्—का० ।

॥ ॐ नमो बुद्धाय ॥

चतुर्थं कोशस्थानम्

(कर्मनिर्देशः)

अथ यदेतत् सत्त्वभाजनलोकस्य बहुधा वैचित्र्यमुक्तं ... कृतम् ? न खलु केनचिद् बुद्धिपूर्वकं कृतम्। किं तर्हि ? सत्त्वानां

कर्मजं लोकवैचित्र्यम्,

यदि कर्मजम्, कस्मात् सत्त्वानां कर्मभिः कुङ्कुमचन्दनादयो रम्यतरा जायन्ते, न तेषां शरीराणि ? कर्माण्येव तान्येवञ्जातीयानि व्यामिश्रकारिणां सत्त्वानाम् यदाश्रयाश्च व्रणभूता जायन्ते, भोगाश्च रम्यास्तच्चिकित्सोपकरणभूताः। अव्यामिश्रकारिणां तु देवानामुभयेऽपि रम्याः।

किं पुनस्तत् कर्म ? इत्याह—

चेतना तत्कृतं च तत्।

सूत्र उक्तम्—"द्वे कर्मणी चेतना कर्म चेतयित्वा च" (   ) इति। यत् तच्चेतयित्वा चेतनाकृतं च तत्।

ते एते द्वे कर्मणी त्रीणि भवन्ति—काय-वाङ्-मनस्कर्माणि।

कथमेषां कर्मणां व्यवस्थानम्, किमाश्रयतः ? आहोस्वित् स्वभावतः

स्फुटार्थाव्याख्यायाम्

चतुर्थं कोशस्थानम्

तीर्थंकरविप्रतिपत्त्या समुत्पादित-सन्देहः पृच्छति—*अथ यदेतदिति* विस्तरः।

तत्र *सत्त्ववैचित्र्यं* धातु-गति-योन्यादिभेदेन। *भाजनवैचित्र्यं* मेरु-द्वीपादि-भेदेन। *व्यामिश्रकारिणामिति*। कुशलाकुशलव्यामिश्रकारिणाम्। अथ कस्मात् तेषामाश्रया रम्या न भवन्ति, भोगास्तु रम्या इति ? सति चैवं विषयोपभोगः सम्भवति। आश्रयरम्यत्वे हि कस्य प्रतीकाराय रम्यविषयोपभोगः स्यात्। *अव्यामिश्रकारिणामिति*। रूपावचराणाम्। कामावचरा अपि देवा अव्यामिश्र-कारिकल्पा आश्रयविषयरम्याः; रम्यताहेतुकर्मद्वयकारित्वात्।

चेतयित्वा चेति। एवं चेदं करिष्यामीति।

समुत्थानतो वा ? आश्रयतश्चेद्, एकं कायकर्म प्राप्नोति, सर्वेषां कायाश्रितत्वात् । स्वभावतश्चेद्, वाक्कर्मैकं प्राप्नोति; वचसः कर्मस्वभावत्वात् । समुत्थानतश्चेत्, मनस्कर्मैकं प्राप्नोति; सर्वेषां मनःसमुत्थितत्वात् ?

यथाक्रमं त्रिभिः कारणैस्त्रयाणामिति वैभाषिकाः ।

तत्र पुनः—

चेतना मानसं कर्म,

चेतना मनस्कर्मेति वेदितव्यम् ।

तज्जं वाक्कायकर्मणी ॥ १ ॥

यच्चचेतनाजनितं चेतयित्वा कर्मेत्युक्तम्, कायवाक्कर्मणी ते वेदितव्ये ।

ते तु विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती,

ते तु कायवाक्कर्मणी प्रत्येकं विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्तिस्वभावे वेदितव्ये ।

तत्र तु—

कायविज्ञप्तिरिष्यते ।

संस्थानम्,

चित्तवशेन कायस्य तथा तथा संस्थानं कायविज्ञप्तिः । गतिरित्यपरे । प्रस्यन्दमानस्य हि कायकर्म, नोऽप्रस्यन्दमानस्येति[1] ।

न गतिर्यस्मात् संस्कृतं क्षणिकं

कोऽयं क्षणो नाम ? आत्मलाभोऽनन्तरविनाशी, सोऽस्यास्तीति

स्वभावतश्चेद्वाक्कर्मैकमिति । वागेव कर्मेति कृत्वा । इतरयोस्तु न कर्मत्वम् । कायेन कायस्य वा कर्म कायकर्म, एवं मनस्कर्म । इति न स्वभावतः कर्म ।

त्रिभिः कारणैरिति । आश्रयतः, स्वभावतः, समुत्थानतश्चेति । त्रयाणामिति । कायवाङ्मनस्कर्मणाम् । आश्रयतः कायकर्म—कायाश्रयं कर्म कायकर्मेति, स्वभावतो वाक्कर्म—वागेव कर्मेति, समुत्थानतो मनस्कर्म—मनःसमुत्थितमिति कृत्वा ॥ १ ॥

गतिरित्यपर इति । वात्सीपुत्रीयाः ।

आत्मलाभोऽनन्तरविनाशीति । क्षणस्यानन्तरक्षण इति नैरुक्तेन विधिना आत्मलाभः । अनन्तरविनाशी क्षणशब्देनाभिधीयते । अथ वा—कालपर्यन्तः

१. ०स्येति । न उच्यन्ते—का० ।

क्षणिकः[1] । दण्डिकवत् । सर्वं हि संस्कृतमात्मलाभादूर्ध्वं न भवतीति यत्रैव जातं तत्रैव ध्वंस्यते । तस्यायुक्ता देशान्तरसंक्रान्तिः । तस्मान्न गतिः कायकर्म ।

स्यादेतदेव, यदि सर्वस्य क्षणिकत्वं सिध्येत् ? सिध्यतीदं विद्धि । कुतः ? संस्कृतस्यावश्यं—

व्ययात् ॥ २ ॥

आकस्मिको हि भावानां विनाशः । किं कारणम् ? कार्यस्य हि कारणं भवति, विनाशश्चाभावः । यश्चाभावस्तस्य किं कर्तव्यम् । सोऽसावाकस्मिको विनाशो यदि भावस्योत्पन्नमात्रस्य न स्यात्, पश्चादपि न स्याद्; भावस्य तुल्यत्वात् । अथान्यथीभूतः ? न युक्तं तस्यैवान्यथात्वम् । न हि स एव तस्माद् विलक्षणो युज्यते । दृष्टो वै काष्ठादीनामग्न्यादिसंयोगाद् विनाशः । न च दृष्टाद् गरिष्ठं प्रमाणमस्तीति । न च सर्वस्याकस्मिको विनाशः ।

कथं तावद् भवान् काष्ठादीनामग्न्यादिसंयोगाद् विनाशं पश्यतीति मन्यते ? तेषां पुनरदर्शनात् । सम्प्रधार्यं तावदेतत्—किमग्निसंयोगात् काष्ठादयो विनष्टाः,

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क्षणः स्वावस्थानः । सोऽस्यास्तीति क्षणिकः । "अत इनिठनौ" (पा० सू० ५.२.११५) इति ठन् ।

संस्कृतस्यावश्यं व्ययादिति । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरविनाशिरूपं चित्तचैत्तवत् ।

आकस्मिको हि भावानां विनाश इति । अकस्मादेव आकस्मिकः । अहेतुक इत्यर्थः । साधनं चात्र—'अहेतुको विनाशः; अभावत्वाद्, अत्यन्ताभाववत्' । दृष्टो वै काष्ठादीनामिति विस्तरः । आदिशब्देन रूपादीनां ग्रहणम् । दृष्टोऽग्निसंयोगाद् विनाश इति । प्रत्यक्षद्वारापतितो धर्मस्वरूपविपर्यय इति प्रतिज्ञादोषं दर्शयति । अत एवाह—न च दृष्टाद् गरिष्ठं प्रमाणमिति । न प्रत्यक्षाद् गुरुतमं प्रमाणमस्तीत्यर्थः ।

आचार्यः प्रत्यक्षाभिमानं परेषां दर्शयन्नाह—कथं तावद्भवान् यावन् मन्यत इति । न हि काष्ठादिविनाशो रूपादिवत् प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते । अक्षणिकवादिनस्त आहुः । तेषां पुनरदर्शनादिति । तेषां काष्ठादीनामदर्शनात् । तदेवमनुमानतः सिद्धिं दर्शयति—'अग्निसंयोगहेतुकः, काष्ठादिविनाशः; तदापाते भावात् । यस्य यदापाते भावः स तद्धेतुकः, तद्यथा—बीजपातभाव्योऽङ्कुरः । सम्प्रधार्यं तावदेतदिति । अनेकान्तिकतामुद्भावयति[2] । न हि यस्यापाते यो विनाशो भवति

१. क्षणिकम्—का० । २. नैकान्तिक०—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

षो न दृश्यन्ते ? उतादौ स्वयं विनष्टाः अन्ये च पुनर्नोत्पन्नाः, अतो न दृश्यन्ते; यथा वायुसंयोगात् प्रदीपः, पाणिसंयोगाद् घण्टाशब्द इति ? तस्माद-नुमानसाध्योऽयमर्थः ॥ २ ॥

किं पुनरत्रानुमानम् ? उक्तं तावत् अकार्यत्वादभावस्येति । पुनः—

न कस्यचिदहेतोः स्यात्

यदि विनाशो हेतुसामान्यान्न कस्यचिदहेतुकः स्यादुत्पादवत् । क्षणिकानां च बुद्धिशब्दार्चिषां दृष्ट आकस्मिको विनाश इति नायं हेतुमपेक्षते ।

यस्तु मन्यते—बुद्ध्यन्तराद् बुद्धेर्विनाशः, शब्दान्तराच्छब्दस्येति ? न[1] युक्तमेतत्[1]; बुद्ध्योरसमवधानात् । न हि संशयनिश्चयज्ञानयोर्युक्तं समवधानम् ।

स तद्धेतुक इति । वायुसंयोगपाते हि सति प्रदीपस्य विनाशः । न च स विनाशो वायुसंयोगकृतः । क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमाद्धि प्रदीपस्याकस्मिको विनाश इष्यते । स हि उत्पन्नप्रध्वंसितत्वात् स्वयं विनष्टः प्रदीपः । वायुप्रतिबन्धादन्यस्यानुत्पत्तौ न दृश्यते, न तेन विनाश इति । तथा घण्टाशब्दः क्षणिक इष्यते । पाणिसंयोगपाते च सति घण्टाशब्दस्य विनाशः, न स तत्कृतः । क्षणिकत्वाद्धि स्वयं विनष्टो घण्टाशब्दस्तत्प्रतिबन्धत्वादन्यस्यानुत्पत्तौ न दृश्यते, न तेन विनाश इति । तस्मादनुमानसाध्योऽयमर्थः । न प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध इत्यभिप्रायः । तस्मादनैकान्तिकमेतत् । यस्य पाते यः कश्चिद्विनाशः स तत्कृत इति ।

किं पुनरत्रानुमानमिति । अत्राहेतुको विनाश इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे किमनुमानमिति । उक्तं तावदकार्यत्वादभावस्येति । 'अहेतुको विनाशः; अकार्यत्वादाकाशवत् । अकार्यश्चासौ अभावस्वभावत्वादत्यन्ताभाववत्' ॥ २ ॥

"न कस्यचिदहेतोः" इति । न कस्यचिदकस्मादित्यर्थः । उत्पादवदिति । विपरीतोपमानम् । यथोत्पाद आत्मलाभलक्षणः सहेतुक एव, नाहेतुकस्तद्विनाशः स्यात् । न चैवं भवति । कथम् ? इत्याह—क्षणिकानां च बुद्धिशब्दार्चिषां दृष्ट आकस्मिको विनाशः । तदेवमनुमानापतितो धर्मः स्वरूपविपर्ययः । 'आकस्मिकः काष्ठादीनां विनाशः; विनाशस्वाभाव्यात्, बुद्ध्यादिविनाशवद्' इति ।

यस्तु मन्यत इति । वैशेषिकः । पूर्वा बुद्धिरुत्तरया बुद्ध्या उत्पन्नया विनाश्यते । अन्या तु बुद्धिः पूर्वया बुद्ध्या विनाश्यते । एवं शब्दोऽपि वाच्यः । आह—न युक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? बुद्ध्योरसमवधानात् अयुगपद्भावादित्यर्थः । न ह्यसन्तं नाश्यं हेतुर्विनाशयतीति । कथं गम्यते बुद्ध्योरसमवधानमिति ? अत आह—न हि संशयनिश्चयज्ञानयोर्युक्तं समवधानमिति विस्तरः । स्वसंवेद्य-

1–1. तदयुक्तम्—का० ।

एवं[1] सुखदुःखयोः, रागद्वेषयोर्वा । यदा च पटुबुद्धिशब्दानन्तरमपटुबुद्धि-शब्दावुत्पद्येते, तदा कथमपटुः समानजातीयो धर्मः पटीयांसं हिंस्यात् । अन्त्ययोश्च कथम् ।

योऽपि अर्चिषामवस्थानहेत्वभावाद्, धर्माधर्मवशाद् वा विनाशं मन्यते ? स[2] चायुक्तः[2]; न ह्यभावः कारणं भवितुमर्हति । न चाप्युत्पादविनाशहेत्वोर्धर्माधर्मयोः क्षण[3] एव[3] क्षणे वृत्तिलाभप्रतिबन्धौ भवितुमर्हतः ।

शक्यश्चैष कारणपरिकल्पः सर्वत्र संस्कृते कर्तुमित्यलं विवादेन ।

मेतत् । यदा संशयज्ञानं न तदा निश्चयज्ञानम्, यदा निश्चयज्ञानं न तदा संशयज्ञानमिति । एवं सुखदुःखयो रागद्वेषयोश्चासमवधानमिति योज्यम् । यथा च विरुद्धयोरसमवधानम्, एवमविरुद्धयोरपि ज्ञानयोरसमवधानं भवतीति । यदा चेति विस्तरः । अथापि समवधानं स्यादिति, तथाप्यपटुबुद्धिशब्दौ पटू न हिंस्याताम्; दुर्बलसमानजातीयत्वात् । न हि दुर्बलसमानजातीयो बलवन्तं हिंसन् दृष्टः । असमानस्तु दुर्बलोऽपि हिंस्यात् । तद्यथा—उदकं तेजः ।

योऽप्यर्चिषामवस्थानहेत्वभावादिति । अवस्थानहेत्वभावाद् भावानां विनाश इति स्थविर-वसुबन्धुप्रभृतिभिरयं हेतुरुक्तः; स चायुक्तः । न ह्यभावः कारणं भवितुमर्हतीति । धर्माधर्मवशाद्वेति वैशेषिकाः । तं प्रत्याह—न चाप्युत्पादविनाशहेत्वोरिति । उत्पादविनाशहेत्वोरधर्मस्य । क्षण एव क्षण इति । मुख्ये क्षणे, नौपचारिके क्षण इत्यर्थः । अथ वा क्षण एव क्षण इति । क्षणे क्षण एवेत्यर्थः । वृत्तिलाभप्रतिबन्धौ । वृत्तिलाभो वृत्तिप्रतिबन्धश्च क्षणे क्षणे भवितुं नार्हतः । कथं कृत्वा ? यस्यार्चिषः उत्पत्तावनुग्रहो भवति चैत्रस्य मैत्रस्य वा, तस्य धर्म उपलब्धवृत्तिः तदुत्पादयतीत्येवमुत्पादहेतुः । विनाशहेतुरपि, यदि तद्विनाशस्तस्यानुग्रहं करोति अन्धकारावस्थायाम् । एवमधर्मोऽपि यस्यार्चिरुत्पत्तावपकारो भवति, तस्याधर्मोपलब्धवृत्तिस्तदुत्पादयति । विनाशहेतुरपि, यदि तद्विनाशस्तस्याप्यपकारं करोति अन्धकारावस्थायामिति तयोर्वृत्तिलाभादर्चिषामुत्पत्तिर्भवति । न च वृत्तिलाभं तयोरप्रतिबध्य ताभ्यामेव तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे तेषां विनाश इति । क्षणे क्षणे वृत्तिलाभप्रतिबन्धौ न ह्ययोर्युज्येते ।

शक्यश्चैष कारणपरिकल्प इति विस्तरः । धर्माधर्मविनाश इति कारणपरिकल्प इति । सर्वत्र संस्कृते द्व्यणुकादौ अनित्येषु रूपादिषु कर्मणि च शक्यते कर्तुम् । अतो न वक्तव्यमेतत्—अग्निसंयोगात् काष्ठादीनां विनाश इत्येवमादि । ततश्च सर्वसंस्कृतस्य क्षणिकसिद्धिः; धर्माधर्मयोस्तद्विनाशकारणान्तरानपेक्ष-

1. का० पुस्तके नास्ति । 2–2. तदप्ययुक्तम्—का० । 3–3. क्षणे—का० ।
अभि० को० २ : १३

यदि च काष्ठादीनामग्न्यादिसंयोगहेतुको विनाशः स्यात्, एवं सति पाकजानां गुणानां पक्वतरतमोत्पत्तौ—

हेतुः स्याच्च विनाशकः ।

हेतुरेव च विनाशकः स्यात् । कथं कृत्वा ? घासाद्यग्निसम्बन्धाद्[१] गुणाः पाकजा उत्पन्नाः, तत एव तादृशाद्वा पुनः पक्वतरतमोत्पत्तौ तेषां विनाश इति हेतुरेव तेषां विनाशकः स्याद्, हेतुविशिष्टो वा ।

न च युक्तम्—यत एव यादृशाद्वा तेषां भावः, तत एव तादृशाच्च तेषां पुनरभाव इति । ज्वालान्तरेषु च[२] तावद्धेतुभेदेऽपि[३] परिकल्पनां[३] परिकल्पयेयुः । क्षारहिमशुक्रसूर्योदकभूमिसम्बन्धात्तु पाकजविशेषोत्पत्तौ कां कल्पनां कल्पयेयुः ।

पच्यमाना अपि क्वाथ्यमानाः क्षीयन्ते, किं तत्राग्निसंयोगाः कुर्वन्ति ? तेजोधातुं प्रभावतो वर्धयन्ति, यस्य प्रभावादपां संघातः क्षामक्षामो जायते, यावदतिक्षामतां गतोऽन्ते न पुनः सन्तानं सन्तनोति । इदमत्राग्निसंयोगाः कुर्वन्ति ।

स्यादित्यर्थे विधादेन ।

तत एव तादृशाद्वेति । अग्निसंयोगः श्यामतां घटस्य निवर्त्य रक्ततां जनयति, स एव रक्ततां निवर्त्य रक्ततरतां जनयतीति कल्प्यते । हेतुरेव विनाशकः स्यात् ।

अथ ज्वालानां क्षणिकत्वादन्यस्तत्संयोगो जनकः, अन्योऽपि विनाशक इति कल्प्यते ? हेतुविशिष्टो विनाशकः स्यात्, न च युक्तमिति सर्वम् । *ज्वालान्तरेषु च तावद्धेतुभेदेऽपि परिकल्पनां परिकल्पयेयुर्वैशेषिकाः ।* क्षणिकत्वात् ज्वालानामन्या जनिका अन्या विनाशिका इति । *क्षार-यावद्-भूमिसम्बन्धात्तु पाकजविशेषोत्पत्तौ कां कल्पनां कल्पयेयुः ।* न हि तेषां क्षारादयः क्षणिकाः । तत्र हेतुरेव विनाशकः स्यात् ।

यत्तर्हि आप इति विस्तरः । यद्यग्निसंयोगेऽप्यापो न विनाश्यन्ते, कथं तर्ह्यापः *क्वाथ्यमानाः क्षीयन्त* इत्यभिप्रायः । *तेजोधातुमिति ।* तदविनिर्भागसंवर्धनम् । *यस्य प्रभावादपां संघातः*[४] *क्षामक्षामो जायत* इति । कारणविशेषात् कार्यविशेष इति क्षामक्षामतरो जायते । *यावदतिक्षामतां गतोऽन्ते न पुनः सन्तानं सन्तनोति ।* कार्यं करोति । न स्वभावं करोतीत्यर्थः ।

१. ०सम्बन्धा—का० ।
२. का० पुस्तके नास्ति ।
३–३. ०भेदकल्पना—का० ।
४. संहातः—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

तस्मान्नास्ति भावानां विनाशहेतुः । स्वयमेव तु भङ्गुरत्वाद् विनश्यन्त उत्पन्नमात्राद्[१] विनश्यन्तीति सिद्ध एषां क्षणभङ्गः । क्षणभङ्गाच्च गत्यभावः ।

गत्यभिमानस्तु देशान्तरेषु निरन्तरोत्पत्तौ तृणज्वालावत् । गत्यभावे च "संस्थानं कायविज्ञप्तिः" इति सिद्धम् ।

"नास्ति संस्थानं द्रव्यतः" इति सौत्रान्तिकाः । एकदिङ्मुखे हि भूयसि वर्णे उत्पन्ने दीर्घं रूपमिति प्रज्ञप्यते, तमेवापेक्ष्याल्पीयसि ह्रस्वमिति, चतुर्दिशं भूयसि चतुरस्रमिति, सर्वत्र समे वृत्तमिति । एवं सर्वम् । तद्यथा—अलातमेकस्यां दिशि देशान्तरेष्वनन्तरेषु निरन्तरमाशु दृश्यमानं दीर्घमिति प्रतीयते, सर्वतो दृश्यमानं मण्डलमिति । न[२] द्रव्यसत्[२] संस्थानम् । यदि हि स्यात्—

द्विग्राह्यं स्यात्,

चक्षुषा हि दृष्ट्वा दीर्घमित्यवसीयते कायेन्द्रियेणापि स्पृष्ट्वेति द्वाभ्यामस्य ग्रहणं प्राप्नुयात् । न च रूपायतनस्य द्वाभ्यां ग्रहणमस्ति ।

यथा वा स्प्रष्टव्ये दीर्घादिग्रहणम्, तथा वर्णेऽपि[३] सम्भाव्यताम् ।

भङ्गुरत्वादिति विस्तरः । भङ्गशीलत्वात् *स्वयं विनश्यन्तोऽन्येनाजनित*विनाशाः । *सन्त उत्पन्नमात्रा*देकक्षणलब्धात्मानो भवन्तो *विनश्यन्ति ।*

तृणज्वालावदिति । यथा तृणज्वालायाः क्षणिकत्वेऽपि *देशान्तरेषु निरन्तरोत्पत्तौ गत्यभिमानः*—तृणं दहन्तीति, ज्वाला गच्छन्तीति, तद्वत् । साधनं च—'अविद्यमानगतयो देशान्तरे निरन्तरमुत्पद्यमाना रूपादयो भावाः; क्षणिकत्वात्, तृणज्वालावत्' । *संस्थानं कायविज्ञप्तिरिति ।* वैभाषिकवचनम् ॥ ३ ॥

एकदिङ्मुख इति । एका दिङ् मुखमस्येति एकदिङ्मुखं तस्मिन् । *भूयसि* बहुतरे । *एवं सर्वमि*त्यूर्ध्वैकदिङ्मुखे भूयसि उत्पन्ने उन्नतमिति प्रज्ञप्यते, अधो भूयस्यवनतमिति । एषा दिक् । तद् *यथा अलातमिति ।* 'न द्रव्यसत् संस्थानम्; वर्णग्रहणात् पक्षग्रहणत्वात्, अलातचक्रवद्' इति । अथवा—'न द्रव्यसंस्थानम्; अन्यरूपग्रहणात् पक्षग्रहणत्वाद्धान्यराशिवद्' इति ।

*द्वाभ्यामस्य ग्रहणं प्राप्नुयादि*त्युक्ते वैभाषिको ब्रूयात्—न दीर्घत्वादेः कायेन्द्रियेण ग्रहणम्, किं तर्हि ? स्प्रष्टव्यावयवेष्वेव तथासंनिविष्टेषु दीर्घादिग्रहणं भवति, अतो न द्वाभ्यामस्य ग्रहणं प्राप्नोति ? अत इदमुच्यते—*यथा वा*

१. उत्पन्नमात्रा—का० ।
२–२. न तु खलु आयतनमस्ति—का० ।
३. वर्णे—का० ।

स्मृतिमात्रं तत्र स्पर्शसाहचर्याद्[1] भवति। स तु साहचर्यात् भवति, न तु साक्षाद् ग्रहणम्, यथा—अग्निरूपं दृष्ट्वा तस्योष्णतायां स्मृतिर्भवति, पुष्पगन्धं च घ्रात्वा तद्वर्णे इति।

युक्तमत्राव्यभिचारत्वादन्येनान्यस्मरणम्[2]; न तु किञ्चित् स्प्रष्टव्यं क्वचित् संस्थाने नियतम्, यतोऽत्र[3] स्मरणं नियमेन स्यात्।

तथा[4] सत्यपि साहचर्यनियमे संस्थाने[5] स्मरणं[5] नियमेन स्यात्। वर्णेऽपि स्यात्। वर्णवद् वा संस्थानेऽप्यनियमेन स्यात्।

स्प्रष्टव्य इति विस्तरः। कोऽर्थः? यथा स्प्रष्टव्ये दीर्घह्रस्वादिग्रहणम्, न च स्प्रष्टव्यायतनसंगृहीतं संस्थानम्; तथा वर्णेऽपि सम्भाव्यतां दीर्घादिग्रहणम्, न च रूपायतनसंगृहीतसंस्थानम्। अर्थान्तरभूतं स्यादित्यर्थः।

पुनर्वैभाषिक आह—स्मृतिमात्रं तत्र इति विस्तरः। स्मृतिमात्रं तत्र संस्थाने स्पर्शसाहचर्यात् श्लक्ष्णत्वादिभिः स्पर्शैः सहचरभावाद् भवति। न तु साक्षाद्ग्रहणं दीर्घादिसंस्थानस्य। यथाग्निरूपं दृष्ट्वा तस्याग्नेरुष्णतायां स्मृतिर्भवति साहचर्यात्। पुष्पस्य च चम्पकस्य च गन्धं घ्रात्वा तद्वर्णेऽपि स्मृतिसाहचर्यम्।

आह—युक्तमत्रेति विस्तरः। युक्तमत्राग्नावव्यभिचारात् उष्णतायाश्च रूपस्य च। अन्येनान्यस्मरणम्। अग्निरूपेणोष्णतायाः, पुष्पगन्धेन च तद्वर्णस्य। न तु किञ्चिदिति विस्तरः। न तु किञ्चित् स्प्रष्टव्यं श्लक्ष्णत्वादि क्वचिदिति संस्थाने दीर्घादौ नियतम्; यतोऽत्र संस्थाने स्प्रष्टव्यं स्पृष्ट्वा स्मरणं नियमेन स्यात्। यत्र ह्यग्निरूपम्, तत्र तदुष्णतया भवितव्यम्। यत्र च चम्पकगन्धः, तत्र तद्रूपेण भवितव्यम्। न तु यत्र श्लक्ष्णत्वं कर्कशत्वं वा, तत्र दीर्घत्वेन ह्रस्वत्वेन वा भवितव्यम्। तस्मात् तदुष्णतारूपयोर्नियमेन युज्यते। संस्थानेन तु नियमेन स्मरणं न प्राप्नोति।

तथा सत्यपि साहचर्यनियमे स्प्रष्टव्यं संस्थानयोः संस्थाने स्मरणं नियमेन स्यात्। वर्णेऽपि स्यात्। स्मरणं नियमेनेति वर्तते। तदेवं स्प्रष्टव्यं स्पृष्ट्वा स्मरेदित्यर्थः। अथानियमेन वर्णस्मरणं भवति? वर्णवद्वा संस्थानेऽप्यनियमेन स्यात्—

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१. स्प्रष्टव्यसाह०—का०।
२. ०नान्यस्य स्मरणम्—का०।
३. यतस्तत्र—का०।
४. यथा—का०।
५-५. संस्थान०—का०।

न चैवं भवति। अयुक्तमस्य स्प्रष्टव्यात् स्मरणम्। चित्रान्तरेण[1] चाऽनेकवर्णसंस्थाने दर्शनाद् बहूनामेकदेशं[2] प्राप्नुयात्। तथायुक्तं वर्णवत्।

तस्मान्नास्ति द्रव्यतः संस्थानम् ॥

यच्चापि किञ्चित् समतिघं रूपमस्ति तदवश्यं परमाणौ विद्यते।

न चाणौ तत्

न च संस्थानं परमाणौ विद्यते दीर्घादि। तस्माद् बहुष्वेव तथासन्निविष्टेषु दीर्घादिप्रज्ञप्तिः।

दीर्घे ह्रस्वमिति, ह्रस्वे दीर्घमिति। किं कारणम्? वर्णे ह्यनियमेन स्मरणं भवति स्प्रष्टव्यात् कदाचिद् रक्ते पीतमिति पीते रक्तमिति। न चैवं भवति। कथमेवं न भवति? यथा वर्णे संस्मरणं न नियमेन भवति, तथा संस्थानेऽप्यनियमेनेति। किं तर्हि? वर्णे स्मरणं न नियमेन भवति, संस्थाने पुनर्नियमेनेति अयुक्तमस्य संस्थानस्य स्प्रष्टव्यात् स्मरणम्। कथं तर्हि दीर्घबुद्धिर्ह्रस्वबुद्धिर्वा भवति? उक्तमेतद्—एकदिङ्मुखे भूयसि वर्णे वा स्प्रष्टव्ये वा गृह्यमाणे दीर्घविकल्पबुद्धिः, अल्पीयसि ह्रस्वविकल्पबुद्धिरित्येवमाद्यवगन्तव्यम्। चित्रान्तरेण चेति विस्तरः। चित्रान्तरेण चानेकवर्णसंस्थाने बहुभिः प्रकारैर्दृश्यमानेनानेकसंस्थानं दृश्यते दीर्घादि। अतोऽनेकसंस्थानदर्शनात् बहूनां संस्थानानामेकदेशं प्राप्नुयात्। यत्रैव दीर्घत्वं तत्रैव ह्रस्वादिग्रहणात्। तथायुक्तं वर्णवत्। यथा हि वर्णः सप्रतिघत्वादेकदेशो न भवति, तथा संस्थानमपीति।

तथा च सति द्रव्यतोऽपि संस्थानमिति सापक्षयाः पक्षो भवति; धर्मविशेषविपर्ययात्।

"न चाणौ तद्" इति। यथा नीलादिरूपम् अष्टद्रव्यकादावणौ विद्यते न चैवमणौ संस्थानं दीर्घादि विद्यते। कथं पुनर्गम्यते—संस्थानं परमाणौ नास्तीति? दीर्घसङ्घातेऽपचीयमाने दीर्घबुद्ध्यभावात्। दीर्घं हि दण्डमुपलभ्य तस्मिन्नेवापचीयमाने दीर्घबुद्धिर्न निवर्तेत[3]। न हि नीलादि द्रव्यमुपलभ्यापचीयमाने तस्मिन् पीतबुद्धिर्भवति। दीर्घद्रव्ये त्वपचीयमाने ह्रस्वबुद्धिर्भवति, न दीर्घबुद्धिः। न च युक्तं वक्तुम्—तदेव संस्थानं दीर्घादि-ह्रस्वादि-बुद्धिं जनयतीति। तस्माद् बहुष्वेवेति सर्वम्।

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१. चित्रास्तरणे—का०।
२. मैकदेशे—का०।
३. विवर्तेत—मुद्रितः पाठः।

अथ मतम्—संस्थानपरमाणव एव तथासन्निविष्टा दीर्घादिसंज्ञा[1] भवन्ति[1] इति । सोऽयं केवलः पक्षपातः; तेषामसिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धस्वलक्षणानां हि तेषां सञ्चयो युज्यते । न च संस्थानावयवानां वर्णादिवत् स्वभावः सिद्ध इति कुत एषां सञ्चयः ।

यर्तार्ह वर्णत्वाभिन्नो[2] भवति, संस्थानं च भिन्नं दृश्यते मृद्घाजनानाम् । ननु चोक्तं यथा कृत्वा वर्णे दीर्घादिसंज्ञा प्रज्ञप्यते, यथा च पिपीलिकादीनामभेदे पङ्क्तिचमादीनां भेदः प्रज्ञायते, तथा संस्थानस्यापि ।

यर्तार्ह तमसि[3] दूराद् वा वर्णमपश्यन्तः स्थाण्वादीनां दैर्घ्यादीनि पश्यन्ति । वर्णमेव ते तत्राव्यक्तं दृष्ट्वा दीर्घादिपरिकल्पं कुर्वन्ति, पङ्क्तिसेनापरिकल्पवत् ।

अथ मतमिति विस्तरः । *संस्थानपरमाणव एव तथासन्निविष्टा* एकदिङ्मुखादियोगेन *दीर्घादिसंज्ञा भवन्ति* । न ह्येतत्स्वभावाः तथासन्निविष्टाः समानास्तां संज्ञामुपलब्धुमर्हन्तीत्यभिप्रायः । *न च संस्थानावयवानां वर्णादिवत् स्वभावः सिद्ध इति* । वर्णावयवाः प्रसिद्धस्वभावाः; प्रत्ययवयं नीलादित्वतो ग्रहणात्, न चैवं संस्थाने परमाणवः प्रत्ययवयं दीर्घादित्वतो गृह्यन्ते । तस्मान्न प्रसिद्धस्वभावाः । यदि तु नैव ते दीर्घादिस्वभावाः, सन्निवेशविशेषात् तु दीर्घादिबुद्धिहेतवो भवन्ति । वर्णादिपरमाणव एव सन्निवेशविशेषात् दीर्घादिबुद्धिहेतवो भवन्तीति किं नेष्यते ।

यर्तार्ह वर्णत्वाभिन्न इति । यदि वर्णसन्निवेशमात्रं संस्थानं स्यात्, वर्णाभेदे संस्थानभेदो न स्यात्; *मृद्घाजनानां* कुण्डादीनामनर्थान्तराभावात् ।

ननु चोक्तमिति विस्तरः । *यथा कृत्वा वर्णे दीर्घादिसंज्ञा प्रज्ञप्यते* । एकदिङ्मुखे च वर्णे इति विस्तरेण । *यथा च पिपीलिकादीनामिति* विस्तरः । यथा च पिपीलिकादय एकरूपा भवन्ति । तेषां च *पङ्क्तिरित्यस्मिन्* देशेऽन्यादृशी, अन्यस्मिन्नन्यादृशी । एवं *चमादीनां भेद* इत्येवमादि । तथा वर्णाभेदेऽपि *संस्थानभेदः स्यात्* ।

यत् तर्हि तमसीति विस्तरः । यत् तर्हि तमसि *वर्णमपश्यन्तः स्थाणुपुरुषहस्त्यादीनामिति दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वपरिमण्डलादीनि पश्यन्ति* । तत् कथमिति वाक्यशेषः । यदि तर्हि वर्णाज्जात्यन्तरसंस्थानं न स्यात् । यथा वर्णं नीलं पीतमिति वा न पश्यन्ति तथा संस्थानमपि दीर्घह्रस्वमिति न पश्येयुः, पश्यन्ति च कदाचित् । अतो जात्यन्तरं संस्थानमिति । *पङ्क्तिसेनापरिकल्पवदिति* । यथा

१–१. ०संज्ञा लभन्त—का० । २. वर्णत्वाभिन्नो—का० । ३. तमपि—का० ।

वेविदितं[1] चैतदेवम् । यत् कदाचिदनिर्धार्यमाणपरिच्छेदं सङ्घातमात्रमव्यक्तं दृश्यते किमप्येतदिति ।

अथेदानीं कायस्य गतिं निराकृत्य संस्थानं च तत्रभवन्तः सौत्रान्तिकाः कां कायविज्ञप्तिं प्रज्ञपयन्ति ? संस्थानमेव हि ते कायविज्ञप्तिं प्रज्ञपयन्ति, न तु पुनर्द्रव्यतः ।

तां च प्रज्ञपयन्तः कथं कायकर्म प्रज्ञपयन्ति ? कायाधिष्ठानं कर्म कायकर्म, या चेतना कायस्य तत्र तत्र प्रणेत्री ।

एवं वाङ्मनस्कर्मणी अपि यथायोगं वेदितव्ये ।

यर्तार्ह "चेतना कर्म चेतयित्वा च" ( ) इत्युक्तम् ? सङ्कल्पचेतना पूर्वं भवति—'एवं चैवं च करिष्यामि' इति । तथा चेतयित्वा पश्चात् क्रिया चेतनोत्पद्यते । यया कायः प्रेर्यते सासौ चेतयित्वा कर्मेत्युच्यते ।

एवं तर्हि विज्ञप्त्यभावादविज्ञप्तिरपि कामावचरी न[2] स्यादिति[2] महान्तो

तमस्यव्यक्तं पक्षिणः पिपीलिका वा दृष्ट्वा दीर्घा पङ्क्तिरिति परिकल्पयन्ति, यथा वा तमस्येव हस्त्यादीनव्यक्तं दृष्ट्वा परिमण्डलेयं सेना व्यवस्थितेति परिकल्पयन्ति, तद्वत् । *वेविदितं चैतदेवमिति* । यथेदानीमुक्तम्—असत्यपि जात्यन्तरे संस्थाने वर्णमेव ते तत्राव्यक्तं दृष्ट्वा दीर्घादिपरिकल्पं कुर्वन्ति । *यत् कदाचिदिति* विस्तरः । *अनिर्धार्यमाणपरिच्छेदमिति* । अनिर्धार्यमाणसंस्थानसंघातमात्रमव्यक्तमलक्ष्यमाणनीलत्वादिकं दृश्यते । न च वर्णसंस्थानव्यतिरिक्तं रूपायतनमस्तीति । यथा नान्यत् किञ्चिद् द्रव्यं कल्प्यते, तद्वत् संस्थानमपि न वर्णव्यतिरिक्तं कल्पयितव्यम् ।

तत्रभवन्त इति । ते भवन्त इत्यर्थः । "इतराभ्योऽपि दृश्यन्ते" (पा० सू० ५.३.१४) इति वचनात् । *कथं कायकर्म प्रज्ञापयन्तीति* । प्रज्ञप्तिसत्त्वात् कायकर्मायोग इति मन्यमानः पृच्छति । *कायाधिष्ठानमिति* । कायालम्बनमित्यर्थः । यस्य हि कायः प्रवर्त्यः, तत्कायाधिष्ठानं कर्म । तेनाह—*या चेतना कायस्य तत्र तत्र प्रणेत्रीति*[3] । *यथायोगं वेदितव्ये* इति । वागधिष्ठानं कर्म वाक्कर्म । मनस्कर्म तु मनसः कर्म, मनसा वा संयुक्तं कर्म मनस्कर्म । तेन *यथायोगमित्युक्तम्* ।

विज्ञप्त्यभावादिति विस्तरः । यदि विज्ञप्तिर्न स्यात् अविज्ञप्तिरपि कामावचरी न स्यात् । विज्ञप्त्यधीना हि कामावचर्यविज्ञप्तिः, न चित्तानुपरिवर्तिनीति । सा

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१. इत्थं—का० । २–२. नास्तीति—का० । ३. प्रणेत्रीति—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

दोषा अनुपज्यन्ते, अनुपङ्गाणां[1] पुनः प्रत्यनुपङ्गा भविष्यन्ति; यदि तस्मादेव कायकर्मसंशब्दिताच्चेतनाविशेषादविज्ञप्तिः स्यात्, चित्तानुपरिवर्तिनी स्यात् समाहितविज्ञप्तिवत् ।

नैवं भविष्यति; चेतनाविशेषेण तदाक्षेपविशेषात् । सापि च विज्ञप्तिः सती तदाक्षेपे उत्पादनचेतनाया[2] बलं निभालयते; जडत्वात् । द्रव्यमेव तु संस्थानं वैभाषिका वर्णयन्ति, संस्थानात्मिकां तु कायविज्ञप्तिम् ।

वाग्विज्ञप्तिस्तु वाग्ध्वनिः ॥ ३ ॥

वाक्स्वभावो यः शब्दः सैव वाग्विज्ञप्तिः ॥ ३ ॥

अविज्ञप्तिः पूर्वमेवोक्ता । सापि द्रव्यतो नास्तीति सौत्रान्तिकाः; अभ्युपेत्याकरणमात्रत्वात् । अतीतान्यपि महाभूतान्युपादाय प्रज्ञप्तेः, तेषां चाविद्यमान-

चेवं नास्तीति महान्तो दोषा अनुपज्यन्ते । संवरासंवराभावदोषः, सौपधिकपुण्यक्रियावस्तु–पुण्यवृद्ध्यभावदोष इत्येवमादयोऽनुपङ्गाः । अनुपङ्गाणां पुनः प्रत्यनुपङ्गा इति । तत्परिहारा भविष्यन्तीत्यर्थः । कायकर्मसंशब्दितादिति । कायाधिष्ठानादित्यर्थः । समाहिताविज्ञप्तिवदिति । यथा समाहिताविज्ञप्तिश्चित्तानुपरिवर्तिनी, एवं प्रातिमोक्षसंवरादिलक्षणाप्यविज्ञप्तिः स्यात् ।

सौत्रान्तिका आहुः—नैवं भविष्यति । न चित्तानुपरिवर्तिनी भविष्यति; चेतनाविशेषणासमाहितेन तदाक्षेपविशेषाद् । असमाहिताया अविज्ञप्तेराक्षेपादित्यर्थः । सापि च विज्ञप्तिर्भवदीया सती विद्यमाना अविज्ञप्तेराक्षेपे उत्पादनचेतनाया बलं सामर्थ्यं निभालयते अपेक्षते । कस्मात् ? जडत्वाद् । अपटुत्वाच्चेतनाबलमन्तरेण तामविज्ञप्तिं जनयितुं न शक्नोति । न ह्यसत्यां समादानचेतनायां गच्छतोऽपत्ना विज्ञप्तिरविज्ञप्तिं जनयति ।

"वाग्विज्ञप्तिस्तु" इति । तु-शब्दो विशेषणेन । यथा कायविज्ञप्तिः संस्थानात्मिका, न तथा वाग्विज्ञप्तिः । किं तर्हि ? वागात्मको ध्वनिः, वर्णात्मकः शब्द इत्यर्थः ॥ ३ ॥

अविज्ञप्तिः पूर्वमेवोक्तेति । "ते तु विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती" इत्युक्तम् । तत्र विज्ञप्तिरुक्ता, अविज्ञप्तिर्वक्तव्या । सा च पूर्वमेवोक्ता—"विक्षिप्ताचित्तकस्य" (अभि० को० १.११) इति वचनात् । सापि द्रव्यतो नास्ति । साप्यविज्ञप्तिर्द्रव्यतो नास्ति । न केवला विज्ञप्तिरित्यपिशब्दः । अभ्युपेत्याकरणमात्रत्वादिति । "इमं दिवसमुपा-

१. अनुपङ्गानां—का० । २. चेतनायाः—का० ।

स्वभावत्वात्, रूपलक्षणाभावाच्च ।

अस्तीति वैभाषिकाः । कथं ज्ञायते ?

त्रिविधामलरूपोक्तिवृद्ध्यकुर्वत्पथादिभिः ।

त्रिविधं रूपमुक्तं सूत्रे—"त्रिभिः स्थानै रूपस्य रूपसंग्रहो भवति—अस्ति रूपं सनिदर्शनं सप्रतिघम्, अस्ति रूपमनिदर्शनं सप्रतिघम्, अस्ति रूपमनिदर्शनमप्रतिघम्" ( ) इति । अनास्रवं च भगवता रूपमुक्तम्—"अनास्रवाः धर्माः कतमे ? यस्मिन् रूपेऽतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नो नोत्पद्यतेऽनुनयो वा प्रतिघो वा यावद् यस्मिन् विज्ञाने, इम उच्यन्तेऽनास्रवा धर्माः" ( ) इति । नाविज्ञप्ति[1] विरहय्यास्ति रूपमनिदर्शनमप्रतिघम्, नाप्यनास्रवम् ।

दाय प्राणातिपातादिभ्यः प्रतिविरमामि' इत्यभ्युपेत्य । तस्मात् परेण तेषामकरणमात्रमविज्ञप्तिरित्येवं द्रव्यतो नास्तीति सौत्रान्तिकाः । तेषां चातीतानां महाभूतानाम् । न ह्यतीतानां प्रत्युत्पन्नस्वभावोऽस्ति । पञ्चमे च कोशस्थान एतद् दर्शयिष्यत इति । कथम् ? अविद्यमानान्यस्या आश्रय इत्यतो न द्रव्यतोऽस्ति । रूपलक्षणाभावाच्च । रूप्यत इति रूपलक्षणम्, तच्चास्या अप्रतिघत्वान्नास्ति । तस्मान्न द्रव्यतोऽस्ति ।

त्रिविधेति विस्तरः । त्रिविधञ्च तदमलञ्च त्रिविधामलरूपम्, तस्योक्तिः । अकुर्वतः पन्था अकुर्वत्पथः । परेण कारयतः स्वयमकुर्वतः कर्म इत्यर्थः । त्रिविधामलरूपोक्तिश्च वृद्धिश्चाकुर्वत्पथश्चादिरेषाम्, तानीमानि त्रिविधामलरूपोक्तिवृद्ध्यकुर्वत्पथादीनि । आदिशब्देन धर्मो भिक्षो इत्यत्रारूपीत्यवचनम्, आर्याष्टाङ्गवचनम्, प्रातिमोक्षसंवरसेतुवचनं च गृह्यते ।

रूपस्य रूपसंग्रह इति । रूपस्य रूपेणैव संग्रहो भवति, नान्यैर्वेदनादिभिः । अस्ति रूपं सनिदर्शनं सप्रतिघम् । यच्चक्षुर्विज्ञानविज्ञेयं रूपम् । अस्त्यनिदर्शनं सप्रतिघम् । यानि चक्षुरादीनि तत् पुनर्नव रूप्यायतनानि । अस्ति रूपमनिदर्शनमप्रतिघम् । यन्मनोविज्ञानविज्ञेयम् अविज्ञप्तिरूपं धर्मायतनसंगृहीतम् । नाविज्ञप्तिं विरहय्येति विस्तरः । अविज्ञप्तिं मुक्त्वा नास्ति रूपमनिदर्शनमप्रतिघं यद् रूपसंग्रहसूत्र उक्तम् । नाप्यनास्रवमस्ति रूपम् । अविज्ञप्तिं विरहय्येति वर्तते । न हि मार्गसत्यसमापन्नस्य कायवाग्विज्ञप्तिरूपं युज्यते ।

१. न ह्यविज्ञप्ति—का० ।

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वृद्धिरपि चोक्ता—"एभिः सप्तभिरौपधिकैः पुण्यक्रियावस्तुभिः समन्वागतस्य श्राद्धस्य कुलपुत्रस्य वा[1] कुलदुहितुर्वा चरतो वा स्वपतो वा तिष्ठतो वा जाग्रतो वा सततसमितमभिवर्धत एव पुण्यम्, उपजायत एव पुण्यम्। एवं निरौपधिकैः" ( ) इति। न चाविज्ञप्तिमन्तरेणान्यमनसोऽपि पुण्यस्याभिवृद्धिर्युज्यते। अकुर्वतश्च स्वयं परैः कारयतः कर्मपथा न सिध्येयुरसत्यामविज्ञप्तौ।

सप्तभिरौपधिकैरिति। उपधिः=आरामविहारादिः, तत्र भवमौपधिकम्। तस्योपधेरभावान्निरौपधिकम्। सततमभीक्ष्णम्। समितं निरन्तरम्।

अत्र सूत्रम्—"भगवान् कौशाम्ब्यां विहरति स्म घोषितारामे। अथायुष्मान् महाचुन्दो येन भगवांस्तेनोपसंक्रान्तः। उपसंक्रम्य भगवतः पादौ शिरसा वन्दित्वा एकान्तेऽस्थात्। एकान्ते स्थित आयुष्मान् महाचुन्दो भगवन्तमेतदवोचत्—'लभ्यं भदन्त औपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु प्रज्ञपयितुं महाफलं महानुशंसं महाद्युतिकं महावैस्तारिकम्' ? 'लभ्यं चुन्द' इति भगवांस्तस्यावोचत्।

'सप्तेमानि चुन्दौपधिकानि पुण्यक्रियावस्तूनि महाफलानि यावन्महावैस्तारिकाणि। यैः समन्वागतस्य श्राद्धस्य कुलपुत्रस्य वा कुलदुहितुर्वा चरतो वा तिष्ठतो वा स्वपतो वा जाग्रतो वा सततसमितमभिवर्धते एव पुण्यम्, उपजायते एव पुण्यम्'।

'कतमानि सप्त' ? १. 'इह चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा चातुर्दिशाय भिक्षुसङ्घायारामं प्रतिपादयति। इदं चुन्द प्रथमौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु महाफलं यावन्महावैस्तारिकम्, येन समन्वागतस्य कुलपुत्रस्य वा विस्तरेण यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

२. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तस्मिन्नेवारामे विहारं प्रतिष्ठापयति। इदं द्वितीयमौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु महाफलं यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

३. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तस्मिन्नेव विहारे शयनासनं प्रयच्छति। तद्यथा—मञ्चं पीठं बृषिं कोचवं बिम्बोपधानं चतुरस्रकं ददाति। इदं चुन्द तृतीयमौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु पूर्ववत्।

४. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तस्मिन्नेव विहारे ध्रुवभिक्षां प्रज्ञपयत्यनुकूलयज्ञाम्। इदं चुन्द चतुर्थमौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु महाफलं पूर्ववत्।

१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति।

५. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा आगन्तुकाय गमिकाय वा दानं ददाति। इदं चुन्द पञ्चममौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु पूर्ववत्।

६. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा ग्लानाय ग्लानोपस्थापकाय वा दानं ददाति। इदं चुन्द षष्ठमौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु पूर्ववत्।

७. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा यास्ता भवन्ति शीतलिका वा वर्दलिका वा वातलिका वा वर्पलिका वा, तद्रूपासु शीतलिकासु यावद्वर्पलिकासु भक्तानि वा तर्पणानि वा यवागूपानानि वा तानि सङ्घायाभिनिर्हृत्यानुप्रयच्छति—इदमार्या अस्माकमनार्द्रगात्राः अनभिवृष्टचीवराः परिभुज्य सुखस्पर्शं विहरन्तु। इदं च चुन्द सप्तममौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु महाफलं यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

'एभिः सप्तभिरौपधिकैः पुण्यक्रियावस्तुभिः समन्वागतस्य श्राद्धस्य कुलपुत्रस्य वा कुलदुहितुर्वा न लभ्यं पुण्यस्य प्रमाणमुद्ग्रहीतुम्—एतावत् पुण्यं वा, पुण्यफलं वा, पुण्यविपाकं वा। अपि तु बहुत्वात् पुण्यस्य 'महापुण्यस्कन्धः' इति संख्यां गच्छतीत्येवमादि'"।

"द्विरप्यायुष्मान् महाचुन्दो भगवन्तमेतदवोचत्—'लभ्यं भदन्त निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु प्रज्ञपयितुं महाफलं यावन्महावैस्तारिकम् ? 'लभ्यं चुन्द' इति भगवांस्तस्यावोचत्। 'सप्तेमानि चुन्द निरौपधिकानि पुण्यक्रियावस्तूनि यैः समन्वागतस्य श्राद्धस्य कुलपुत्रस्य वा कुलदुहितुर्वा चरतो वा तिष्ठतो वा विस्तरेण यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्'।

'कतमानि सप्त' ? १. 'इह चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा शृणोति तथागतं वा तथागतश्रावकं वा अमुकं ग्रामक्षेत्रमुपनिश्रित्य विहरतीति। श्रुत्वा पुनरधिगच्छति प्रीतिप्रामोद्यमुदारं कुशलं नैष्क्रम्योपसंहितम्। इदं चुन्द प्रथमं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु पूर्ववत् यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

२. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा शृणोति तथागतं वा तथागतश्रावकं वा उद्युक्तमागमनाय। श्रुत्वा च पुनरधिगच्छतीति पूर्ववत्। इदं चुन्द द्वितीयं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु।

३. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा शृणोति तमेव तथागतं वा तथागतश्रावकं वा अध्वानमार्गप्रतिपन्नं तमेव ग्रामक्षेत्रमनुप्राप्तम्। श्रुत्वा च पुनरधिगच्छतीति पूर्ववत्। इदं चुन्द तृतीयं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

४. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा शृणोति तमेव तथागतं वा तथागतश्रावकं वा तदेव ग्रामक्षेत्रमनुप्राप्तम्। श्रुत्वा च पुनरधिगच्छतीति पूर्ववत्। इदं चुन्द चतुर्थं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यम्।

न ह्याज्ञापनविज्ञप्तेः[1] कर्मपथ उपयुज्यते[1]; तस्य कर्मणोऽकृतत्वात्। कृतेऽपि च तस्याः स्वभावविशेषादिति।

उक्तं च भगवता—"धर्मा भिक्षवो बाह्यमायतनमेकादशभिरायतनैरसंगृहीतमनिदर्शनमप्रतिघम्" (   ) इति। न त्वरूपीत्युक्तम्। तत्र किं प्रयोजनं स्याद् यदि धर्मायतनान्तर्गतमविज्ञप्तिरूपं नश्येत।

अष्टाङ्गश्च मार्गो न स्यादविज्ञप्तिमन्तरेण। समापन्नस्य वाक्कर्मान्ताजीवानामयोगात्[2]।

यत्तर्हीदमुक्तम्—"तस्यैवं जानत एवं पश्यतः सम्यग्दृष्टिर्भावनापरिपूरिं

५. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तमेव तथागतं वा तथागतश्रावकं वा दर्शनायोपसंक्रामति, दृष्ट्वा च पुनरधिगच्छतीति पूर्ववत्। इदं चुन्द पञ्चमं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु।

६. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तस्यैव तथागतस्य वा तथागतश्रावकस्य वा अन्तिकाद् धर्मं शृणोति। श्रुत्वा च पुनरधिगच्छतीति पूर्ववत्। इदं चुन्द षष्ठं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु।

७. 'पुनरपरं चुन्द श्राद्धः कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा तस्यैव तथागतस्य वा तथागतश्रावकस्य वा अन्तिकाद् धर्मं शृणोति। श्रुत्वा च बुद्धं शरणं गच्छति, धर्मं शरणं गच्छति, सङ्घम् शरणं गच्छति, शिक्षापदानि च प्रतिगृह्णाति। इदं चुन्द सप्तमं निरौपधिकं पुण्यक्रियावस्तु महाफलमिति पूर्ववत्"। बहुग्रन्थभयात् न सर्वं लिखितम्।

न ह्याज्ञापनविज्ञप्तेः कर्मपथ उपयुज्यते; तस्य प्राणातिपातादिकर्मणोऽकृतत्वात्। स्यान्मतम्, कृते तस्मिन् कर्मणि तदाज्ञापनविज्ञप्तेः कर्मपथो भविष्यतीति? अत्रेदमुच्यते—*कृतेऽपि च तस्याः स्वभावाविशेषादिति।* परेण कृतेऽपि तस्मिन् कर्मणि तस्या आज्ञापनविज्ञप्तेर्न कश्चित् स्वभावविशेषोऽस्ति, येन तदानीं कर्मपथः स्यात्। तस्मात् पूर्ववत्। *तस्याः स्वभावाविशेषात्।* यथैव पूर्ववत् कर्मपथो न व्यवस्थाप्यते, तथैव पश्चादित्यतोऽस्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्या यासौ तदानीमुत्पद्यते कर्मपथसंगृहीतेति।

एकादशभिरायतनैरसंगृहीतमिति ॥ धर्मायतनवर्जैः। *वाक्कर्मान्ताजीवानामयोगादिति।* विज्ञप्तिस्वभावानामेवासम्भवादित्यर्थः।

यत्तर्हीदमुक्तमिति विस्तरः। कोऽस्याभिसम्बन्धः। यदि वा मतम्—यद्य-

१—१. ०विज्ञप्तिः मौलः कर्मपथो युज्यते—का०। २. सम्यग्वाक्क०—का०।

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गच्छति, सम्यक्सङ्कल्पः, सम्यग्व्यायामः, सम्यक्स्मृतिः, सम्यक्समाधिः। पूर्वमेव चास्य सम्यग्वाक्कर्मान्ताजीवाः परिशुद्धा भवन्ति पर्यवदाताः" (   ) इति। लौकिकमार्गवैराग्यं पूर्वकृतमभिसन्धायैतदुक्तम्।

प्रातिमोक्षसंवरश्चापि न स्यादसत्यामविज्ञप्तौ। न हि समादानादूर्ध्वं तदस्ति, येनान्यमनस्कोऽप्ययं भिक्षुः स्यात्, भिक्षुणी वेति। सेतुश्च सूत्रे विरतिरुक्ता; दौःशील्यविबन्धत्वात्। न वा भवन्ती सेतुर्भवितुमर्हत्यसत्येवाविज्ञप्तिः।

अत्र सौत्रान्तिका आहुः—बह्वप्येतत्, चित्रमप्येतत्। नैवं त्वेतत्। किं कारणम्? यत्तावदुक्तम्—"त्रिविधरूपोक्तेः" इति।

तत्र योगाचारा उपदिशन्ति—ध्यायिनां समाधिविषयरूपं[1] समाधिप्रभावादुत्पद्यते, चक्षुरिन्द्रियाविषयत्वाद् अनिदर्शनम्, देशानावरणाद् अप्रतिघमिति[2]।

अथ मतम्—कथमिदानीं तद् रूपमिति? एतदविज्ञप्तौ समानम्। यदप्युक्तम्—'अनास्रवरूपोक्तेः' इति, तदेव समाधिप्रभावसम्भूतं रूपमनास्रवे समाधावनास्रवं वर्णयन्ति योगाचाराः।

विज्ञप्तिर्न स्यादष्टाङ्गोऽयं मार्गो न स्यात्; तत्र विज्ञप्त्ययोगात्। तस्माद् अस्त्यविज्ञप्तिरिति।

यत्तर्हीदमुक्तमिति विस्तरेणोक्त्वा यावत् *सम्यक् समाधिरिति* किमर्थमेवमुच्यते? *पूर्वमेव चास्येति* सर्वम्। मार्गस्य समापत्तिकालात् पूर्वमित्यर्थः। विज्ञप्तिरूपास्त उक्ता इत्यभिप्रायः। *वैभाषिका परिहरन्ति—लौकिकमार्गवैराग्यमिति विस्तरः।* लौकिकमार्गवैराग्यावस्थायां वागादिस्वभावं विज्ञप्तिरूपम्। *एतदभिसन्धायैतदुक्तम्।* न तु मार्गकाले तत् संगृहीतं वागाद्यविज्ञप्तिरूपं नास्तीति।

समाधिविषयरूपमिति। समाधेरालम्बनमस्थिसङ्कलादि। *देशानावरणादप्रतिघमिति।* यद्रूपं देशमावृणोति तत् प्रतिघम्। विपर्ययादप्रतिघमिति सिद्धम्।

कथमिदानीं तद्रूपमिति। यदि न रूपयितुं शक्यत इत्यभिप्रायः। *एतदविज्ञप्तौ समानम्।* अविज्ञप्तिरपि वा देशं नावृणोतीति तुल्यम्। *अनास्रवे समाधौ अनास्रवमिति।* मार्गं सम्मुखीकुर्वाणो *योगाचारस्तद्रूपमाशयं* चाश्रयञ्च प्रतिलभते यत् सम्यग्दृष्टिवदनास्रवं शीलं प्रतिलभते। यस्मिन् सति प्रकृतिशीलतायां सन्तिष्ठते।

१. ०विषयो रूपं—का०। २. ०नावरणत्वाद०—का०।

अर्हतो यद् रूपं बाह्यं चेत्यपरे; आस्रवाणामनिःश्रयत्वात् ।

यत्तर्हि सूत्र उक्तम्—"सास्रवा धर्माः कतमे ? यावदेव चक्षुर्यावदेव रूपाणि" इति विस्तरः ? तत्[1] पुनरास्रवाणामप्रतिपक्षत्वात् सास्रवमुक्तम् । पर्यायेण तर्हि तदेव सास्रवं चानास्रवं च स्यात् ? किं स्यात् ? लक्षणसङ्करः स्यात् । यथा तत् सास्रवं तथा न कदाचिदनास्रवमिति कोऽत्र सङ्करः ? यदि च रूपायतनानीति एकान्तेन सास्रवाणि स्युः, इह सूत्रे किमर्थं विशेषितानि स्युः—"यानि रूपाणि सास्रवाणि सोपादानीयानि चेतःखिलम्रक्षवस्तु" इति विस्तरः ।

यदप्युक्तम्—"पुण्याभिवृद्धिवचनाद्" इति, तत्रापि पूर्वाचार्या निर्दिशन्ति—"धर्मता ह्येषा यथा यथा दातॄणां दायाः परिभुज्यन्ते तथा तथा भोक्तॄणां गुणविशेषादनुग्रहविशेषाच्चान्यमनसामपि दातॄणां तदालम्बनदानचेतनापरिभाविताः[2] सन्ततयः सूक्ष्मं परिणामविशेषं प्राप्नुवन्ति, येनायत्यां बहुतरफलाभिनिष्पत्तये

अथवा अनास्रवेऽपि समाधौ तदेवंविधं रूपं न आचार्या इच्छन्ति । अर्हतो यद्रूपं बाह्यं चेत्यपर इति । अपर आचार्या वर्णयन्ति—अर्हतो यद्रूपं चक्षुरायतनादि बाह्यं च काष्ठकुड्यादि तदनास्रवं रूपम् । कुतः ? आस्रवाणामनिश्रयत्वात् । न ह्यर्हत्सान्तानिकं रूपं बाह्यं चास्रवाणां क्लेशानां निश्रय इति ।

यद्येवम्, यत्तर्हि विशेषेण सूत्र उक्तम्—सास्रवा धर्माः कतमे ? यावदेव चक्षुर्यावदेव रूपाणीति विस्तरः । तत् पुनरास्रवाणामप्रतिपक्षत्वात् सास्रवमुक्तम् । चित्तचैत्तविशेषो हि आस्रवप्रतिपक्ष इति । पर्यायेण तर्हीति विस्तरः । तदेवार्हतो रूपं बाह्यं चास्रवाणामप्रतिपक्षत्वात् सास्रवम्, आस्रवाणामनिश्रयत्वादनास्रवमिति । तथा च लक्षणसंकरः स्यादिति दोषः । यानि रूपाणीति । यानि रूपाण्यायतनानीत्यर्थः । विस्तरेण यावद् ये धर्माः सास्रवाः सोपादानीयाश्चेतःखिलम्रक्षवस्त्विति वचनात् । सन्त्यनास्रवाणि रूपायतनानीति । तानि पुनः कतमानि सास्रवाणि ? सोपादानीयानि पृथग्जनरूपाणि; आस्रवाणां निःश्रयत्वात्तदप्रतिपक्षत्वाच्च । कतमान्यनास्रवाणि ? यान्यर्हतो रूपाणि बाह्यानि च; आस्रवाणामनिःश्रयत्वात् ।

धर्मता ह्येषेति । कर्मणामनादिकालिका शक्तिः । गुणविशेषादिति । ध्यानाप्रमाणादिगुणविशेषात् । अनुग्रहविशेषाच्चेति । शरीरस्य वर्णबलादिविशेषात् । तदालम्बनेति विस्तरः । सप्रतिग्राहकमालम्बनमस्याः सेयं तदालम्बना दानचेतना, तया परिभाविताः सन्ततयः सूक्ष्मं परिणामविशेषं फलोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं

१. तत्र—का० । २. ०चेतनाभाविताः—का० ।

समर्था भवन्ति" । इदमभिसन्धायोक्तं भवेद्—"अभिवर्धत एव पुण्यमुपजायत एव पुण्यम्" इति ।

अथ मतम्—कथमिदानीं सन्तानान्तरविशेषादन्यमनसोऽपि सन्तानान्तरस्य परिणामः सेत्स्यतीति ? एतदविज्ञप्तौ समानम् ।

कथमिदानीं सन्तानान्तरविशेषात् सन्तानान्तरे धर्मान्तरमविज्ञप्तिः सेत्स्यतीति निरौपधिकेष्विदानीं पुण्यक्रियावस्तुषु कथं भविष्यतीति ? अभीक्ष्णं तदालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासात् स्वप्नेष्वपि ता अनुषङ्गिण्यो भवन्ति । अविज्ञप्तिवादिनस्तु निरौपधिके यत्र विज्ञप्तिर्नास्ति तत्र कथमविज्ञप्तिः स्यात् ?

यच्च[1] औपधिकेष्वप्येवमभीक्ष्णम्[1], तदालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासादित्यपरे[2] ।

यत्तर्हि सूत्रमुक्तम्[3]—"यस्यों भिक्षुः शीलवान् कल्याणधर्मा पिण्डकं परिभुज्याप्रमाणं चेतःसमाधिं कायेन साक्षात्कृत्वोपसम्पद्य विहरति, अप्रमाणस्तन्निदानदायकस्य दानपतेः पुण्याभिष्यन्दः कुशलाभिष्यन्दः सुखास्वादधारः प्रति-

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प्राप्नुवन्ति । कथं भविष्यतीति । बहुतरफलाभिनिष्पत्तये कथं भविष्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । नह्यत्र दातॄणां दाया परिभुज्यन्ते, यत्परिभोगात् भोक्तॄणां गुणविशेषादनुग्रहविशेषाच्चान्यमनसामपि दातॄणामिति विस्तरेण यावत् समर्था भवन्ति यावदुपजायत एव पुण्यमिति वा ।

तदालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासादिति । तथागततच्छ्रावकालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासात् सन्ततयः सूक्ष्मं परिणामविशेषं प्राप्नुवन्ति । येनायत्यां बहुतरफलाभिनिष्पत्तये समर्था भवन्ति । चरतस्तिष्ठतो जाग्रतो युक्तम्, एवं स्वपतस्तु कथम् ? इत्यत आह—स्वप्नेष्वपि ताश्चेतना अनुषङ्गिण्यो भवन्तीति । अविज्ञप्तिवादिनस्तु वैभाषिकस्य निरौपधिके पुण्यक्रियावस्तुनि यत्र विज्ञप्तिर्नास्ति, केवलं तं श्रुत्वाधिगच्छति प्रीतिप्रामोद्यमुदारं कुशलम्, तत्र कथमविज्ञप्तिः स्यात्; तस्य श्रोतुर्विज्ञप्तिसमाध्योरसम्भवात् । अविज्ञप्तिर्हि विज्ञप्तेः समाधेर्वा सम्भवेत् ।

औपधिकेष्वपीति विस्तरः । आरामदानादिष्वपि तदालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासात् । प्रतिग्राहक आलम्बनमस्याश्चेतनाया इति पूर्ववत् । आह—यच्चौपधिकेष्वप्येवमभीक्ष्णं तदालम्बनचेतनाभ्यासात् ।

यत्तर्हि सूत्रमिति विस्तरः । अप्रमाणं चेतःसमाधिमिति । मैत्र्यादिसम्प्रयुक्तं

१–१. औपधिकेष्वप्यभी०—का० । २. तदालम्बने—का० ।
३. सूत्रे उक्तम्—का० ।

...विज्ञप्तिः" इति, अत्र तदानीं दातुः कश्चेतनाविशेषः ? तस्मात् सन्तति-परिणामविशेष एव न्याय्यः ।

यदप्युक्तम्—"कारयतः कथं कर्मपथाः सेत्स्यन्ति" इति ? तत्राप्येवं वर्णयन्ति—तत्प्रयोगेण परेषामुपघातविशेषात् प्रयोक्तुः सूक्ष्मः सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषो जायते, यत आयत्यां समन्तेऽपि बहुतरफलाभिनिर्वर्तनसमर्थो भवतीति ।

स्वयमपि च कुर्वतः क्रियाफलपरिसमाप्तावेष एव न्यायो वेदितव्यः ।

सोऽसौ सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषः 'कर्मपथः' इत्याख्यायते; कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । कायिकवाचिकत्वं तु तस्य[1] तत्क्रियाफलत्वाद्, यथा अविज्ञप्तिवादिनामविज्ञप्तिरिति[2] ।

उपात्तेषु स्कन्धेषु त्रिकालया चेतनया प्राणातिपातावद्येन स्पृश्यते घातक[3] इति भदन्तः । 'हनिष्यामि', 'हन्मि', 'हतम्' इति चास्य यदा भवतीति ।

न म्रियता कर्मपथः परिसमाप्यते । मा भूद्धतेऽपि मात्रादौ हताभिमानिना-

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चेतनाविशेष इति । एतदालम्बनचेतनस्यापि दायकस्याप्रमाणः पुण्याभिष्यन्दोऽस्तीति दर्शयति ।

क्रियाफलपरिसमाप्ताविति । मौलकर्मपथप्रयोगः *क्रिया* । मौलकर्मपथफलं तस्य परिसमाप्तौ । *एष एव न्याय इति* । स्वयं प्रयोगेण परेषामुपघातविशेषात् कर्तुः सूक्ष्मः सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषो जायत इति सर्वम् ।

कार्ये कारणोपचारादिति । *सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषः कर्मपथो भवतीति* । सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषः *कार्यम्*, कर्मपथः *कारणम्* । योऽसौ कायवाचोः प्रयोगः, स हि चेतनालक्षणस्य कर्मणः पन्था इति । तस्मिन् कार्ये कर्मपथ इति कारणोपचारः । *कायिकवाचिकत्वं तु तस्य सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषस्य तत्क्रियाफलत्वात्* । कायवाक्क्रियायाः फलत्वादित्यर्थः । *यथा अविज्ञप्तिवादिनाम् अविज्ञप्तिरिति* । यथा वैभाषिकाणामविज्ञप्तिवादिनामविज्ञप्तिः कर्मपथ इत्याख्यायते; कार्यकारणोपचारात् । कायिकवाचिकत्वं तु तत्क्रियाफलत्वादिति ।

अविज्ञप्तिद्रव्यमिति प्रकारान्तरेण दर्शयन् *भदन्त आह—उपात्तेषु स्कन्धेष्विति* विस्तरः । सत्त्वसंख्यातेषु वर्तमानेषु स्कन्धेषु *त्रिकालया चेतनया प्राणातिपातावद्येन स्पृश्यते घातक इति* । कथं त्रिकालया ? इत्याह—*हनिष्यामि हन्मि हतमिति चास्य यदा भवतीति* । तदेवमत्र चेतनैव कर्मेत्युक्तं भवति । आचार्यो भदन्तमतं केनचिद् भागेनाभिप्रेतं केनचिद्भागेनानभिप्रेतं दर्शयन्नाह—*न म्रियतेति*

१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति । २. ०मविज्ञप्तेरिति—का० । ३. का० पुस्तके नास्ति ।

मानन्तर्यं कर्मेति, स्वयं तु घ्नत एतावांश्चेतनासमुदाचार इति—अयमत्राभिप्रायो युक्तरूपः स्यात् ।

क इदानीमेष प्रद्वेषो यदविज्ञप्तिः प्रक्षिप्यते, सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषश्चाभ्युपगम्यते तथैवासंज्ञायमानः[1] ?

न खलु कश्चित् प्रद्वेषः; किन्तु चित्तान्वयकायप्रयोगेण क्रियापरिसमाप्तौ ताभ्यां पृथग्भूतं धर्मान्तरं प्रयोक्ष्यितुरुत्पद्यत इति नोत्पद्यते परितोषः । यत्कृतप्रयोगसम्भूता तु क्रियापरिसमाप्तिस्तस्यैव तन्निमित्तः सन्ततिपरिणामो भवतीति भवति परितोषः; चित्तचैत्तसन्तानाच्चायत्यां फलोत्पत्तेः ।

उक्तं चात्र । किमुक्तम् ? "विज्ञप्त्यभावाद्" इत्येवमादि । तदभावादविज्ञप्तेरभावः ।

'यदप्युक्तम्—"धर्मायतनस्यारूपित्वं यस्मान्नोक्तम्" इति ? तद्येवात्र रूप-

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विस्तरः । यदि कश्चिदेवं प्रयोजयेत्—मन्मातरं मारयेति । उच्चलिते च मारके तस्यैवं भवेद्—हता तेन मन्मातेति । तस्य *हताभिमानिन आनन्तर्यकर्म स्यात्* । न चेष्यते । तस्मात् स्वयं घ्नन्तीति भदन्तेन विशेष्यं वक्तव्यम् । अत एवाह—*स्वयं तु घ्नत इति* विस्तरः । *एतावांश्चेतनासमुदाचार इति* । हनिष्यामि हन्मि हतमिति । *युक्तरूप इति* । युक्त एव युक्तरूप इति । स्वार्थे रूपप्रत्ययः, नामधेयवत् । यथा—नामैव नामधेयमित्येके व्याचक्षते । प्रशस्तरूपो युक्तरूपः । युक्तं वा रूपं स्वभावोऽस्येति युक्तरूपः ।

तथैवासंज्ञायमान इति । यथैवाविज्ञप्तिर्दुरवबोधा, तथैव सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषोऽपीति । *चित्तान्वयकायप्रयोगेणेति* । चित्तपूर्वकेण कायप्रयोगेणेत्यर्थः । *ताभ्यां पृथग्भूतमिति* । चित्तकायाभ्यां पृथग् भूतम् । *यत्कृतप्रयोगसम्भूतेति* । येन कृतो यत्कृतः, यत्कृतात् प्रयोगात् सम्भूता । *क्रियापरिसमाप्तिः* । कर्मपथपरिसमाप्तिः । *तस्यैव* चित्तचैत्तस्य प्रयोक्तुस्त*न्निमित्त*स्तत्प्रयोगनिमित्तः *सन्ततिपरिणामो भवतीति* । *भवति परितोषः* । अस्माकमिति वाक्यशेषः । *चित्तचैत्तसन्तानाच्चायत्यां फलोत्पत्तेः* । नाविज्ञप्तेः । किम् ? भवति परितोष इति वर्तते ।

विज्ञप्त्यभावादित्येवमादीति । समुत्थापकस्य धर्मस्याभावात् समुत्थाप्यस्य धर्मस्याभाव इत्यर्थः । अविज्ञप्तिर्द्रव्यतो नास्तीति साधितमेतत् । आदि-शब्देन—अभ्युपेत्याकारणमात्रत्वादतीतानि महाभूतान्युपादाय प्रज्ञप्तेः; तेषामविद्यमान-

१. ०वाप्रज्ञायमानः—का० ।

अभि० को० २ : १४

मनिदर्शनमप्रतिघं चोक्तम्, तदेवास्तु धर्मायतनपर्यापन्नम् ।

यदप्युक्तम्—अथाङ्ग आर्यमार्गो न स्यादिति ? अङ्ग[1] तावदाचक्ष्व—कथं मार्गसमापन्नस्य सम्यग्वाक्कर्मान्ताजीवा भवन्तीति । किमसौ वाचं भाषते, क्रियां वा करोति, चीवरादीन् वा पर्येषते ? नेत्याह । किं तर्हि ? तद्रूपामनास्रवाम-विज्ञप्तिं प्रतिलभते । यस्याः प्रतिलम्भाद् व्युत्थितोऽपि न पुनर्मिथ्यावागादिषु प्रवर्तते, सम्यग्वागादिषु च प्रवर्तते । अतो निमित्ते नैमित्तिकोपचारादविज्ञप्ती तथा[2] व्याक्रियते[2] ।

यद्येवम्, इहाप्येवं किं न गृह्यते—मार्गसमापन्नो विनाप्यविज्ञप्त्या तद्रूपमाशयं च आश्रयं च प्रतिलभते, यस्य प्रतिलम्भाद् व्युत्थितोऽपि न पुनर्मिथ्यावागादिषु प्रवर्तते, सम्यग्वागादिषु च प्रवर्तते । अतो निमित्ते नैमित्तिकोपचारं कृत्वा अष्टौ मार्गाङ्गानि व्यवस्थाप्यन्त इति ?

अपरस्त्वाह—तदक्रियामात्रमनाङ्गमुक्तं स्यात् । यदसावार्यमार्गसामर्थ्याद-क्रियानियमं प्रतिलभते, तथानास्रवमार्गसन्निश्रयलाभादनास्रवं स्यात् ।

न हि सर्वत्र द्रव्यमन्तो धर्माः परिसंख्यायन्ते । तद्यथा अष्टौ लोकधर्माः—

स्यादि । तदेवास्तु धर्मायतनपर्यापन्नमिति । यद्ध्यायिनां समाधिविषयो रूपं समाधिप्रभावादुत्पद्यत इत्युक्तं तदप्रनिदर्शनं चाप्रतिघं च ।

अङ्ग तावदाचक्ष्वेति । अङ्गाप्रातिलोम्य इति पठ्यते । हन्त तावदाचक्ष्वेति । एहि तावदाचक्ष्वेत्यर्थं इत्यपरे । अतो निमित्त इति विस्तरः । यत एवम्, अतो निमित्तेऽविज्ञप्तौ नैमित्तिकोपचारात् सम्यग्वागाद्युपचारात् अविज्ञप्ती तदा व्याक्रियते । सम्यग्वाक्कर्मान्ताजीवाख्या क्रियत इत्यर्थः ।

आशयं चाश्रयं चेति । आशयः प्राणातिपाताद्यकरणाशयः, श्रद्धाद्याशयो वा । आश्रय आश्रयपरावृत्तिः । अतो निमित्ते आशये च नैमित्तिकोपचारम् । सम्यग्वागाद्युपचारं कृत्वाष्टौ मार्गाङ्गानि व्यवस्थाप्यन्त इति ।

तदक्रियामात्रमिति । मिथ्यावागाद्यक्रियामात्रम् । कतमत्तद् ? इत्याह—यद-साविति विस्तरः । यद्यक्रियामात्रमङ्गं कथं तदनास्रवम् ? इत्याह—तथानास्रव-मार्गसन्निश्रयालाभादनास्रवमिति । यद्यक्रियामात्रमङ्गम्, तथाऽद्रव्यसत् ।

कथमष्टावङ्गानि भवन्ति ? इत्याह—न हि सर्वत्रेति विस्तरः । विधिपूर्व-

१. अङ्गं—का० । २-२. तदाख्याक्रियते—का० ।

लाभः, अलाभः, यशः, अयशः, निन्दा, प्रशंसा, सुखम्, दुःखमिति । न चात्र चीवरादीनामलाभो नामास्ति द्रव्यान्तरम् । प्रातिमोक्षसंवरोऽपि स्यात्, यया चेतनया विधिपूर्वं कृत्वाऽभ्युपगमः प्रतिषिद्धात् कर्मणः कायवाचौ संवृणोति ।

अन्यचित्तो न संवृतः स्यादिति चेत् ? न; तद्भावनया क्रियाकाले स्मरतः तत्प्रत्युपस्थानात् सेतुभावोऽपि स्यादक्रियां प्रतिज्ञां संस्मृत्य लज्जितो दौःशील्या-करणात् इत्यर्थमेव[1] तस्याः समादानम् । यदि पुनरविज्ञप्तेरेव दौःशील्यं प्रतिबध्नीयात्, न कश्चित् मुषितस्मृतिः शिक्षां भिन्द्यात् ।

अलं विस्तरेण, अस्त्येव द्रव्यान्तरमविज्ञप्तिरूपमिति वैभाषिकाः ।

यदस्ति, तच्च महाभूतान्युपादायेत्युक्तम्, तत् किं विज्ञप्तिमहाभूतान्येवोपा-दायाविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते ? अथान्यानि ? अन्यान्येव सा महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते ।

न हि सैव सामग्री सूक्ष्मफला चौदारिकफला च युज्यते । किं खलु ? यदातनी विज्ञप्तिस्तदातनान्येव सा महाभूतान्युपादाय वर्तते । सर्वमुपादायरूपं

मिति । शीलग्रहणविधिपूर्वम् । अन्यचित्तो न संवृतः स्यादिति चेत् । यदि सा चेतना संवरः, तस्माच्चेतनाचित्तादन्यचित्तो न संवृतः स्यात् । यया[2] चेतनया[2] कायवाचौ संवृणोति नासौ तदानीमस्तीति । न तद्भावनयेति विस्तरः । नैत-देवम्; तद्भावनया चित्तसन्तानभावनया क्रियाकाले प्राणातिपातादिचित्ते प्रत्युपस्थिते स्मरतः अहं प्राणातिपातादिभ्यः प्रतिविरत इति प्रत्युपस्थितस्मृतेः । तत्प्रत्युपस्थानाद् यया चेतनया कायवाचौ संवृणोति; तस्याः सम्मुखीभावात् । इत्यर्थमेव तस्याः समादानमिति । कथम् ? अयमक्रियाप्रतिज्ञां संस्मृत्य दौःशील्यं कुर्यादिति । न कश्चिन्मुषितस्मृतिः शिक्षां भिन्द्यादिति । यासावविज्ञप्तिः सेतुभूता दौःशील्यं प्रतिबध्नाति सा तदानीं विद्यत इति ।

न हि सैव सामग्रीति विस्तरः । न सैव पृथिवीधात्वादीनां महाभूतानां विज्ञप्त्याश्रयाणां सामग्री सूक्ष्मफला चानिदर्शनाप्रतिघा अविज्ञप्तिफलत्वात्, औदा-रिकफला च सनिदर्शनसप्रतिघविज्ञप्तिफलत्वाद् युज्यते । तस्मादन्यान्येव महा-भूतानि उपादायाविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते ।

यदातनी विज्ञप्तिरिति विस्तरः । यदा भवा विज्ञप्तिः यदातनी विज्ञप्तिः । एवं तदातनानि महाभूतानि । यत्कालसम्भूता विज्ञप्तिः किं तत्कालसम्भूतान्येव महाभूतान्युपादाय विज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते । सर्वमुपादाय रूपं विज्ञप्तिरविज्ञप्तिर्ध्यानास्रव-

१. ०मेव च—का० । २-२. यया चेतना या—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

प्रादेशेयम्, किञ्चिद्[1] वर्तमानमनागतं चातीतानि महाभूतान्युपादाय ।

किं पुनस्तदिति ?

क्षणादूर्ध्वमविज्ञप्तिः कामाप्तातीतभूतजा ॥ ४ ॥

प्रथमात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमविज्ञप्तिः कामावचरी अतीतानि महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते । तान्यस्या आश्रयार्थेन सम्भवन्ति[2] । प्रत्युत्पन्नानि शरीरमहाभूतानि सन्निश्रयार्थेन; प्रवृत्त्यनुवृत्तिकारणत्वाद् यथाक्रमम् । चक्रस्येव भूमौ सपरिवर्तमानस्य पाण्यावेध-भूमिप्रदेशौ ॥ ४ ॥

अथ कुतस्त्यानि महाभूतान्युपादाय कुतस्त्यं कायवाक्कर्म ?

स्वानि भूतान्युपादाय कायवाक्कर्म सास्रवम् ।

कामावचरं कायवाक्कर्म कामावचराण्येव महाभूतान्युपादाय । एवं यावच्च चतुर्थध्यानभूमिकं तद्भूमिकान्येवोपादाय ।

संगृहीता चक्षुःश्रोत्ररूपशब्दादि चैवं समानकालान्येव महाभूतान्युपादाय वर्तते । प्रायेणेतिग्रहणं किञ्चित्कामावचर्यविज्ञप्तिनिरासार्थम् । अत एवाह—किञ्चिद् वर्तमानमनागतमतीतानि महाभूतान्युपादायेति । किञ्चिदुपादाय रूपं वर्तमानमतीतानि महाभूतान्युपादाय वर्तते, किञ्चिदनागतमुपादायरूपमतीतानि महाभूतान्युपादाय वर्तते ।

कि पुनस्तदुपादायरूपं यदेवं भूतमिति दर्शयन्नाह—

"क्षणादूर्ध्वमविज्ञप्तिः कामाप्तातीतभूतजा" इति । कामावचरसंवरादिग्रहणकालेऽविज्ञप्तिः सहजानि महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते । एवमन्याप्यविज्ञप्तिस्तान्येवोपादायोत्पद्यते; यस्मात् तान्यस्या आश्रयार्थेन सम्भवन्ति । यथान्येषामुपादायरूपाणां प्रत्युत्पन्नानि महाभूतान्याश्रयः, एवं तस्यातीतान्याश्रयः । प्रवृत्त्यनुवृत्तिकारणत्वात् यथाक्रममिति । अतीतानि महाभूतानि प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वात् आक्षेपकारणत्वात् आश्रयार्थेन भवन्ति । प्रत्युत्पन्नानि शरीरमहाभूतान्यनुवृत्तिकारणत्वादधिष्ठानकारणत्वात् सन्निश्रयार्थेन भवन्ति । चक्रस्येवेति विस्तरः । यथा चक्रस्य पाण्यावेधः । एवमस्याः प्रवृत्तिकारणम् । यथा भूमिप्रदेशः । एवमनुवृत्तिकारणम् ॥ ४ ॥

कालनियममुक्त्वा भूमिनियमं पृच्छति—अथ कुतस्त्यानीति विस्तरः । यावच्च चतुर्थध्यानभूमिकमिति । आरूप्येषु भूतभौतिकानामभावात् ।

१. किंचित्तु—का० । २. भवन्ति—का० ।

अनास्रवं यत्र जातः,

अनास्रवं तु कायवाक्कर्म यस्यां भूमौ जातस्तदुत्पादयति; तद्भूमिकान्युपादाय तद् वेदितव्यम् । धात्वपतितत्वाद्, अनास्रवाणां च महाभूतानामभावात्[1], तद्बलेन चोत्पत्तेः । तत्र विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्त्याख्यकर्मणी वेदितव्ये ।

अविज्ञप्तिरनुपात्तिका ॥ ५ ॥

नैःष्यन्दिकी च सत्त्वाख्या,

किञ्च—

निष्यन्दोपात्तभूतजा ।

नैःष्यन्दिकान्येव भूतान्युपादाय चित्तचैत्तानि चोपादायाविज्ञप्तिर्भवति ।

असमाहितभूमिकाया एष प्रकारः ॥

समाधिजौपचयिकानुपात्ताभिन्नभूतजा ॥ ६ ॥

ध्यानानास्रवसंवरा विज्ञप्तिः समाधिजा । सा समाधिसम्भूतान्यौपचयि-

धात्वपतितत्वादिति । अनास्रवस्य कायवाक्कर्मणोः धात्वप्रतिसंयुक्तत्वात् । नास्ति नियमत इत्यभिप्रायः । अनास्रवाणि तर्हि महाभूतान्युपादाय कस्मान्न भवति ? इत्यत आह—अनास्रवाणाञ्च महाभूतानामभावादिति । किं पुनरस्या महाभूतैः कार्यम् ? इत्यत आह—तद्बलेन चोत्पत्तेरिति । महाभूतबलेन चोत्पत्तेरित्यर्थः । अथ चित्तबलेनैव तदुत्पत्तिः कस्मान्न भवति ? अनुपादायरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

"अविज्ञप्तिरनुपात्तिका" इति । अमूर्तत्वाच्चित्तचैत्ताधिष्ठानभावायोगात् ॥५॥

"नैष्यन्दिकी च" इति । कुशलाकुशलत्वात् । न विपाकजा; "नाव्याकृताख्यविज्ञप्तिः" (अभि० ४.७) इति वचनात् । विपाकजस्य चाव्याकृतत्वात् "विपाकोऽव्याकृतो धर्मः" (अभि० को० २.५७) इति वचनात् । नोपचयिकी उपचयाभावात् । पारिशेष्यान्नैष्यन्दिकी ।

"सत्त्वाख्या" सत्त्वसन्तानपतितत्वात् ।

"निष्यन्दोपात्तभूतजा" इति । नैष्यन्दिकोपात्तमहाभूतजा; समुत्थापकचित्तापेक्षत्वात्, असमाहितचित्तविज्ञप्त्यधिकाराच्च । न स्वप्नसमाध्यादौपचयिकमहाभूतजा । अत एव च न विपाकजमहाभूतजा ।

"समाधिजा" इति विस्तरः । सास्रवानास्रवमाधिजत्वात् । ध्यानानास्-

१. भूतानाम०—का० ।

कानि, अनुपात्तानि च महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते । अभिन्नानि च, यान्येव च भूतान्युपादाय प्राणातिपाताद् विरतिरुत्पद्यते तान्येव यावत् सम्भिन्नप्रलापात् । किं कारणम् ? चित्तवद् भूताभेदात् ।

प्रातिमोक्षसंवरे त्वन्यान्यानि महाभूतान्युपादाय सप्तविज्ञप्तयो भवन्ति । विज्ञप्तिस्तु नैःष्यन्दिकी । उपात्ता तु कायिकी ।

किं पुनरियं विज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यमाना पूर्वकस्य संस्थानस्य सन्तानं बाधित्वोत्पद्यते ? उताहो न ?

किञ्चातः यदि बाधित्वोत्पद्यते ? न; विपाकरूपस्योच्छिन्नस्य पुनः प्रबन्धादवैभाषिकीयं प्राप्नोति ।

अथाबाधित्वा ? कथमेकस्मिन् भूतसङ्घाते संस्थानद्वयं सिध्यति । अन्यान्येव तानि नैःष्यन्दिकानि तदानीमुपजायन्ते यान्युपादाय विज्ञप्तिर्भवति ?

वज्रसंवराविज्ञप्तिः समाधिजेत्युच्यते । *अनुपात्तानि च महाभूतान्युपादायेति* । समाहितचित्तवशेन तत्र शरीरे चित्तानुवृत्तित्वात् । उपात्तानि हि महाभूतानि निरोधसमापत्त्याद्यवस्थासु चित्तमन्तरेणापि वर्तन्ते । *यावत्सम्भिन्नप्रलापादिति* । यावच्छब्देन अदत्तादानात् काममिथ्याचारान्मृषावादात् पैशुन्यात् पारुष्यात् सम्भिन्नप्रलापादिति । *चित्तवद् भूताभेदात्* । यथा तदुत्पादकं चित्तमभिन्नम्, एवं भूतान्यपि तदुत्पादकान्यभिन्नान्येव । न चाधारार्थेनाविज्ञप्तेर्महाभूतान्याश्रयः, किं तर्हि ? तत्प्रवर्तनार्थेन । तस्मादभिन्नभूतजेति वचनं न विरुध्यते ।

प्रातिमोक्षसंवरे त्वन्यान्यानीति । अचित्तानुपरिवर्त्तनीयत्वात् । *विज्ञप्तिस्तु नैष्यन्दिकीति* । आक्षेपवशेनानुवृत्तेः । *उपात्ता तु कायिकीति* । न वाचिकीत्यर्थः । कायिकी हि कायमहाभूताविनिर्भागवर्तित्वात् तदाश्रयभूतानामुपात्ता । न तु वाचिकी; तद्विनिर्भागवर्तित्वात् ।

अत्र चोदयति—शास्त्रविरुद्धमेतद् । एवं ह्याह–"यानीमान्युपासकस्य पञ्च शिक्षापदानि, एषां कत्युपात्तानि ? कत्यनुपात्तानि ? आह—सर्वाण्यनुपात्तानि" इति ? अविज्ञप्तिलक्षणशिक्षापदमभिसन्धिवचनाद् बाहुलिकत्वाद्वा तथानिर्देशस्येत्यदोषः ।

पुनः प्रबन्धादवैभाषिकीयमिति । एकसंस्थानोत्पत्तावितरसंस्थानानिवृत्तेः । *कथं विस्तरेण यावत् संस्थानद्वयं सिध्यतीति* । अन्योन्यावकाशादानात् ।

एवं तर्हि यथदेवाङ्गं निश्चित्योत्पद्यते विज्ञप्तिः, तेन तेनाङ्गेन महीयसा भवितव्यम्; तन्महाभूतैरभिव्यापनात् । अनभिव्यापने च पुनः कथं कृत्स्नेनाङ्गेन[1] विज्ञपयेत् । शुषिरत्वात् कायस्यास्ति तेषामवकाशः ॥ ६ ॥

तत् खल्वेतत् कर्म पर्यायेण द्विविधम्, त्रिविधम्, पञ्चविधं चोक्तम् । चेतना, चेतयित्वा चेति । चेतयित्वा पुनर्द्विधा—काय-वाक्कर्म, चेतना च । कायकर्म पुनः द्विविधम्—विज्ञप्त्याख्यम्, अविज्ञप्त्याख्यं च । एवं वाक्कर्म, चेतना चेति पञ्चविधं भवति । तत्र पुनरविज्ञप्तिर्द्विधा—कुशला, अकुशला च ।

नाव्याकृतास्त्यविज्ञप्तिः,

किं कारणम् ? अव्याकृतं हि चित्तं दुर्बलम्, अतो न शक्तं बलवत् कर्माक्षेप्तुम्, यन्निरुद्धेऽपि तस्मिन्ननुबध्नीयात् ।

त्रिधाऽन्यत्,

अन्यत् कर्म त्रिविधम्—कुशलाकुशलाव्याकृतम् । किं तदन्यत् ? विज्ञप्तिः, चेतना च ।

अशुभं पुनः ।

तन्महाभूतैरभिव्यापनादिति । विज्ञप्त्याश्रयैर्महाभूतैरङ्गस्याभिव्यापनात् । *अनभिव्यापने च पुनर्विज्ञप्तिमहाभूतैः कथं कृत्स्नेनाङ्गेन विज्ञापयेत्* । न हि शक्यते वक्तुम्—कायैकदेशेनासौ विज्ञापयति न सर्वकायेनेति । विज्ञप्त्याश्रयाणि महाभूतानि तदङ्गं न व्याप्यावतिष्ठन्त इति । *शुषिरत्वात् कायस्यास्ति तेषामवकाश इति* । अभिव्यापनेऽपि न महीयसाङ्गेन भवितव्यम्; शुषिरत्वेन कायानुप्रवेशात् । पीनेन तर्हि गुरुणा वा तेनाङ्गेन न भवितव्यम्; सूक्ष्मत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥

द्विविधं त्रिविधं पञ्चविधं चोक्तमिति । "चेतना तत्कृतं च तत्" (अभि० को० ४.१) इति वचनाद् द्विविधमुक्तम् । "चेतना मानसं कर्म तज्जे वाक्कायकर्मणी" (अभि० को० ४.२) इति वचनात् त्रिविधमुक्तम् । "ते तु विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती" (अभि० को० ४.३) इति कायवाक्कर्मणोर्विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्तित्वे भेदाद् चेतनात्मनः कर्मणश्च पञ्चसत्त्वात् पञ्चविधमुक्तम् ।

"*नाव्याकृतास्त्यविज्ञप्तिः*" इति । कुशलाकुशलैवाविज्ञप्तिरित्यर्थादुक्तं भवति । *बलवत्कर्मेति* । अविज्ञप्तिलक्षणम् ।

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१. कृत्स्नाङ्गेन—का० ।

कामे,

अकुशलं वस्तु कर्म कामधातौ वेदितव्यम्, नान्यत्र; अकुशलमूलानां प्रहीणत्वात्, आह्रीक्यानपत्राप्ययोश्च। कुशलाव्याकृतं तु सर्वत्राप्रतिषेधात्। तत्र—

रूपेऽप्यविज्ञप्तिः,

कामेऽपीति; अपिशब्दात्। आरूप्येषु नास्ति; भूताभावात्। यत्र हि कायवाचोः प्रवृत्तिस्तत्र कायवाक्संवरौ।

इह तर्हि समापन्नस्य स्यादनास्रवाविज्ञप्तिवत्? न; तस्या धात्वपतितत्वात्। आरूप्यावचरी त्वविज्ञप्तिर्नार्हति कामरूपावचराणि[1] विसभागानि महाभूतान्युपादाय[2] भवितुम्।

सर्वरूपवैमुख्याच्चारूप्यसमापत्तिर्नालं[3] रूपोत्पत्तये; विभूतरूपसंज्ञत्वात्। दौःशील्यप्रतिपक्षेण शीलम्। तच्च दौःशील्यं कामावचरम्। आरूप्याश्च

कामेऽपीति अपिशब्दादिति। च-शब्दार्थेनापिशब्देन काम इत्याकृष्यते। *अनास्रवाविज्ञप्तिवदिति।* यथा न च तावदनास्रवाया अविज्ञप्तेरनास्रवाणि महाभूतानि; अथ च पुनर्यस्यां भूमौ जातस्तामुत्पादयति, तद्भूमिकानि महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते। एवं न च तावदारूप्याणि महाभूतानि स्युः।

अथ च पुनर्यस्यां भूमौ जातस्तामुत्पादयति, तद्भूमिकानि महाभूतान्युपादायारूप्यावचर्याविज्ञप्तिर्भविष्यतीति? *न; तस्या धात्वपतितत्वादिति।* नेह; असाम्यात्। यस्मादविज्ञप्तिरनास्रवा धात्वपतिता कामरूपारूप्यावचरीति तृष्णाभिरस्वीकृतत्वात् तस्या धातुतो भूमितो वा नैव सभागानि, नापि विसभागानि महाभूतानि भवन्तीति, अतो यत्र जातस्तत्रजानि महाभूतान्युपादायोत्पद्यते। *आरूप्यावचरी त्वविज्ञप्तिर्नार्हति कामरूपावचराणि विसभागानि महाभूतान्युपादाय भवितुम्।* धातुपतितत्वादित्यभिप्रायः।

किञ्च—सर्वरूपवैमुख्याच्चारूप्यसमापत्तिर्नालं रूपोत्पत्तये। रूपभूमिका त्वनास्रवा समापत्तिरलं रूपोत्पत्तये, अविज्ञप्त्युत्पत्तये इत्यर्थः। कस्मात्? सर्वरूपवैमुख्यादित्यभिप्रायः। कथं चारूप्यसमापत्तेः सर्वरूपवैमुख्यमिति? अतो ब्रवीति—*विभूतरूपसंज्ञत्वादिति।* विगतरूपसंज्ञत्वादित्यर्थः।

दौःशील्यप्रतिपक्षेण शीलमिति विस्तरः। दौःशील्यं कामावचरम्; अकुशल-

१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति। २. भूतान्युपा०—का०। ३. ०समापत्तु०—का०।

कामधातोराश्रयाकारालम्बनप्रतिपक्षदूरताभिर्दूरे। अत एव विज्ञप्तिर्नास्तीति वैभाषिकाः।

विज्ञप्तिः सविचारयोः ॥ ७ ॥

विज्ञप्तिस्तु सविचारयोरेव भूम्योः। कामधातौ प्रथमे च ध्याने न तत ऊर्ध्वम् ॥ ७ ॥

कामेऽपि निवृता नास्ति,

निवृता तु विज्ञप्तिः कामधातावपि नास्ति। ब्रह्मलोक एवास्ति। महाब्रह्मणो हि शाठ्यसमुत्थितं कायकर्म श्रूयते। स हि स्वपर्षन्मध्ये आयुष्मतोऽश्वजितः क्षेपार्थमात्मानं क्षिपवान्।

तत ऊर्ध्वमसत्यां वाग्विज्ञप्तौ कथं तत्र शब्दायतनं बाह्यमहाभूतहेतुकम्।

समुत्थानत्वात्। तस्य रूपभूमिकं शीलमविज्ञप्तिलक्षणं प्रतिपक्ष इति युज्यते। आरूप्यावचरमप्येवं भविष्यतीति चेत्? अत आह—*आरूप्याश्च कामधातोरिति विस्तरः।* *आरूप्याः कामधातोश्चतसृभिर्दूरताभिर्दूरे।* दूरत्वाच्चारूप्यसंगृहीतं शीलं कामधातुप्रतिपक्षे न कल्पते। चतस्रश्च दूरता व्याख्याताः पुरस्तादिति[1] न पुनर्व्याख्यायन्ते। प्रतिपक्षदूरता चात्रोदाहरणम्।

"विज्ञप्तिः सविचारयोः" इति। सविचारयोरेव भूम्योरिति। अवधारणार्थ आरम्भः। "वितर्क्य विचार्य वाचं भाषते" इति वितर्कविचारपूर्वकत्वात् कायवाक्कर्मणोः ॥ ७ ॥

"कामेऽपि निवृता नास्ति" इति। न केवलमविचारासु भूमिष्विति दर्शयति। ब्रह्मलोक एवास्तीत्युक्तं भवति।

तत ऊर्ध्वमिति। ब्रह्मलोकादूर्ध्वम्। *बाह्यमहाभूतहेतुकमिति।* वाय्वप्रभृतीनां शब्दायतनम्। विज्ञप्तिशब्दप्रतिषेधपरमेतद्वचनम्। न तु बाह्यमहाभूतहेतुकमिति। पाण्याद्यक्षशब्दोऽपि हि द्वितीयादिषु ध्यानेषु सम्भवति। अन्यथा हि शास्त्रविरोधः स्यात्। तथा हि शास्त्र उक्तम्—"शब्दधातुना कः समन्वागतः? आह—कामरूपावचरः। कोऽसमन्वागतः? आह—आरूप्यावचरः" ( ) इति। न हि बाह्येन सत्त्वसंख्यातेन समन्वागतो युज्यते; "प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिस्वसन्तानपतितानाम्" (अभि० को० २.३६) इति वचनात्।

१. द्र०—अभि० को० स्फु० २.६७; पृ० १५८।

अन्ये पुनराहुः—द्वितीयादिष्वपि ध्यानेषु विज्ञप्तिरस्त्यनिवृताव्याकृता । न तु[1] कुशला, न क्लिष्टा । किं कारणम् ? न हि तेषूपपन्नस्तथाजातीयमधोभूमिकं[2] चित्तं सम्मुखीकरोति, येन तां विज्ञप्तिं समुत्थापयेत्; न्यूनत्वात्, प्रहीणत्वाच्च ।

पूर्वमेव तु वर्णयन्ति ।

किं पुनः कारणमूर्ध्वं ब्रह्मलोकान्नास्ति विज्ञप्तिः, कामधातौ च निवृताव्याकृता नास्ति ?

समुत्थानमसद्यतः ।

सवितर्कविचारेण हि चित्तेन विज्ञप्तिः समुत्थाप्यते । तच्च द्वितीयादिषु ध्यानेषु नास्ति, भावनाप्रहातव्येन चोत्थाप्यते; दर्शनप्रहातव्यस्यान्तर्मुखप्रवृत्तत्वात् ।

अस्यैव च दोषपरिहारार्थमन्ये पुनराहुरिति । द्वितीयादिष्वपि ध्यानेषु विज्ञप्तिरस्तीति । किम्भूमिका ? प्रथमध्यानभूमिका । वैभाषिकपक्ष एवायम्, न पक्षान्तरम्;

"कायाक्षिश्रोत्रविज्ञानं विज्ञप्त्युत्थापकं च यत् ।
द्वितीयादौ तदा ब्यात्तमक्लिष्टाव्याकृतं च तत्" ॥

इति सिद्धान्तात् । एवं तर्हि द्वितीयादिध्यानभूमिका भवति पक्षान्तरम् । सा तु किं व्याकृता, उताव्याकृता ? इत्याह—*अनिवृताव्याकृता । न तु कुशला न क्लिष्टेति* । परस्परसम्भाषणादि कुर्वतां ततस्त्यानामव्याकृता विज्ञप्तिर्भवति । *किं कारणं न कुशला न क्लिष्टाऽस्ति ?* इत्याह—*न हि तेषूपपन्न* इति विस्तरः । न हि द्वितीयादिषु ध्यानेषूपपन्नः *तथाजातीयं* कुशलक्लिष्टजातीयमधोभूमिकं *चित्तं सम्मुखीकरोति । येन* चित्तेन कुशलां क्लिष्टां वा *विज्ञप्तिं समुत्थापयेत् । किं कारणम् ?* इति आह—*न्यूनत्वात् प्रहीणत्वाच्चेति* । कुशलमधोभूमिकं न्यूनत्वात् न सम्मुखीकरोति । प्रहीणत्वाच्चेति न क्लिष्टम् । अर्थादेतदुक्तं भवति—अव्याकृतमधोभूमिकं चित्तं सम्मुखीकरोति, तेन तां समुत्थापयतीति । एतदुक्तं भवति—अधोभूमिकेन चित्तेनोर्ध्वभूमिका विज्ञप्तिरुत्थाप्यत इति । तदेवं नेच्छन्ति *वैभाषिकाः* । प्रथमध्यानिकैव हि सा विज्ञप्तिः; प्रथमध्यानभूमिकचित्तसमुत्थापितत्वात् । तस्मादाह—*पूर्वमेव तु वर्णयन्तीति* ।

तच्च कामधाताविति । तच्च भावनाप्रहातव्यं *निवृताव्याकृतं* चित्तं कामधातौ *नास्ति* । सत्कायान्तग्राहदृष्टिसम्प्रयुक्तमेव हि कामधातौ निवृताव्याकृतं चित्तमिष्यते । तेन च न विज्ञप्तिः समुत्थाप्यते । *अन्तर्मुखप्रवृत्तत्वात्* ।

१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति । २. ०सत्तज्जातीय०—का० ।

तच्च कामधातौ निवृताव्याकृतं नास्ति ।

किं खलु समुत्थानवशादेव धर्माणां कुशलाकुशलत्वं वेदितव्यम् ? नेत्याह । किं तर्हि ? चतुर्भिः प्रकारैः—परमार्थतः, स्वभावतः, सम्प्रयोगतः, समुत्थानतश्च ।

तत्र तावत्—

परमार्थशुभो मोक्षः,

निर्वाणं हि सर्वदुःखव्युपशमः । ततः परमक्षेमत्वात् परमार्थेन कुशलम्, आरोग्यवत् ।

स्वतो मूलह्रीत्रपाः ॥ ८ ॥

त्रीणि कुशलमूलानि ह्रीरपत्राप्यं च स्वभावेन कुशलानि; अन्यसम्प्रयोगसमुत्थानानपेक्षत्वात्, पथ्यौषधवत् ॥ ८ ॥

सम्प्रयोगेण तद्युक्ताः,

तैरेव कुशलमूलह्र्यपत्राप्यैः सम्प्रयुक्ता धर्माः सम्प्रयोगेण कुशलाः; तैरसम्प्रयुक्तानां कुशलत्वाभावाद्, औषधमिश्रपानीयवत् ।

समुत्थानात् क्रियादयः ।

कायवाक्कर्मणी चित्तविप्रयुक्ताश्च संस्कारजात्यादयः प्राप्तिनिरोधासंज्ञिसमापत्तयस्तैरेव कुशलमूलादिसम्प्रयुक्तैर्धर्मैः समुपस्थापिताः समुत्थानेन कुशलाः, औषधिपानीयसम्भूतक्षीरवत्[1] ।

प्राप्तीनां तु विसभागचित्तसमुत्थापितानां कथं कुशलत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् ।

स्वभावत इति । आत्मतः । *परमक्षेमत्वादिति* । अक्षेमक्लेशानुबन्धाभावात् । यद्धि स्वभावसम्प्रयोगसमुत्थानतः कुशलम्, न तत् परमक्षेममित्युक्तं भवति ॥८॥

असम्प्रयुक्तानां कुशलत्वाभावादिति । कुशलमूलादिभिरसम्प्रयुक्तानां चेतादीनां कुशलत्वाभावात् तत्सम्प्रयोगकुशलत्वसिद्धिः ।

तैरेव कुशलमूलादिसम्प्रयुक्तैरिति । आदिशब्देन ह्र्यपत्राप्ययोर्ग्रहणम् । *औषधिपानीयसम्भूतक्षीरवदिति* । पीतौषधपानीयाया गोर्यत् क्षीरं तदौषधपानीयसंभूतम् ।

प्राप्तीनां त्विति विस्तरः । *प्राप्तीनां* कुशलानां *विसभागचित्तसमुत्थापितानाम्* । विसभागं चित्तं कुशलादन्यत् । विचिकित्सया कुशलमूलप्रतिसन्धाने याः

१. औषधपानीयसम्भूतधात्रीक्षीरवत्—का० ।

तद्यथा—विचिकित्सया कुशलमूलप्रतिसन्धानम्, धातुप्रत्यागमपरिहाणिभ्यां च ।

यथा च कुशलमुक्तम्, ततो

विपर्ययेणाकुशलम्,

कथं कृत्वा ? संसारः परमार्थेनाकुशलः; सर्वदुःखप्रवृत्त्यात्मकत्वेन परमाक्षेमत्वात् । अकुशलमूलाह्रीक्यानपत्राप्याणि स्वभावतः । तत्सम्प्रयुक्ता धर्माः सम्प्रयोगतः । तत्समुत्थापिताः कायवाक्कर्मजात्यादिप्राप्तयः समुत्थानतः व्याध्यपथ्योपपादिभिरुपमेयाः ।

एवं तर्हि न किञ्चित् सास्रवमव्याकृतं भविष्यति, कुशलं वा; संसाराभ्यन्तरत्वात् ? परमार्थत एवमुक्तम्, विपाकं तु प्रति यत् सास्रवं न व्याक्रियते तदव्याकृतमित्युच्यते ।

कुशलानां प्राप्तयः, तासां कुशलत्वम् । न तावत् परिनिर्वाणवत्; परमार्थक्षेमत्वात् । नाप्यलोभादिवत् स्वभावतः कुशलम्; अतत्स्वभावत्वात् । नापि वेदनादिवत्; संप्रयोगतो विप्रयुक्तत्वात् । नापि समुत्थानतः; तत्समुत्थानचित्तस्य विलष्टत्वात् । एवं पुनर्भवप्रतिसन्धावपि उपपत्तिप्रतिलम्भिककुशलप्राप्तयो वक्तव्याः । कथं तासां कुशलत्वमिति वक्तव्यमेतत् । कर्तव्योऽत्र यत्न इत्यभिप्रायः । अत्र परिहरन्ति—कुशलमूलसमुत्थापनीयत्वादनागतावस्थायामेव ताः कुशलमूला भवन्ति । विलष्टेन चित्तेन तत्प्राप्तिविबन्धोऽपनीयते । न तत् कुशलत्वमापद्यत इति ।

सर्वदुःखप्रवृत्त्यात्मकत्वेनेति । सर्वस्य दुःखस्य प्रवृत्तिरात्मा स्वभावोऽस्येति सर्वदुःखप्रवृत्त्यात्मकः, तद्भावेन । *परमार्थेनाक्षेमः संसारः । कायवाक्कर्मजात्यादिप्राप्तय इति* । कायवाक्कर्माणि विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्तिस्वभावान्यसंवर-नैवसंवरनासंवरसंगृहीतानि । जात्यादयो जातिजरास्थित्यनित्यतालक्षणालक्षणस्वभावाः । प्राप्तयोऽकुशलानाम् । *व्याध्यपथ्योपपादिभिरुपमेया* इति । संसारो व्याधिनोपमेयः । व्याधिसंसार इत्यर्थः । लोभादीन्यपथ्योपधेनोपमेयानि; अन्यसम्प्रयोगसमुत्थानापेक्षत्वात् । तत्सम्प्रयुक्ता अपथ्योपधिमिश्रपानीयेन । कायवाक्कर्मजात्यादिप्राप्तयोऽपथ्योपधपानीयसम्भूतक्षीरेणोपमेयाः ।

एवं तर्हीति विस्तरः । यदि परमार्थेनाकुशलः संसारः । न *किञ्चित् सास्रवमव्याकृतं भविष्यति, कुशलं वा; संसाराभ्यन्तरत्वात्* सास्रवस्य । *परमार्थत एवमुक्तमिति* । अभ्युपगतमेतत्—सर्वं संसारपर्यापन्नमकुशलमिति । *विपाकं तु प्रतीति* विस्तरः । *यद्विपाकं प्रति न व्याक्रियते* । सविपाकमेतदिति । तदव्याकृत-

इष्टविपाकत्वात्[1] कुशलमित्युच्यते ।

यदि तु परमार्थेनाव्याकृतं मृग्यते, तत्—

परमाव्याकृते ध्रुवे ॥ ९ ॥

द्वे असंस्कृते निष्पर्यायेणानिवृताव्याकृते—आकाशम्, अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधश्च ।

इदं विचार्यते—यदि समुत्थानवशात् कुशलाकुशलत्वं कायवाक्कर्मणः, किं न महाभूतानाम् ? कर्मणि हि कर्तुरभिप्रायः, न महाभूतेषु ।

समाहितस्याविज्ञप्तौ नास्त्यभिप्रायः । न चासमाहितं चित्तं तस्याः समुत्थापकं विसभागभूमिकत्वादिति कथं तस्याः कुशलत्वम् ।

दिव्ययोरपि वा चक्षुःश्रोत्रयोः कुशलत्वप्रसङ्गः ? कर्तव्योऽत्र यत्नः ।

मित्युच्यते । तदुक्तं भवति—यत् सास्रवं तदकुशलम्; परमाक्षेमत्वात् । विपाकं प्रत्यव्याकरणार्थादव्याकृतमिति । कुशलमपि । तथैवाकुशलम् । *इष्टविपाकत्वात् कुशलमित्यवगन्तव्यम्* ।

यदि समुत्थानवशादिति विस्तरः । चेतनाया एव कुशलाकुशलत्वमित्यनेनाभिप्रायेण । *कायवाक्कर्मणः कुशलाकुशलत्वं* विचारयति । *किं न महाभूतानामिति* । कुशलाकुशलत्वम् । कुशलाकुशलेन हि चित्तेन कायवाक्कर्म-तन्महाभूतानि समुत्थाप्यते । वैभाषिक आह—*कर्मणि हि कर्तुरभिप्रायो न महाभूतेषु* । न 'महाभूतानि कुर्याम्' इति । किं तर्हि ? 'इदं कर्म कुर्याम्' इति । न कर्मवन्महाभूतानां कुशलाकुशलत्वमिति ।

आचार्य आह—*समाहितस्य कर्तुरविज्ञप्तौ नास्त्यभिप्रायः* । अविज्ञप्तिं कुर्यामिति । *न चासमाहितं चित्तं तस्याः समुत्थापकमस्ति* । यदेवमभिप्रायं कुर्यात् । *विसभागत्वाद्* विसदृशत्वाद् भूमितोऽसमाधानाद्वा । *कथं तस्याः* समाहितायाः अविज्ञप्तेः *कुशलत्वम्* । महाभूतवत् तस्याः कुशलत्वं न स्यादित्यभिप्रायः ।

दिव्ययोरपि वा चक्षुःश्रोत्रयोः कुशलत्वप्रसङ्ग इति । यद्यन्तरेणापि तदभिप्रायमविज्ञप्तेः कुशलमिति । अथ वा अयमस्याभिसम्बन्धः—यदि विसभागासमाहितचित्तवशेन तस्याः कुशलत्वम्, दिव्ययोरपि चक्षुःश्रोत्रयोः कुशलत्वप्रसङ्गः, प्रयोगकाले तदभिप्रायसम्भवात् । न च तयोः कुशलमस्ति, "अव्याकृते श्रोत्रचक्षुरभिज्ञे" (अभि० ७.४५) इति वचनात् ।

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१. ०विपाकं च—का० ।

यदुक्तम्—"दर्शनप्रहातव्यं चित्तं विज्ञप्तेरसमुत्थापकम्" इति। किं तर्हि भगवतोक्तम्—"ततोऽपि मिथ्यादृष्टेर्मिथ्यासङ्कल्पः प्रभवति मिथ्यावाग् मिथ्याकर्मान्तः[1]" इत्येवमादि। अविरुद्धमेतत् ॥ ९ ॥

समुत्थानं द्विधा हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञितम्।

द्विविधं समुत्थानम्—हेतुसमुत्थानम्, तत्क्षणसमुत्थानं च। तत्रैव क्षणे सद्भावात्[2]।

प्रवर्तकं तयोराद्यं द्वितीयमनुवर्तकम् ॥ १० ॥

हेतुसमुत्थानं प्रवर्तकम्; आक्षेपकत्वात्। तत्क्षणसमुत्थानमनुवर्तकम्; क्रियाकालानुवर्तनात्।

किमिदानीं तस्य तस्यां क्रियायां सामर्थ्यम्? तेन हि विनासौ मृतस्येव न स्यादाक्षिप्तापि सती।

यदुक्तं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं चित्तं विज्ञप्तेरसमुत्थापकमिति। दर्शनप्रहातव्यस्यान्तर्मुखप्रवृत्तत्वादित्येवं ब्रुवतां *किं तर्हि भगवतोक्तमिति* विरुध्यते। तद् भगवतोक्तमिति वाक्यार्थः। किं तद्? इत्युच्यते—*ततो मिथ्यादृष्टेरिति* विस्तरः। कथं *मिथ्यादृष्टेर्दर्शनप्रहातव्यायाः मिथ्यावाक्* विज्ञप्तिस्वभावा, *मिथ्याकर्मान्तश्च* तत्स्वभाव एवेत्युक्तमिति ॥ ९ ॥

"*हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञितम्*" इति। हेतूत्थानं च तत्क्षणोत्थानं च हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानम्, हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानमिति संज्ञितं हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञितम्। संज्ञितमिति संज्ञीकृतम्। अथवा—हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानं संज्ञास्येति हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञम्, हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञीकृतं हेतुतत्क्षणोत्थानसंज्ञितम्।

हेतुसमुत्थानमिति। समुत्तिष्ठतेऽनेनेति समुत्थानम्, हेतुश्च समुत्थानञ्च तत् हेतुसमुत्थानम्। *तत्क्षणसमुत्थानमिति*। स क्षणः क्रियाक्षणः, तत्क्षणे समुत्थानं तत्क्षणसमुत्थानम्। *तत्रैव क्षणे सद्भावात्*। सद्भावात्। तत्रैव क्रियाक्षणे तत्क्षणसमुत्थानस्य भावादित्यर्थः। *आक्षेपकत्वादिति*। उत्पादकत्वात्।

किमिदानीमिति विस्तरः। *तस्य* तत्क्षणसमुत्थानस्य *तस्यां* विज्ञपनक्रियायां *सामर्थ्यम्*। येन तदानीं तदनुवर्तकमित्युच्यते। *तेन हीति* विस्तरः। *तेन हि* तत्क्षणसमुत्थानेन *विना असौ* विज्ञप्तिर्*मृतस्येव न स्यादाक्षिप्ता सती*। हेतुसमुत्थानेन जनितापि सती। तद्यथा—कश्चिद् 'ग्रामं गमिष्यामि' इत्याक्षिप्तक्रियान्तरा म्रियेत, तस्यानुवर्तकचित्ताभावाद् गमनं न भवति, तद्वत्।

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१. मिथ्याकर्मान्तिम्—का०। २. तद्भावात्—का०।

अचित्तकस्य तर्हि संवरोत्पत्ती कथं भवति? स्फुटतरा तर्हि सचित्तकस्य भवतीति, एतत् तस्य[1] सामर्थ्यम् ॥ १० ॥

तत्र च—

प्रवर्तकं दृष्टिहेयं विज्ञानम्,

दर्शनप्रहातव्यं चित्तं विज्ञप्तेः प्रवर्तकम्; तत्समुत्थापकयोर्वितर्कविचारयोर्निदानभूतत्वात्। न त्वनुवर्तकम्; बहिर्मुखचित्तस्य क्रियाकाले तदभावात्। तत्समुत्थापितं च रूपं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं स्यात्।

किं स्यात्? अभिधर्मो बाधितः स्यात्।

विद्याविद्याभ्यां चाविरोधान्नास्ति रूपं दर्शनप्रहातव्यम्।

अचित्तकस्य तर्हीति विस्तरः। यदि तत्क्षणसमुत्थानेन विनाऽसौ मृतस्येव न स्यात्। निरोधसमापत्तिलाभिनः कस्यचिदुपसम्पाद्यमानस्य कायविज्ञप्तिमाबध्नतः तत्कालोपस्थितनिरोधसमापत्तित्वादचित्तकस्य *संवरोत्पत्ती* कर्मवासनावसानकालीनायां तत्संवरान्तर्गता कायविज्ञप्तिः *कथं भवति*। कथमुत्पद्यते तत्क्षणसमुत्थानं विनेत्यर्थः। एवं विरोधिते समाध्यन्तरं श्रीयते—*स्फुटतरा तर्हीति*। तत्क्षणसमुत्थानेन *सचित्तकस्य व्यक्ततरा* विज्ञप्तिर्*भवतीत्येतत् तस्य सामर्थ्यम्* ॥ १० ॥

प्रवर्तकं दृष्टिहेयमिति। प्रवर्तकमेव दृष्टिहेयमित्यवधार्यते। कथं पुनस्तत् प्रवर्तकम्? इत्याह—*तत्समुत्थापकयोर्वितर्कविचारयोर्निदानभूतत्वात्*। हेतुभूतत्वाद् विज्ञप्तेः प्रवर्तकमिति। *न त्वनुवर्तकमिति* विस्तरः। यत्तद् बहिर्मुखं चित्तमनुवर्तकम्, तस्य यो विज्ञप्ति*क्रियाकालः*, तस्मिन् *तदभावात्*। तस्य दर्शनप्रहातव्यस्य प्रवर्तकस्याभावादित्यर्थः। अतस्तन्नानुवर्तकम्। अयं चान्यो दोषः—*तत्समुत्थापितं च रूपमिति* विस्तरः। यदि तदनुवर्तकं स्याद्दर्शनप्रहातव्यम्, तेन दर्शनप्रहातव्येन *समुत्थापितं* कायवाग्विज्ञप्तिरूपं *दर्शनप्रहातव्यं स्यात्*। यथा भावनाप्रहातव्येन चित्तेन समुत्थापितं कायवाक्कर्म भावनाप्रहातव्यमिति।

किं स्यादिति चोदकः। *अभिधर्मो बाधितः स्यादिति* वैभाषिकः। "न दृष्टिहेयमक्लिष्टं न रूपम्" (अभि. को. १.४०) इति वचनात्।

किञ्च—*विद्याविद्याभ्यां चाविरोधात्*। विद्यया दर्शनमार्गेण सत्कायदृष्ट्यादिवत् तस्य रूपस्या*विरोधात्*। अप्रहाणादित्यर्थः। दृष्टसत्यानामपि तत्समन्वागतत्वा*न्नास्ति रूपं दर्शनप्रहातव्यम्*। *अविद्यया चाविरोधात्*। किञ्च अविद्ययापि

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१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति।

साध्य एव पक्षः ।

भूतान्यपि तर्हि दर्शनप्रहातव्यानि स्युः; समानचित्तोत्थापितत्वात् ?

नैवं भविष्यति, यथा न कुशलाकुशलानि भवन्ति । अथ वा पुनर्भवन्तु ।

नैवं शक्यम् । न हि तानि दर्शनप्रहातव्यानि युज्यन्ते, नाप्यप्रहातव्यानि ।

किं कारणम् ? अक्लिष्टस्य धर्मस्य विद्याविद्याभ्यामविरोधात् ।

रूपं न विरुध्यते । न हि क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टरूपसमुदाचारावस्थायां तत्प्राप्तिप्रवाहे वा सत्यविद्या न भवति । अविद्यायां च सत्यां सत्त्व भवति । यथा अनास्रवो मार्गोऽविद्यया विरुध्यते; पृथग्जनावस्थायां तदनुत्पादात् । तदुत्पादे वार्यावस्थायां कस्याश्चिदविद्यायाः प्रहाणात् । तदेवमनास्रववदप्रहातव्यमपि न भवति । न चेदप्रहातव्यम्, नापि दर्शनप्रहातव्यम्, पारिशेष्याद् भावनाप्रहातव्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

इतर आह—*साध्य एव पक्षः*—विद्यया रूपं न विरुध्यत इति । यो हि दर्शनप्रहातव्यं रूपमिच्छति स कथं विद्यया रूपस्याविरोधं ग्रहीष्यति ।

वैभाषिक आह—*भूतान्यपीति* विस्तरः । यदि तद्रूपं दर्शनप्रहातव्यचित्तसमुत्थापितं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं स्यात् । तदाश्रयभूतान्यपि *तर्हि दर्शनप्रहातव्यानि स्युः* । कस्मात् ? *समानचित्तोत्थापितत्वात्* । येन हि दर्शनप्रहातव्येन चित्तेन तद्रूपं समुत्थापितम्, तेनैव तदाश्रयभूतान्यपि इति । न च तानि तथा भवितुमर्हन्ति; अक्लिष्टाव्याकृतत्वात् । दर्शनप्रहातव्यानां च क्लिष्टत्वात् ।

इतर आह—*नैवं भविष्यति* । दर्शनप्रहातव्यानि स्युरिति । कथम् ? इत्याह—*यथा न कुशलाकुशलानि भवन्ति* । यथा येन चित्तेन कुशलाकुशलेन कुशलाकुशलं रूपं समुत्थापितं तेनैव तदाश्रयभूतानि समुत्थापितानि । तत्र कायवाक्कर्मस्वभावं रूपं कुशलाकुशलम्, न तदाश्रयभूतानीति, तद्वत् । स एव पुनः परावृत्याह—*अथवा पुनर्भवन्तु* दर्शनप्रहातव्यानीति ।

वैभाषिक आह—*नैवं शक्यं भवितुम्* । दर्शनप्रहातव्यानीति वाक्यशेषः । कस्मात् ? *अक्लिष्टस्य धर्मस्य विद्याविद्याभ्यामविरोधात्* । न ह्यक्लिष्टो धर्मः अनिवृताव्याकृतः कुशलसास्रवश्च विद्ययाऽनास्रवेण मार्गेण विरुध्यते । यथा क्लिष्टा धर्माः प्राप्तिच्छेदाद् विरुध्यन्ते । तदालम्बनक्लेशप्राप्तिच्छेदात्तु विरोधो न प्रतिषिध्यते । नाप्यविद्यया विरुध्यते । प्राप्तिच्छेदेन तदालम्बनक्लेशप्रहातव्येन च । भूतानि चाक्लिष्टानि । तत्र यदुक्तम्—'अथवा पुनर्भवन्तु' इति, तदयुक्तम् । तदेवमत्र साधनमुत्तिष्ठते—"न दर्शनप्रहातव्यानि क्लिष्टरूपाश्रयमहाभूतानि; अक्लिष्टत्वादक्लिष्टचित्तचैत्तधर्मवत्" इति ।

अतो हेतुसमुत्थानमधिकृत्य सूत्रे पठनान्नास्ति विरोधः ।

उभयं पुनः ।

मानसं भावनाहेयम्,

भावनाहेयं पुनर्मनोविज्ञानमुभयं भवति—प्रवर्तकं च, अनुवर्तकं च ।

पञ्चकं त्वनुवर्तकम् ॥ ११ ॥

पञ्च विज्ञानकाया अनुवर्तका एव । तदिदं चतुष्कोटिकं भवति—प्रवर्तकमेव दर्शनप्रहातव्यं चित्तम्, अनुवर्तका एव पञ्च विज्ञानकायाः, उभयं भावनाहेयं मनोविज्ञानम्, नोभयमनास्रवम् ॥ ११ ॥

किं खलु यथा प्रवर्तकं तथैवानुवर्तकं भवति ? नेदमेकान्तम्[1] ।

प्रवर्तके शुभादौ हि स्यात् त्रिधाप्यनुवर्तकम् ।

कुशले प्रवर्तके कुशलाकुशलाव्याकृतमनुवर्तकं स्यात् । एवमकुशले च, अव्याकृते च ।

तुल्यं मुनेः,

बुद्धस्य तु भगवतस्तुल्यं प्रवर्तकेनानुवर्तकम्—कुशले कुशलम्, अव्याकृते चाव्याकृतम् ।

शुभं यावत्,

कुशलं वा भवत्यनुवर्तकमव्याकृतेऽपि प्रवर्तके । न तु कदाचित् कुशलं प्रवर्तकमनुवर्तकं चाव्याकृतं भवति । अम्लायमाना[2] हि बुद्धानां देशनेति ।

तदेवं *वैभाषिकः प्रवर्तकं द्विविधं विज्ञानमिति* सचोद्यपरिहारं प्रतिष्ठाप्य निगमयति—*अतो हेतुत्थानमिति* विस्तरः । यदुक्तम्—'मिथ्यादृष्टेर्मिथ्यासंकल्पो यावन्मिथ्याकर्मान्तः' इति, तस्य सूत्रस्य न विरोधो भवतीति ।

प्रवर्तकं चानुवर्तकं चेति । अन्तर्बहिर्मुखप्रवृत्तत्वात् ।

"पञ्चकं त्वनुवर्तकम्" इति । अवधारणमविकल्पकत्वात् ।

नोभयमनास्रवमिति । न प्रवर्तकम्, नाप्यनुवर्तकम्; समाहितान्तर्मुखप्रवृत्तत्वात् ॥ ११ ॥

अम्लायमानेति । अहीयमाना । शानच्प्रत्ययान्तश्चायं शब्दः ।

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१. मायमेका०—का० ।   २. आम्नायमाना—का० ।
अभि०,को०.२ १,१५

नास्ति बुद्धानामव्याकृतं चित्तमिति निकायान्तरीयाः । कुशलैकसन्ताना[1] हि बुद्धानां सन्ततयः; नित्यं समाहितत्वात् । उक्तं हि सूत्रे--

"चरन् समाहितो नागस्तिष्ठन्नागः समाहितः ।
स्वपन् समाहितो नागो निषण्णोऽपि समाहितः" ॥ (   ) इति ।

अनिच्छयास्य चित्तस्याविसरणादेवमुक्तम्, न तु न सन्त्यव्याकृतानि विपाकजैर्यापथिकनिर्माणचित्तानि बुद्धानामिति वैभाषिकाः । मानसं भावनाहेयं प्रवर्तकं चानुवर्तकं चेत्युक्तम्, तत् कुशलाकुशलाव्याकृतं सर्वं वेदितव्यम् ।

नोभयं तु विपाकजम् ॥ १२ ॥

विपाकजं तु चित्तं नैव प्रवर्तकं नानुवर्तकम्; निरभिसंस्कारवाहित्वात् ।

किमिदानीं यथा प्रवर्तकं तथा विज्ञप्तिः, आहोस्विद् यथा अनुवर्तकम् ? किं चातः ? यथा प्रवर्तकं चेत्, इहापि निवृताव्याकृता विज्ञप्तिः प्राप्नोति; सत्कायान्तग्राहदृष्टिप्रवर्तितत्वात् ?

न वा सर्वं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं प्रवर्तकमिति विशेषणं वक्तव्यम् । यथानुवर्तकं

कुशलैकसन्ताना इति । कुशलैकप्रवन्धा इत्यर्थः । "बुद्धो भगवान् नागः" इत्युक्तं सूत्रे । कथम् ? "तथागत उदायिन् सदेवके लोके समारके" इति विस्तरेणोक्त्वाह--"आगो न करोति कायेन वाचा मनसा, तस्मान्नाग इत्युच्यते" इति । आगो न करोतीति, अपराधं न करोतीत्यर्थः ।

अनिच्छयास्येति । अनिच्छयास्य बुद्धस्य चित्तस्याविसरणाद् विषयेष्वगमनादेवमुक्तम् ।

चरन्[2] *समाहितो नाग* इति विस्तरः । चतुर्ष्वीर्यापथेषु चरन् चरामीति, यावत् निषीदन्निषीदामीति उपस्थितस्मृतित्वान्नित्यसमाहितः स उच्यते ।

निरभिसंस्कारवाहित्वादिति । अभावो हि संस्कारस्य = प्रयत्नस्य निरभिसंस्कारम्, निरभिसंस्कारं वहतीति निरभिसंस्कारवाही, तद्भावस्तस्मात् इति ।

न वा सर्वं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं प्रवर्तकमिति । स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि सर्वं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं प्रवर्तकमिष्येत, न तु सर्वम् । किं तर्हि ? मिथ्यादृष्ट्यादिकमेव प्रवर्तकं विज्ञप्तेः, न सत्कायदृष्ट्यादिकम् ? इत्यत आह—न वा सर्वमिति विशेषणं

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१. कुशलैकताना—का०; जा० ।   २. चरण—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

चेत्, अकुशलाव्याकृतचित्तस्य प्रातिमोक्षविज्ञप्तिः कुशला न प्राप्नोति ? यथा प्रवर्तकं तथा विज्ञप्तिः, न तु यथा दर्शनप्रहातव्यम्; भावनाहेयान्तरितत्वात् ।

यदि नानुवर्तकवशाद्विज्ञप्तेः कुशलादित्वम्, न तर्हीदं वक्तव्यम्—'हेतुसमुत्थानं सन्धायोक्तं सूत्रे, न तत्क्षणसमुत्थानम् । अतो नास्तीह निवृताव्याकृता विज्ञप्तिः' इति । एवं तु[1] वक्तव्यम्—'अन्यव्यवहितं हेतुसमुत्थानं सन्धायोक्तम्' इति । अवसितः प्रसङ्गः ॥ १२ ॥

सा तु पूर्वोक्ता

अविज्ञप्तिस्त्रिधा ज्ञेया संवरासंवरेतरा ।

संवरश्च, असंवरश्च, ताभ्यां चेतरो नैवसंवरो नासंवरः । दौःशील्यप्रसरस्य संवरणं संरोधः = संवरः । तत्र पुनः—

संवरः प्रातिमोक्षाख्यो ध्यानजोऽनास्रवस्तथा ॥ १३ ॥

त्रिविधः संवरः—१. प्रातिमोक्षसंवर इहत्यानां कामावचरं शीलम् । २. ध्यानसंवरो रूपावचरं शीलम् । ३. अनास्रवसंवरोऽनास्रवं शीलम् ॥ १३ ॥

वक्तव्यम्—ईदृशं प्रवर्तकमीदृशं नेति । *अकुशलाव्याकृतचित्तस्येति* । उपसम्पाद्यमानस्य केनचिद् योगेनाकुशलाव्याकृतचित्तस्य । प्रातिमोक्षसंवरविज्ञप्तिरज्ञल्यादिका *कुशला न प्राप्नोति* । तदनुवर्तकचित्तमकुशलाव्याकृतमिति कृत्वा । *यथा प्रवर्तकमिति* विस्तरः । यथा प्रवर्तकं चित्तं भावनाप्रहातव्यम् । *तथा विज्ञप्तिर्व्यवस्थाप्यते* । *न तु यथा दर्शनप्रहातव्यं* प्रवर्तकं तथा व्यवस्थाप्यते । कस्मात् ? *भावनाहेयेनान्तरितत्वात्* । तस्मात् तत्प्रवर्तकं दर्शनप्रहातव्यं भावनाहेयेन प्रवर्तकेनान्तरितम् । कथं कृत्वा ? तद्यथा—'अस्त्यात्मेति मया परेषां गमयितव्यम्' इति पूर्वमेनावधार्य ततो वाक्समुत्थापकेन चित्तेन बहिर्मुखप्रवृत्तेन भावनाप्रहातव्येन सवितर्केण सविचारेण वाचं भाषते 'अस्त्यात्मा' इत्येवमादि । अतो *यथाप्रवर्तकमिति* विस्तरः । तदेवमवश्यं दर्शनप्रहातव्यस्य प्रवर्तकस्यानन्तरं प्रवर्तकमेव भावनाप्रहातव्यं कुशलमकुशलमव्याकृतं चोत्पद्यते, तद्वशाच्च विज्ञप्तेः कुशलादित्वमिति ।

एवं तु वक्तव्यमिति विस्तरः । एवं तु वक्तव्य*मन्याव्यवहितं* भावनाहेयव्यवहितं *हेतुसमुत्थानं सन्धायोक्तमिति* । परम्पराहेतुसमुत्थानं सन्धायेत्यर्थः ॥ १२ ॥

"अविज्ञप्तिस्त्रिधा" इति विस्तरः । त्रिविधेत्युद्दिश्य *"संवरासंवरेतरा"* इति ।

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१. का० पुस्तके नास्ति ।

तत्र पुनः—

अष्टधा प्रातिमोक्षाख्यः,

१. भिक्षुसंवरः, २. भिक्षुणीसंवरः, ३. शिक्षमाणासंवरः, ४. श्रामणेरसंवरः, ५. श्रामणेरीसंवरः, ६. उपासकसंवरः, ७. उपासिकासंवरः, ८. उपवाससंवरश्च—एषोऽष्टविधसंवरः प्रातिमोक्षसंवर इत्याख्यायते ।

नामत एषोऽष्टविधः,

द्रव्यतस्तु चतुर्विधः ।

१. भिक्षुसंवरः, २. श्रामणेरसंवरः, ३. उपासकसंवरः, ४. उपवाससंवरश्च—इत्येव चतुर्विधः प्रातिमोक्षसंवरस्तु द्रव्यतः; प्रतिनियतलक्षणत्वात् । भिक्षुसंवराद् भिक्षुणीसंवरो नान्यः, श्रामणेरसंवराच्च शिक्षमाणा-श्रामणेरीसंवरौ । उपासकसंवरादुपासिकासंवरो नान्यः ।

कथं ज्ञायते ?

लिङ्गतो नामसञ्चारात्,

लिङ्गमिति व्यञ्जनस्याख्या, येन स्त्रीपुरुषौ लिङ्ग्येते । लिङ्गतो हि भिक्षुभिक्षुण्यादीनां नामसञ्चारो भवति । कथं कृत्वा ? परिवृत्ते हि व्यञ्जने भिक्षुर्भिक्षुणीत्युच्यते, भिक्षुणी च पुनर्भिक्षुः । श्रामणेरः श्रामणेरीत्युच्यते, श्रामणेरी च पुनः शिक्षमाणा च श्रामणेरः । उपासक उपासिकेत्युच्यते, उपा-

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विवृणोति—संवरश्च सः असंवरश्च सः संवरासंवरः, संवरासंवरश्च स इतरा च सा संवरासंवरेतरेति समासः ॥ १३ ॥

प्रतिनियतलक्षणत्वादिति । भिक्षुसंवरस्यान्यल्लक्षणम्, एवं यावदुपवाससंवरस्यान्यल्लक्षणम् । तथा हि वक्ष्यति—

"पञ्चाष्टदशसर्वेभ्यो वर्ज्येभ्यो विरतिग्रहात् ।
उपासकोपवासस्थश्रमणोद्देशभिक्षुता" ॥ (अभि० को० ४.१४)

इति अष्टविधत्वं तु साङ्कर्यसम्भवः । य एव हि भिक्षुसंवरः स एव भिक्षुणीसंवर इत्येवमादि ।

श्रामणेरी च पुनः शिक्षमाणा चेति । श्रामणेरी परिवृत्तव्यञ्जना श्रामणेरो भवति । शिक्षमाणा चापि परिवृत्तव्यञ्जना श्रामणेर एव भवति । किमेवं

सिका च पुनरुपासक इति । न च व्यञ्जनपरिवृत्तौ पूर्वसंवरत्यागकारणमस्ति[1], नाप्यपूर्वसंवरप्रतिलम्भे । तस्मादभिन्न एषां चतुर्णां संवराणां त्रिभ्यः स्वभावः ।

य उपासकसंवराच्छ्रामणेरसंवरं समादत्ते तस्माच्च पुनर्भिक्षुसंवरम्, किं ते संवरा विरतिवृद्धियोगादन्योन्य उच्यन्ते, पञ्च-दश-विंशतिवत्, दीनारसतेरवच्च[2] ? आहोस्वित् पृथगेव ते सकला उपजायन्ते[3] ? आह—

पृथक्,

अव्यामिश्रा एव ते पृथग्लक्षणा उपजायन्ते । त्रिषु संवरेषु तिस्रः प्राणातिपातविरतयो यावन्मद्यपानविरतयः । एवं शेषाः ।

नेष्यते, परिवृत्तव्यञ्जनो भिक्षुर्भिक्षुसंवरं च त्यजति भिक्षुणीसंवरं च प्रतिलभते ? इत्यत आह—*न च व्यञ्जनपरिवृत्ताविति* विस्तरः । न भिक्षुभिक्षुणीव्यञ्जनप्रादुर्भावे *पूर्वसंवरत्यागकारणमस्ति* ।

प्रातिमोक्षदमत्यागः शिक्षानिक्षेपणाच्च्युतेः ।
उभयव्यञ्जनोत्पत्तेर्मूलोच्छेदान्निशात्ययात् ॥ (अभि० को० ४.३८)

इत्यत्र यत् कारणमुक्तम् । *नाप्यपूर्वसंवरप्रतिलम्भे* । कारणमस्तीति वर्तते । यदुक्तम्—प्रातिमोक्षाख्यः परविज्ञानादिभिरिति । अतो विज्ञायते—न भिक्षुसंवरादन्यो भिक्षुणीसंवर इति । एवं श्रामणेरादीनामपि वक्तव्यम् । *तस्मादभिन्नोऽनन्यश्चतुर्णां* भिक्षुणीशिक्षमाणाश्रामणेर्युपासिका*संवराणां त्रिभ्यो* भिक्षुश्रामणेरोपासकसंवरेभ्यः *स्वभावः* ।

किं ते संवरा इति विस्तरः । *यथा पञ्चसंख्यायामन्यानि पञ्च प्रक्षिप्य* पञ्चवृद्धियोगाद् *दश भवन्ति* । पञ्चदशसंख्यायां चान्यानि पञ्च प्रक्षिप्य च *विंशतिर्भवन्ति* । *दीनारसतेरवच्च* । यथा पूर्वको दीनारो द्वितीयेन सह सतेरो भवति । तथा हि लोके एकदीनारमूल्येन द्वितीयं दीनारं दीनारमूल्यं वा तेन पूर्वकेण दीनारमूल्येन सहाधिकमपेक्ष्य कश्चिद् वक्ता भवेत्—दीनारसतेरो मया लब्ध इति । दीनारद्वयं मया लब्धमित्यर्थः । किमेवमेतदुपासकश्रामणेरभिक्षु*संवरा विरतिवृद्धियोगात्* प्राणातिपातादिविरतिषु तथैवावस्थितासु पुनर्नृत्यगीतविरत्यादीनां पूर्वासां विरतीनां वृद्धियोगादन्योन्य *उच्यन्ते* । अन्य उपासकसंवराच्छ्रामणेरसंवरः, श्रामणेरसंवराच्चान्यो भिक्षुसंवर इति एकदेशविशेषयोगादन्योन्यव्यवस्थेत्यर्थः । *आहोस्वित् पृथगेव ते सकला उपजायन्ते* । अन्याः प्राणातिपातादिविरतय उपासकस्य, ततोऽन्याः श्रामणेरस्य, ततोऽन्याश्च भिक्षोः—इत्येकस्मिन् भिक्षुसन्ताने *तिस्रः प्राणातिपातादिविरतयः* । एवमदत्ता-

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१. ०त्यागे०—का० । २. ०सतेर०—का० । ३. जायन्ते—का० ।

को नु तासां विशेषः ? निदानविशेषाद् विशेषः ।

कथं कृत्वा ? यथा यथा हि बहुतराणि शिक्षापदानि समादिसते, तथा तथा बहुतरेभ्यो मदप्रमादेभ्यो[1] निवर्तमानो बहुतरेभ्यः प्राणातिपातादीनां निदानेभ्यो निवर्तते, विरतीनां च निदानेषु प्रवर्तत इति निदानविशेषाद् विरतीनां विशेषः। एवं चासति भिक्षुसंवरं प्रत्याचक्षाणस्त्रीनपि संवरान् विजह्याद्, द्वयोरपि तत्रान्तर्भावात् । न चैतदिष्टम् । तस्मात् पृथगेव ते संवराः ।

ते चाविरोधिनः ॥ १४ ॥

ते च त्रयोऽपि सह वर्तन्ते । नोत्तरसंवरसमादानात् पूर्वकस्य त्यागः । मा भूत् भिक्षुसंवरपरित्यागादनुपासक एवेति ॥ १४ ॥

कथं चायमुपासको भवति, कथमुपवासस्थो यावद् भिक्षुः ?

पञ्चाष्टदशसर्वेभ्यो वर्ज्येभ्यो विरतिग्रहात् ।
उपासकोपवासस्थश्रमणोद्देशभिक्षुता ॥ १५ ॥

यथासंख्यमनुदेशो वेदितव्यः । पञ्चभ्यो वर्जनीयेभ्यो धर्मेभ्यो विरतिसमापादनादुपासकसंवरस्थो[2] भवति—प्राणातिपाताद्, अदत्तादानात्, काममिथ्याचारात्, मृषावादात्, सुरामैरेयमद्यपानाच्च ।

अष्टाभ्यो विरतिसमादानादुपवासस्थः—प्राणातिपाताद्, अदत्तादानाब्रह्मचर्यमृषावादमद्यपानेभ्यः, गन्धमाल्यविलेपननृत्यगीतवादित्राद्, उच्चशयनमहाशयनाद्, अकालभोजनाच्च ।

दानविरतयः । इत्येवमादि । एवं शेषा इति । नृत्यगीतविरत्यादयः।

मदप्रमादेभ्य इति । उच्चशयनादिमद्यपानादिभ्यः। बहुतरेभ्यः प्राणातिपातादीनां निदानेभ्य इति । उपासकाच्छ्रामणेरो बहुतरेभ्यः प्राणातिपातादिनिदानेभ्यो निवर्तते । तद्यथा—विकालभोजनं प्राणातिपातनिदानं भवेत्, तस्माच्छ्रामणेरो निवर्तते, नोपासक इत्येवमादि योज्यम् । एवं चासति । एवं च यदि न स्यादित्यर्थः। भिक्षुसंवरं प्रत्याचक्षाणस्त्यजन् त्रीनपि उपासकसंवरादीन् विजह्यात् । द्वयोरप्युपासकश्रामणेरसंवरयोरतत्र भिक्षुसंवरेऽन्तर्भावात् ॥ १४ ॥

विरतिसमापादनादिति । विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्तिविरतिरिति वक्ष्यति । समापादना-

१. मदप्रमादपदेभ्यः—का० । २. ०समादानाद्०—का० ।

दशभ्यो विरतिसमादानाच्छ्रामणेरो भवति—एभ्य एव, जातरूपरजतप्रतिग्रहाच्च । नृत्यगीतवादित्रगन्धमाल्यविलेपनं चात्र द्वयीकृत्य दश भवन्ति ।

सर्वेभ्य एव वर्जनीयेभ्यः कायवाक्कर्मभ्यः विरतिसमादानाद् भिक्षुरित्युच्यते ॥ १५ ॥

स एव प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः—

शीलं सुचरितं कर्म संवरश्चोच्यते,

विषमकर्मणां विरतिसमादानाच्छीलम्; शीतलत्वादिति निरुक्तिः । "सुखं शीलसमादानं कायो न परिदह्यते" ( ) इति गाथावचनात् । विद्वत्प्रशस्तत्वात् सुचरितम् । क्रियास्वभावत्वात् कर्म ।

ननु चाविज्ञप्तिरक्रियेत्युच्यते, सा कथं क्रिया भवति, न कुर्वन्ति तया समाचया लज्जिनः पापमित्यक्रियेत्युच्यते ?

सापि तु विज्ञप्तिचित्ताभ्यां क्रियत इति क्रिया भवति ।

क्रियाहेतुत्वात्, क्रियाफलत्वाच्चेत्यपरे । संवर इति कायवाचोः संवरणात् ।

एवं तावदविशेषेण प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः संशब्द्यते ।

पुनः ।

दिति । प्रतिसंस्थापनादित्यर्थः । पापकर्मणो हि सत्त्वेषु विषमं सम्प्रवर्तते ॥१५॥

सापि तु विज्ञप्तिचित्ताभ्यां क्रियत इति । विज्ञप्त्या च क्रियते प्रातिमोक्षसंवरसंगृहीता अविज्ञप्तिः, चित्तेन च क्रियते ध्यानानास्रवसंवरसंगृहीता अविज्ञप्तिः । समाधिना क्रियत इत्यर्थः । तदेवं क्रियत इति क्रियेति कर्मसाधनम् ।

क्रियाहेतुत्वादिति । क्रियाया हेतुत्वात् । संवरस्थो हि संवरपरिरक्षणार्थं क्रियां विज्ञप्तिलक्षणामारभते । क्रियाफलत्वाच्चेति । विज्ञप्तिलक्षणायाः क्रियायाः फलत्वादित्यर्थः । समाधिसम्भूता कथं क्रिया भवति ? समाधिजायाश्चेतनायाः फलत्वात् सापि क्रिया । प्रातिमोक्षसंवराधिकाद्वा । न तत्र चिन्ता[1] ।

एवं तावद् अविशेषेण प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः संशब्द्यत इति । आद्योऽपि क्षणो द्वितीयादयोऽपि च क्षणाः प्रातिमोक्षसंवर इत्युच्यते ।

१. चिन्ता—इति मुद्रितः पाठः ।

आद्ये विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती प्रातिमोक्षक्रियापथः ॥ १६ ॥

संवरसमादानस्य प्रथमे विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती प्रातिमोक्ष इत्युच्यते; पापस्य तेन प्रातिमोक्षणाद् । उत्सर्जनादित्यर्थः । स्वार्थे वृद्धिविधानाद् वैकृत-वैशसवत् ।

प्रातिमोक्षसंवर इत्यपि कायवाक्संवरणात् कर्मपथ इत्युच्यते; मौलसंगृहीतत्वात् ।

द्वितीयादिषु क्षणेषु प्रातिमोक्षसंवर एव, न प्रातिमोक्षः । पृष्ठं च न मौलः कर्मपथः ॥ १६ ॥

अथैषां संवराणां केन कः समन्वागतः ?

प्रातिमोक्षान्विता अष्टौ,

प्रातिमोक्षसंवरेणाष्टौ निकायाः समन्वागताः—भिक्षुः, भिक्षुणी यावदुपवासस्थोऽष्टमः ।

किं खलु बाह्यकानां समादानशीलं नास्ति ? अस्ति, न तु प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः । किं कारणम् ? नहि तदत्यन्तं पापस्य प्रतिमोक्षणाय संवर्तते; भवसन्निश्रितत्वात् ।

प्रातिमोक्षस्वभावस्वाख्यक्षण एव । तदर्थमाह—पुनः *आद्ये विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्ती प्रातिमोक्ष इत्युच्यते । पापस्य तेन प्रतिमोक्षणादिति ।* प्रथमेनैव क्षणेन पापं प्रतिमोक्ष्यते = *उत्सृज्यते । त्यज्यते* इत्यर्थः । प्रतिमोक्ष इति प्राप्ते प्रातिमोक्ष इति वचनं *स्वार्थे वृद्धिविधानात्* । स्वार्थे प्रत्यये कृते वृद्धिकरणादित्यर्थः । *वैकृतवैशसवत् । यथा* विकृतमेव वैकृतम्, विशसमेव मारणं वैशसम् । एवं प्रतिमोक्ष एव प्रातिमोक्ष इति ।

प्रातिमोक्षसंवर इत्यपीति । प्रातिमोक्षश्चासौ संवरश्च । *कायवाचोः संवरणार्थ* इत्यर्थः । *कर्मपथ इत्यप्युच्यत* इति । मौलः कर्मपथ इत्यर्थः । *द्वितीयादिषु प्रातिमोक्षसंवर एव ।* प्रातिमोक्षजातीयः, प्रातिमोक्षाद्वा जातः संवरः प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः । *न प्रातिमोक्षः ।* यस्मात् न तेन पापं प्रतिमोक्ष्यते; प्रथमक्षण एव प्रतिमोक्षितत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

अष्टावेव निकाया इत्यवधारणे पृच्छति—*किं खलु बाह्यकानामिति* विस्तरः । *समादानशीलमिति* विशेषणं शीलद्वैविध्यात् । द्विविधं हि शीलम्—समादानशीलम्, धर्मताप्रतिलम्भितं च । तत्र समादानशीलं यद् गृह्यते । इदं चेदं च न करिष्यामीति । धर्मताप्रतिलम्भिकम्—ध्यानसंवरः, अनास्रवसंवरश्च । *भवसन्निश्रितत्वादिति ।* मोक्षार्थिनामपि तेषां मिथ्यादृष्ट्याद्युपहतत्वात् । भवविशेष

ध्यानजेन तदन्वितः ।

ध्यानाद् ध्याने वा जातो ध्यानजः । यो ध्यानेन समन्वागतः, सोऽवश्यं ध्यानसंवरेण । सामन्तकमप्यत्र ध्यानं कृत्वोच्यते । यथा ग्रामसामन्तकमपि ग्राम इत्युच्यते—अस्त्यस्मिन् ग्रामे शालेयं क्षेत्रम्, अस्ति मैद्देयमिति ।

अनास्रवेणार्यसत्त्वाः,

आर्यपुद्गला अनास्रवेण संवरेण समन्वागताः । ते पुनः शैक्षाशैक्षाः । यदुक्तम्—"सहभूहेतावुच्यमाने द्वौ संवरौ चित्तानुवर्तिनौ" (   ) इति ।

कतमौ तौ ? एषामेव त्रयाणाम्

अन्त्यौ चित्तानुवर्तिनौ ॥ १७ ॥

ध्यानसंवरः, अनास्रवसंवरश्च । न प्रातिमोक्षसंवरः । किं कारणम् ? अन्यचित्ताचित्तकस्याप्यनुवृत्तेः ।

पुनस्तावेव ध्यानानास्रवसंवरौ प्रहाणसंवराख्यां लभेते ॥ १७ ॥

कस्यामवस्थायाम् ? इत्याह—

अनागम्ये प्रहाणाख्यौ तावानन्तर्यमार्गजौ ।

अनागम्ये तौ ध्यानानास्रवसंवरौ नवस्वानन्तर्यमार्गेषु 'प्रहाणसंवरौ' इत्युच्येते; ताभ्यां दौःशील्यस्य तत्समुत्थापकानां च क्लेशानां प्रहाणात् ।

एव च तेषां केषाञ्चिन्मोक्ष इति । भवसन्निश्रितमेव शीलम् । ततोऽस्ति तेषां समादानशीलम्, न *प्रातिमोक्षसंवर* इति ।

सामन्तकमप्यत्र ध्यानं कृत्वोच्यत इति । यस्मात् सामन्तकेऽपि ध्यानसंवरोऽनास्रवसंवरश्चेष्यते, तस्माद् ध्यानसामन्तकमप्यत्र ध्यानशब्देनोच्यत इतीष्यते । *अपिशब्दान्मौलमपि गृह्यत एव ।*

सहभूहेतावुच्यमान इति । "चेता द्वौ संवरौ तेषाम्" (अभि० को० २.५१) इत्यत्र । *त्रयाणामिति ।* प्रातिमोक्षसंवरध्यानसंवरानास्रवसंवराणाम् । *अन्यचित्ताचित्तकस्याप्यनुवृत्तेरिति ।* "विज्ञप्ताचित्तकस्यापि" (अभि० १.११) इति वचनात् ॥ १७ ॥

"अनागम्ये" इति ग्रहणं कामावचरस्यैव दौःशील्यस्य प्रतिपक्षत्वात् । *आनन्तर्यमार्गेष्विति ।* तेषां प्रहाणमार्गत्वात् । *तत्समुत्थापकानामिति ।* दौःशील्यसमुत्थापकानाम् ।

अत एव 'स्याद्ध्यानसंवरो न प्रहाणसंवरः' इति चतुष्कोटिकं क्रियते—प्रथमा कोटिरनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गवर्ज्यः सास्रवो ध्यानसंवरः, द्वितीया अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गेष्वनास्रवः, तृतीया अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गेषु सास्रवः, चतुर्थी अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गवर्ज्योऽनास्रवसंवरः।

एवं 'स्यादनास्रवसंवरो न प्रहाणसंवरः' इति चतुष्कोटिकं यथायोगं वेदितव्यम्।

यत्तर्हि भगवतोक्तम्—

"कायेन संवरः साधु साधु वाचाथ संवरः।

मनसा संवरः साधु साधु सर्वत्र संवरः॥" (   ) इति,

यच्चोक्तम्—"चक्षुरिन्द्रियेण संवरसंवृतो विहरति" (   ) इति,

एतौ मनइन्द्रियसंवरौ किंस्वभावौ? नैतावविज्ञप्तिशीलस्वभावौ। किं तर्हि?

सम्प्रज्ञानस्मृती द्वे तु मनइन्द्रियसंवरौ॥ १८॥

प्रत्येकं द्वित्वभावज्ञापनार्थं पुनर्द्विग्रहणम्, मा यथासंख्यं विज्ञायीति; मनःसंवरोऽपि स्मृतिसम्प्रज्ञानस्वभाव इति। इन्द्रियसंवरोऽपि॥ १८॥

अत एवेति। यस्मादनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गेष्वेव तद्व्यवस्थानम्। तस्माच्चतुःकोटिकं क्रियते। *प्रथमा कोटिरनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गवर्ज्यो ध्यानसंवरः।* अनागम्यभूमिकेषु विमुक्तिप्रयोगविशेषमार्गेषु मौलप्रथमध्यानादिषु वा चतुर्थाद् ध्यानादानन्तर्यविमुक्तिप्रयोगविशेषमार्गेषु यो ध्यानसंवरः। अयं ध्यानसंवरः, न प्रहाणसंवरः; तेन दौःशील्यस्य तत्समुत्थापकानां च क्लेशानामप्रहाणात्। *द्वितीया—अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गेष्वनास्रवसंवरः।* अयं प्रहाणसंवरः; तेनैव दौःशील्यादिप्रहाणात्। न ध्यानसंवरः; अनास्रवत्वात्। *तृतीया—अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गेषु सास्रवसंवरः।* अयं प्रहाणसंवरश्च; तेन दौःशील्यादिप्रहाणात्। ध्यानसंवरश्च; सास्रवसमाधिजत्वात्। *चतुर्थी—अनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गवर्ज्योऽनास्रवसंवरः।* अयं न ध्यानसंवरः; आस्रवत्वात्। नापि प्रहाणसंवरस्तेन दौःशील्याद्यप्रहाणात्। स पुनस्तथैवानागम्यभूमिकेषु विमुक्तिप्रयोगविशेषमार्गेषु विस्तरेण योऽनास्रवसंवरः। संवरनियमेनैवमुक्तम्। अन्यथाप्यन्ये धर्मा वक्तव्याः स्युः।

एवं स्यादनास्रवसंवरो न प्रहाणसंवर इति चतुष्कोटिकम्। प्रथमा कोटिरनागम्यानन्तर्यमार्गवर्ज्योऽनास्रवसंवरः।

मनःसंवरोऽपि स्मृतिसम्प्रज्ञानस्वभावः। इन्द्रियसंवरोऽपि स्मृतिसम्प्रज्ञानस्व-

इदं विचार्यते—कः कतमया विज्ञप्त्या, अविज्ञप्त्या वा कियन्तं कालं समन्वागत इति? तत्र—

प्रातिमोक्षस्थितो नित्यमत्यागाद् वर्तमानया।

अविज्ञप्त्यान्वितः,

यः प्रातिमोक्षसंवरस्थः पुद्गल उक्तः, स यावत् तामविज्ञप्तिं न त्यजति तावत् तया वर्तमानया नित्यं समन्वागतः।

पूर्वात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतया॥ १९॥

प्रथमात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतयापि समन्वागतः। 'अत्यागात्' इति सर्वत्राधिकृतं वेदितव्यम्॥ १९॥

यथा प्रातिमोक्षसंवरस्थ उक्तः,

तथैवासंवरस्थोऽपि,

असंवरस्थोऽपि यावदसंवरं न त्यजति तावन्नित्यमविज्ञप्त्या वर्तमानया एव[1] समन्वागतो भवति[1]। क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतयापि।

ध्यानसंवरवान् सदा।

अतीताजातया,

ध्यानसंवरस्य लाभी नित्यमतीतानागतया[2] अविज्ञप्त्या[2] समन्वागतः;

भाव इति। *द्वित्वभावज्ञापनार्थं द्विग्रहणम्;* द्विवचननिर्देशादेव हि द्वित्वसिद्धिः। कथं पुनर्गम्यते—एतावेवंस्वभावाविति? आगमात्। "अन्यतरा किल देवता भिक्षुं विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणि विचारयन्तमवोचत्—भिक्षो भिक्षो व्रणं मा कार्षीरिति? भिक्षुराह—पिधास्यामि देवते। देवताह—कुम्भमात्रं भिक्षो व्रणं कृत्वा केन पिधास्यसि? भिक्षुराह—स्मृत्या देवते पिधास्यामि, सम्प्रजन्येन वा" (   ) इति॥ १८॥

स यावत्तामविज्ञप्तिं न त्यजतीति। शिक्षानिक्षेपादि।

"पूर्वात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतया" इति। प्रथमे क्षणे वर्तमानयैव समन्वागतो भवतीत्युक्तं भवति॥ १९॥

"ध्यानसंवरवान् सदा अतीताजातया" इति। ध्यानसंवरवान् किं पृथग्जनोऽथार्यः? उभय इत्याह; अविशेषित्वात्। सो*ऽतीतानागतया अविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतः।*

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१. का॰ पुस्तके नास्ति। २–२. ॰नागताभ्यामविज्ञप्तिभ्यां—का॰।

अत्यागात्[1] । प्रथमे हि क्षणे स जन्मान्तरत्यक्तं ध्यानसंवरमतीतं लभते ।

आर्यस्तु प्रथमे नाभ्यतीतया ॥ २० ॥

आर्यस्तु पुद्गलोऽप्येवमनास्रवया । अयं तु विशेषः—स **प्रथमे तु**[2] क्षणे **नाभ्यतीतया**[3] समन्वागतः; मार्गस्य पूर्वमनुत्पादितत्वात् ॥ २० ॥

समाहितार्यमार्गस्थौ तौ युक्तौ वर्तमानया ।

तौ ध्यानानास्रवसंवरान्वितौ समाहितार्यमार्गसमापन्नौ **वर्तमानया**

किंलक्षणया ? ध्यानसंवराधिकाराद् ध्यानसंवरलक्षणयेति गम्यते । *स जन्मान्तरत्यक्तमिति* । उदाहरणप्रदर्शनपरमेतत् । इदं जन्म त्यक्तमपि हि गृह्यते ।

"आर्यस्तु प्रथमेनाभ्यतीतया" इति । आर्यः सदातीताजातया अविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतः । किंलक्षणया—अनास्रवया । आर्याधिकारात् । अत एवाह—*आर्यपुद्गलोऽप्येवमनास्रवयेति* । *अयं तु विशेष* इति । तु-शब्दार्थं दर्शयति । स च भिन्नक्रमः । *प्रथमे तु क्षणे* दुःखधर्मज्ञानक्षान्तिक्षणे । *नाभ्यतीतया* अविज्ञप्त्या *समन्वागत* इत्यर्थः । कस्मात् ? अनादिमति संसारे *मार्गस्य पूर्वमनुत्पादितत्वात्* ।

ननु च फलप्राप्तिकाले, इन्द्रियसञ्चारकालेऽपि वा पूर्वमार्गत्यागे नैवातीतया अविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागम इष्यते ? एवं तर्हि स चापि फलमार्गस्य प्रथमक्षणो भवति । तत्र नातीतयाऽविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतो भवति; फलमार्गस्य पूर्वमनुत्पादितत्वादिति व्याख्यातव्यम् ।

आचार्यवसुमित्रस्त्वस्य चोद्यस्य परिहारमाह—अनास्रवसंवरोऽत्र प्रकृतः । स च दुःखधर्मज्ञानक्षान्तिकाल एव लब्धः । अतस्तेन प्रथमे क्षणे नातीतेन समन्वागतो द्वितीयादिष्वतीतानागतेनेति । ऊर्ध्वं तु यो मार्गान्तरलाभस्तत्रानास्रवसंवरसादृश्यमस्तीति न तदुच्यते इति ।

तदिह 'सादृश्यमस्ति' इति न बुध्यामहे—किं सास्रवसंवरोऽस्तीत्यपेदमेद-मुच्यते, आहोस्विदनास्रवोऽस्तीति ? यदि सास्रवोऽस्तीत्यभिप्रेयते ? दुःखधर्मज्ञानक्षान्तिकालेऽपि सोऽस्तीति नातीतया समन्वागत इति प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । अथ फलप्राप्तिकालेऽतीतानास्रवसंवरोऽस्तीत्यभिप्रेयते ? विहीनः स कथमस्तीति वक्तुमिति चिन्त्योऽस्याभिप्रायः ॥ २० ॥

"समाहितार्यमार्गस्थौ" इति । समाहितमार्गस्थश्च लौकिकसमाहितमार्गस्थ आर्यमार्गस्थश्च *समाहितार्यमार्गस्थौ* । ध्यानानास्रवसंवरान्वितावित्यर्थः । अत्र चार्यमार्गाभिरूढ आर्यमार्गस्थो वेदितव्यः, नोत्स्थन्यायेन । तद् यथा—यो

1. अत्यागात्—का० । 2. का० पुस्तके नास्ति । 3. नातीतया—का० ।

अविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतौ यथाक्रमम्, न तु व्युत्थितौ ।

संवरासंवरस्थानां तावदेष वृत्तान्तः ॥

अथेदानीं मध्यस्थस्य ?

मध्यस्थस्यास्ति चेदादौ मध्यया,

यो नैवसंवरनासंवरे[1] स्थितः स मध्यस्थः । तस्य नावश्यमविज्ञप्तिरस्ति । यस्य त्वस्ति दौःशील्यशीलाङ्गादिसंगृहीता स **आदौ मध्यया** समन्वागतः ।

वर्तमाना ह्यविज्ञप्तिरतीतानागतयोर्मध्याद्—

ऊर्ध्वं द्विकालया ॥ २१ ॥

प्रथमात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतया वर्तमानया च । अत्यागादिति[2] वर्तते ॥२१॥

किमसंवरस्थः कदाचित् कुशलया विज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतो भवति, संवरस्थो वा पुनरकुशलया भवति ? भवन् कदा कियन्तं वा कालम् ? इत्याह—

नावमभिरूढः स नौस्थः । एवं य आर्यमार्गमभिरूढः समापन्नः स आर्यमार्गस्थः । अन्यथा ह्यार्यमार्गसमन्वितोऽप्यार्यमार्गस्थ इति कृत्वा प्रकृतिस्थोऽप्यार्यो *वर्तमानया* अनास्रवया *अविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागत* इति प्राप्नोति ।

अन्यः पुनरेवं प्रसङ्गं परिहरन् व्याचष्टे—एकशेषोऽत्र क्रियते । समाहितश्च समाहितार्यमार्गश्च मार्गौ समाहितार्यमार्गौ, तयोः स्थितौ *समाहितार्यमार्गस्थौ । तौ यथाक्रमं वर्तमानया* ध्यानसंवराविज्ञप्त्या, अनास्रवसंवराविज्ञप्त्या च *समन्वागतौ । न तु व्युत्थितौ* । न तु तन्मार्गव्युत्थितौ तथा । वर्तमानया समन्वागतौ; तस्याः चित्तानुपरिवर्तनीयत्वात् । एवं व्याख्यायते—यच्चोदितमाचार्यसङ्घभद्रेण । कथमविज्ञप्तेः प्रत्युत्पन्नता आर्यमार्गस्थवचनादेव गम्यते, तत्समापन्न एवायम् । न पुनस्तत्समन्वागमवचनप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् ? न; ध्यानाधिकारात् । तत्राविज्ञप्त्यभावाच्च ।

यो नैवसंवरनासंवरस्थितः स मध्यस्थ इति । यो न भिक्ष्वादिः । न च कैवर्तादिः । *स मध्यस्थः । दौःशील्यशीलाङ्गादिसंगृहीतेति* । *दौःशील्यं* प्राणातिपातादि । *शीलाङ्गं* प्राणातिपातविरत्यादि । यच्चसंवरनासंवरसंगृहीतम् । *आदि*शब्देन स्तूपवन्दनाखटचपेटादिक्रियाविज्ञप्त्यादि गृह्यते ॥ २१ ॥

असंवरसंवरस्थौ पुद्गलावकुशल-कुशलधर्मप्रतिघितौ इत्यनयोर्विपर्ययमसम्भावयन् पृच्छति—*किमसंवरस्थ* इति विस्तरः ।

1. नैव संवरे नासंवरे—का० । 2. अत्यागा०—का० ।

असंवरस्थः शुभयाऽशुभया संवरे स्थितः ।
अविज्ञप्त्यान्वितो यावत् प्रसादक्लेशवेगवान् ॥ २२ ॥

येन प्रसादवेगेनासंवरस्थस्य कुशलाविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते स्तववन्दनादिक्रियां कुर्वतः, येन च क्लेशवेगेन संवरस्थस्याकुशलाविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते वधबन्धनताडनादिक्रियां कुर्वतः; तौ यावदनुवर्तेते तावत्ते अप्यविज्ञप्ती । स आद्ये क्षणे वर्तमानयैवाविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतो भवति । अन्येष्वतीतयाऽपि ॥ २२ ॥

अविज्ञप्त्यधिकारः समाप्तः ॥

विज्ञप्त्या तु पुनः सर्वे कुर्वन्तो मध्ययान्विताः ।

सर्वे संवरासंवरमध्यस्था यावद् विज्ञप्तिं कुर्वन्ति तावत् तया वर्तमानया समन्वागताः ।

अतीतया क्षणादूर्ध्वमात्यागात्,

प्रथमात् क्षणादूर्ध्वमात्यागादतीतया विज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतो भवति ।

नास्त्यजातया ॥ २३ ॥

अनागतया तु विज्ञप्त्या न कश्चित् समन्वागतः ॥ २३ ॥

निवृतानिवृताभ्यां च नातीताभ्यां समन्वितः ।

अतीताभ्यामपि निवृतानिवृताव्याकृताभ्यां विज्ञप्तिभ्यां न कश्चित् समन्वागतः । दुर्बलस्य हि धर्मस्य प्राप्तिरपि दुर्बला नानुबन्धीभवति ।

किंकृतं तस्या दौर्बल्यम् ? चित्तकृतम् ।

चित्तस्यापि तर्हि निवृताव्याकृतस्य मा भूत् ? नैतदेवम्; जडा हि विज्ञप्तिः, परतन्त्रा च । न चैवं चित्तम् । सा हि विज्ञप्तिर्दुर्बलेनोत्थापिता दुर्बलतरा भवति ।

असंवरस्थ इत्युक्तम् । कोऽयमसंवरो नाम ?

असंवरो दुश्चरितं दौःशील्यं कर्म तत्पथः ॥ २४ ॥

असंवरस्येमे पर्यायशब्दाः । तत्र कायवाचोरसंवरणादसंवरः । सद्भिः कुत्सितत्वादनिष्टफलत्वाद् दुश्चरितम् । शीलविपक्षाद् दौःशील्यम् । कायवाक्कर्मत्वात् कर्म । मौलसंगृहीतत्वात् कर्मपथः ।

स्याद्विज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतो नाविज्ञप्त्येति चतुष्कोटिकम् ॥ २४ ॥

तत्र तावत्—

विज्ञप्त्यैवान्वितः कुर्वन्मध्यस्थो मृदुचेतनः ।

मृद्व्या चेतनया कुशलमकुशलं वा कुर्वन्नैवसंवरनासंवरस्थितो विज्ञप्त्यैव समन्वागतो भवति, नाविज्ञप्त्या प्रागेवाव्याकृतम्[1], अन्यत्रौपधिकपुण्यक्रियावस्तुकर्मपथेभ्यः ।

तौ यावदनुवर्तेते इति । प्रसादक्लेशवेगौ । अन्येष्वतीतयापीति । द्वितीयक्षणादिषु अतीतया ॥ २२ ॥

"क्षणादूर्ध्वमात्यागाद्" इति । यो यस्यास्त्यागस्तस्मादात्यागात् तयातीतया विज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतः । कथम् ? संवरलक्षणायास्तावद् विज्ञप्तेस्त्यागः शिक्षानिक्षेपादिभिः । तस्मादात्यागादनया अतीतया विज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतः । असंवरलक्षणायाः संवरसमादानादिभिस्त्यागः, तस्मादात्यागादनया समन्वागतः । नैवसंवरनासंवरलक्षणायाः प्रसादक्लेशवेगच्छेदादिभिस्त्यागः, तस्मादात्यागादनया समन्वागत इति । यो हि संवराद्यविज्ञप्तिसमन्वागतः सोऽवश्यं मौलकर्मपथस्वभावया क्षणादूर्ध्वमतीतयाविज्ञप्त्या समन्वागतः ।

अनागतया तु विज्ञप्त्या न कश्चित् समन्वागत इति । चित्ताननुपरिवर्तनीयत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

चित्तस्यापीति । चित्तस्यापि तर्हि निवृताव्याकृतस्य मा भूत् प्राप्तिः । अनुबन्धिनी मा भूदित्यर्थः । कस्माद् ? इत्याह–जडा हि विज्ञप्तिः । अनालम्बनत्वात् । परतन्त्रा च । चित्तपरतन्त्रत्वात् । न चैवं चित्तमिति । न जडम्, न परतन्त्रं चेत्यर्थः । कस्मात् ? तद्विपर्ययात् । सा दुर्बलेन निवृताव्याकृतेन चित्तेनोत्थापिता दुर्बलतरा भवतीति ।

मौलसंगृहीतत्वादिति । चेतनायाः तदर्थत्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

"विज्ञप्त्यैवान्वितः कुर्वन् मध्यस्थो मृदुचेतनः" इति । मध्यस्थग्रहणं संवरासंवरस्थनिरासार्थम् । संवरासंवरस्था हि विज्ञप्त्यविज्ञप्तिभ्यामवश्यं समन्वागताः । मृदुचेतनग्रहणं तीव्रचेतननिरासार्थम् । तीव्रचेतनया[2] हि विज्ञप्तिं कुर्वन् विज्ञप्तिं समुत्थापयेत् । प्रागेवाव्याकृतमिति । मृद्व्या चेतनया प्रागेवाव्याकृतं कुर्वन् । यत्र हि मृद्व्या चेतनया कुशलमकुशलं वा कुर्वन् नैवसंवरनासंवरे स्थितो विज्ञप्त्यैव समन्वागतो भवति; अविज्ञप्तेरनुत्पादात् । प्रागेवाव्याकृतं कुर्वन् सुतरां विज्ञप्त्यैवासौ समन्वागतः, नाविज्ञप्त्या; अविज्ञप्त्युत्पादाशङ्काया अभावात् । अन्यत्रेति विस्तरः । अन्यत्र सप्तभ्य औपधिकेभ्यः पुण्यक्रियावस्तुभ्यः । कर्मपथेभ्यश्च प्राणातिपातादिभ्यः । तत्र ह्यव्याकृतमपि कुर्वंश्च विज्ञप्त्या

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१. प्रागेवाव्याकृते—का० ।
२. ०चेतना—मुद्रितः पाठः ।

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